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Abstract
The central aim of this thesis is to identify a route to achieve 60% carbon savings in the UK 
domestic sector by 2050. This has led to two key questions:
• Is a strategy of relying largely on improvements in energy efficiency likely to achieve 
the required savings?
• If not, could personal carbon rations offer an alternative route?
To answer the first question, both the past record and future projections of savings from energy 
efficiency are investigated. Thirty years of energy efficiency improvements have led to an 
increase of a third in final energy use, due to a contemporaneous increase in demand for energy 
services. A bottom-up energy model shows that even modest social and behavioural changes 
could lead to a future increase in energy consumption of 23% by 2050. In combination with 
these demand increases, even maximum implementation of energy efficiency measures could 
only deliver a 17% saving. Policies for improving energy efficiency do nothing to restrain 
demand for energy services, and this makes it very unlikely they, alone, can deliver 60% carbon 
savings by 2050.
This thesis proposes that personal carbon rationing, for household and personal transport 
energy, would provide a framework for guaranteed and equitable carbon reductions, within a 
context of global carbon reductions. Each person would get an equal ration which would reduce 
over time. Equal carbon rations would not affect everyone equally because emissions currently 
vary considerably between groups and individuals. Personal carbon emissions for 32 case study 
individuals varied by a factor of 12. Therefore a variety of responses to rationing will be 
required, and energy efficiency will remain an important strategy within the rationing 
framework. It is concluded that personal carbon rations have considerable promise for achieving 
60% savings by 2050.
2
Acknowledgements
First of all I would like to sincerely thank my supervisor, Professor Tadj Oreszczyn, for his 
encouragement, constructive advice and helpful support throughout my time of study, and 
particularly for the ‘downhill slope’ metaphor after I had completed my first draft.
Working with Mayer Hillman on writing a book in parallel with my PhD research was a great 
experience, his passion and enthusiasm for taking effective action on climate change has been 
inspirational, and I have gained from his great knowledge of the field.
Thanks are also due to all the people who filled in carbon audit forms to help with my research, 
and special thanks to my Mum who persuaded and helped a number of friends and family 
members to take part.
I am grateful to my whole family for moral and practical support during my return to student 
life, and to my Dad for the laptop.
Finally, I would like to thank my husband, Richard, for his insightful comments, generous 
enthusiasm and for patiently listening to far too much energy and climate change talk over the 
past three years. This PhD is dedicated to him.
3
Table of contents
Abstract............................................................................................................................................. 2
Acknowledgements..........................................................................................................................3
Table of contents..............................................................................................................................4
List of tables.....................................................................................................................................  7
List of figures...................................................................................................................................9
Glossary............................................................................................................................................ 11
Abbreviations...................................................................................................................................13
Chapter 1: Introduction..................................................................................................................14
1.1 Chapter overview.............................................................................................................14
1.2 Context: Insufficient action in the face of climate change.......................................... 14
1.3 Scope and aim s................................................................................................................20
1.4 Thesis structure................................................................................................................21
1.5 Methodological overview...............................................................................................23
1.6 Conventions in this thesis...............................................................................................24
1.7 Note on joint research.....................................................................................................25
Chapter 2: Energy use, energy policy and carbon dioxide emissions...................................... 26
2.1 Chapter overview.............................................................................................................26
2.2 Methodology.................................................................................................................... 26
2.3 Energy use overview....................................................................................................... 27
2.4 UK carbon emissions...................................................................................................... 32
2.5 Energy and climate change policy overview................................................................38
2.6 Energy policy for the domestic sector........................................................................... 42
2.7 Summary and conclusions..............................................................................................45
Chapter 3: Energy and carbon dioxide emissions modelling and future scenarios................. 48
3.1 Chapter overview.............................................................................................................48
3.2 Methodology.................................................................................................................... 48
3.3 Approaches to thinking about the future....................................................................... 49
3.4 Top-down projections of energy use..............................................................................51
3.5 Bottom-up proj ections of energy use.............................................................................55
3.6 Scenarios...........................................................................................................................61
3.7 Comparison of modelling methods................................................................................65
3.8 The problems of modelling savings from energy efficiency...................................... 68
3.9 Summary and conclusions..............................................................................................74
Chapter 4 -  Modelling energy use and carbon dioxide emissions.............................................76
4.1 Chapter overview.............................................................................................................76
4.2 Methodology.................................................................................................................... 77
4
4.3 Johnston’s model...........................................................................................................78
4.4 Analysis of Johnston’s projections............................................................................... 82
4.5 Replicating Johnston’s model....................................................................................... 84
4.6 Variations to data inputs to Business as Usual scenario..............................................86
4.7 Johnston’s technological savings future -  DJ-DS.......................................................95
4.8 Investigating alternative lifestyle and behavioural futures.........................................100
4.9 Supply side variations.................................................................................................... 119
4.10 Summary and conclusions............................................................................................. 124
Chapter 5: Introducing a new policy: personal carbon rations....................................................127
5.1 Chapter overview............................................................................................................ 127
5.2 Methodology................................................................................................................... 128
5.3 Description of personal carbon rations.........................................................................129
5.4 Literature review............................................................................................................. 137
5.5 The international context for carbon saving................................................................ 140
5.6 Experience of rationing in the U K ................................................................................ 148
5.7 Carbon rationing as a practical policy........................................................................... 152
5.8 Wider implications of carbon rationing........................................................................157
5.9 Summary and conclusions..............................................................................................159
Chapter 6 - Analysis of personal carbon rations........................................................................... 161
6.1 Chapter overview............................................................................................................ 161
6.2 Methodology....................................................................................................................161
6.3 Would rationing be equitable in practice?....................................................................162
6.4 Case studies of personal carbon emissions...................................................................167
6.5 Other perspectives on individual carbon emissions.....................................................175
6.6 The effects of carbon rationing on different groups within society........................... 176
6.7 Objections to carbon rationing.......................................................................................187
6.8 Carbon taxation................................................................................................................191
6.9 Summary and conclusions..............................................................................................196
Chapter 7 -  Discussion and conclusions........................................................................................198
7.1 Chapter overview............................................................................................................ 198
7.2 Key research findings.....................................................................................................198
7.3 Reflection on methodology............................................................................................ 203
7.4 Limitations of this research............................................................................................205
7.5 Recommendations for further research.........................................................................205
7.6 Recommendations for policy makers............................................................................207
7.7 Original contribution to knowledge.............................................................................. 209
7.8 Were the objectives of my thesis achieved?.......................... '....................................210
References.........................................................................................................................................212
5
Appendix 1: Comparisons of future-oriented house design.........................................................232
Appendix 2: BREDEM based model............................................................................................. 235
Appendix 3: Summary of TF scenarios..........................................................................................239
Appendix 4: Modelling solar water heating.................................................................................. 242
Appendix 5: Demolition rates, past and present............................................................................246
Appendix 6: Embodied energy in UK housing.............................................................................250
Appendix 7: Carbon audit form.......................................................................................................253
Appendix 8: An example of carbon audit feedback..................................................................... 256
Appendix 9: Full details of carbon audits..................................................................................... 259
Appendix 10: Household expenditure on energy..........................................................................261
Appendix 11: Lists of questions and comments raised at different meetings............................. 262
Appendix 12: A strategy for further investigation of carbon rations..........................................267
6
List of tables
Table 1.1: Summary of methodologies used in each thesis chapter............................................24
Table 2.1: Final energy use and characteristics of GB housing stock, 1970 and 2001 .............32
Table 2.2: Carbon intensity of the UK’s major energy sources...................................................35
Table 2.3: Measures and programmes to deliver carbon savings to 2010 in the domestic sector 
........................................................................................................................................... 43
Table 3.1: Recent bottom-up energy studies and the potential for savings identified............... 56
Table 3.2: Comparison of projections by Leach et al and Olivier et al with actual values 59
Table 3.3: Carbon dioxide emissions, preliminary estimate, UK, 2050....................................  62
Table 3.4: Influence of built form on heating energy requirements for new properties of the
same size........................................................................................................................... 73
Table 4.1: Comparison between TF and DJ model outputs, business as usual projection 85
Table 4.2: Comparison between different methods of calculating water heating energy use,
business as usual scenario............................................................................................... 86
Table 4.3: Mean internal temperature (°C) of the notional dwellings under all scenarios in
Johnston’s model..............................................................................................................87
Table 4.4: Mean internal temperature (°C) in TF-BAU...............................................................89
Table 4.5: Estimated floor areas of the English housing stock, 1996 and 2001 data................90
Table 4.6: Possible future building regulation standards for new housing.................................91
Table 4.7: Key technologies in DJ-DS and their uptake in pre- and post-1996 housing 96
Table 4.8: Effects of internal temperature scenarios on UK household annual energy
consumption......................................................................................................................107
Table 4.9: Effects of hot water demand scenarios on UK household annual energy consumption
 110
Table 4.10: Effects of lights, appliances and cooking scenarios on UK household annual energy
consumption......................................................................................................................111
Table 4.11: Effects of household size scenarios on UK household annual energy consumption
............................................................................................................................................113
Table 4.12: Effects of demolition rates on UK household energy consumption....................... 115
Table 4.13: Fuels used to generate electricity, UK, 1990 and 2003 (fuel input basis) 121
Table 4.14: Variations in carbon intensity of electricity, and their effect on carbon savings under 
DJ-DS................................................................................................................................123
7
Table 5.1: Estimated UK carbon rations for personal energy use per capital to 2050 under
different reduction scenarios...........................................................................................135
Table 5.2: Comparison of carbon rationing-like proposals..........................................................140
Table 5.3: Per capita carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels, various countries, 2000.... 141 
Table 5.4: Opportunities for adapting existing energy policies under a carbon rationing
framework......................................................................................................................... 155
Table 6.1: Factors for translating travel distances into carbon emissions................................ 169
Table 6.2: Comparison of lowest and highest values from case study individuals.................. 171
Table 6.3: Comparison of sample characteristics with UK averages.......................................... 172
Table 6.4: Author’s changing annual household carbon emissions between different properties
............................................................................................................................................ 175
Table 6.5: Average price and carbon intensity of gas, electricity and motor fuels, UK, 2003 179 
Table 6.6: Scale effects of household size on the use of domestic energy (one-person household
= 100), England, 1996...................................................................................................  182
Table 6.7: Greenhouse gas emissions per person by age of head of household, UK, 2001..... 185
Table 6.8: Characteristics which influence personal carbon emissions......................................186
Table 6.9: Summary of comparison between carbon rations and carbon taxation.....................194
Table 7.1: Arguments for and against the proposition that 60% carbon savings can be achieved 
by 2050 largely through improvements in energy efficiency..................................... 200
List of figures
Figure 1.1: Overview of the thesis structure................................................................................. 21
Figure 2.1: UK total annual primary and final energy use by fuel, 1970 and 2003..................28
Figure 2.2: Annual final energy use in the UK by sector, 1970-2003.......................................30
Figure 2.3: UK carbon dioxide emissions, 1970-2003............................................................... 34
Figure 2.4: UK total carbon emissions and carbon equivalent emissions including international
air travel, MtCe, 1990-2003........................................................................................... 36
Figure 3.1: Various DTI projections for annual final energy consumption in the UK domestic
sector up to 2010 /2020.................................................................................................. 53
Figure 3.2: Annual final energy consumption in the UK domestic sector, actual figure 1980-
2003 and three DTI projections up to 2010/2020......................................................... 54
Figure 3.3: Comparison of projections for domestic energy sector UK, 1975-2025, with actual
energy use 1975-2003..................................................................................................... 59
Figure 3.4: Foresight environmental scenarios for the U K .........................................................62
Figure 3.5: IPCC scenarios for energy use and carbon dioxide emissions, showing carbon
concentrations in the atmosphere by 2100...................................................................63
Figure 4.1: Structure of Johnston’s model.....................................................................................78
Figure 4.2: Projected annual carbon emissions UK domestic sector, Johnston’s scenarios, 1996-
2050.................................................................................................................................. 81
Figure 4.3: Actual and projected annual final energy use, UK domestic sector, 1970-2050... 83 
Figure 4.4: Comparison of DJ-BAU projections, actual energy use and external temperature,
1996-2003, UK domestic sector.....................................................................................84
Figure 4.5: Internal temperature monitored (in living rooms) and estimated, and external winter
temperature, 1970-2001.................................................................................................. 88
Figure 4.6: Comparison of DJ-BAU and TF-BAU 1996-2050 and actual energy consumption
1970-2003, UK domestic sector.................................................................................... 92
Figure 4.7: Low and high energy scenarios, UK domestic sector, 1996-2050.......................... 117
Figure 4.8: Low and high energy scenarios combined with DJ-DS, UK domestic sector, 1996-
2050.........................................................................................................   118
Figure 4.9: Carbon intensity of electricity, UK, 1990-2003 and projections to 2010...............120
9
Figure 5.1: Percentage of UK annual carbon equivalent emissions (including international air
travel) by sector, 2001 .....................................................................................................132
Figure 5.2: Percentage of UK carbon equivalent emissions (including international air travel) by
sector -  with transport split into personal and non-personal, 2001...........................  133
Figure 5.3: Historical and future carbon emissions under C&C (shown gross and per capita) for 
a maximum of 450ppmv atmospheric concentration achieved by 2100, with per capita
emissions converging to equality achieved by 2030....................................................144
Figure 5.4: Illustration of a possible future carbon allowance card............................................153
Figure 6.1: Internal temperature achievable on an average carbon ration for gas and electricity
use in the average pre-96 dwelling, 1996..................................................................... 163
Figure 6.2: An average carbon allowance can lead to very different levels of energy
consumption and energy services...................................................................................164
Figure 6.3: Individual annual carbon equivalent emissions by source, UK, 2003.....................171
Figure 6.4: Expenditure per person per week on domestic energy and personal private transport
fuels by household income deciles, 2002/03, U K ........................................................ 178
Figure 6.5: UK average weekly carbon emissions per person from travel by car and domestic
gas and electricity use, by household income decile, 2002/03...................................  179
Figure 6.6: UK average weekly carbon emissions per person from private transport, gas and
electricity use, and estimate air travel emissions by household income decile, 2002/03
 181
Figure 6.7: UK domestic sector annual energy consumption per pre-1996 and post-1996
household, DJ-BAU and DJ-DS, 1996-2050................................................................184
Figure 7.1: Overview of thesis structure..................... 199
10
Glossary
Carbon equivalent or Ce is a unit into which greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide are 
converted so that they can be compared.
Combi boiler is a boiler with a second heat exchanger which works as an instantaneous water 
heater.
Energy services are the actual services for which energy is used, e.g. heating a given amount of 
space to a standard temperature for a period of time.
Final energy, also known as delivered energy, is the energy consumed by final users. It is 
therefore net of fuel industry own use and conversion, transmission and distribution losses, but 
includes conversion losses of final users. It is the energy use as metered at the doorstep of a 
building. This is the measure of energy which will be most commonly used in this thesis.
Household energy use, also known as domestic energy use, is the energy used within 
households for space and water heating, lighting, cooking and appliances. It does not include 
personal transport energy use or the embodied energy contained within household goods.
Primary electricity is that obtained other than from fossil fuel sources, e.g. nuclear, hydro, 
wind and other non-thermal renewables. For electricity not generated from fossil fuels or other 
combustible fuels, conventions are needed to define primary energy content. For electricity 
generated from hydro and wind, primary energy equals final energy. For nuclear energy, 
primary energy is defined as the heat in the steam at the nuclear plant, before it is transformed 
into electricity (with an average efficiency of 38.05% in 2003 (DTI 2004a)).
Primary energy is a measure of the energy content of primary fuels plus primary electricity. 
Primary fuels are those obtained directly from natural sources, e.g. coal, oil and natural gas. 
Primary energy includes energy used or lost in the conversion of primary fuels to secondary 
fuels (for example in power stations), energy lost in the distribution of fuels (for example in 
transmission lines) and energy conversion losses by final users.
Radiative forcing is the change in average net radiation at the top of the lower atmosphere 
which occurs because of a change in the concentration of a greenhouse gas or because of some 
other change in the overall climate system. A positive radiative forcing tends on average to 
warm the earth’s surface and a negative radiative forcing tends on average to cool the surface.
Useful energy is that energy available after deduction of the losses incurred when final users 
convert energy supplied into space or process heat, motive power, light or other energy services
U-value expresses the rate of thermal conduction across a complete building element. Thus U- 
value is a measure of insulating performance, where lower numbers indicate greater resistance 
to heat transfer, i.e. better insulation. It is measured in W/m2K.
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Abbreviations
BRE Building Research Establishment
DEFRA Department for Environment, Food and Regional Affairs
DETR Department o f Environment, Transport and the Regions
DfT Department for Transport
DJ-BAU David Johnston's Business as Usual scenario
DJ-DS David Johnston’s Demand Side scenario
DTI Department o f Trade and Industry
IEA International Energy Agency
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
MtC Millions of tonnes of carbon dioxide, measured as carbon
MtCe Millions of tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent, measured as carbon
ODPM Office of the Deputy Prime Minister
SDC Sustainable Development Commission
TF-BAU Tina Fawcett’s Business as Usual scenario
TF-HighE Tina Fawcett’s High Energy scenario
TF-LowE Tina Fawcett’s Low Energy scenario
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Chapter overview
This chapter provides the context for undertaking the thesis research. The importance of climate 
change as a global environmental problem is established. The current and expected future 
effects in the UK and world-wide are summarised. The global response to the threat of further 
climate change is outlined, and this is contrasted with the climate change science indicating the 
scale of action required. Following this, the aims of the thesis are described and the scope is 
established. A chapter-by-chapter summary and thesis overview diagram clarifies the overall 
structure and direction. Finally a methodological overview of the thesis is presented, explaining 
the research approaches taken overall and in each chapter.
1.2 Context: Insufficient action in the face of climate change
There can be little doubt that climate change is the most important environmental problem 
facing the world community. This assessment is shared by many people including Sir John 
Houghton, former head of the Met Office and former co-chair of the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change’s science working group, who has called climate change a “weapon o f  mass 
destruction” (Houghton 2003). The Prime Minister has identified climate change as 
“unquestionably the most urgent environmental challenge” (Blair 2003). The UK government’s 
chief scientist, David King, has gone even further, saying: “climate change is the most severe 
problem that we are facing today - more serious even than the threat o f terrorism” (King 2004). 
However, as this section briefly outlines, and as Chapter 2 will further illustrate, the seriousness 
of the threat of climate change has not been matched by equally serious action to reduce the risk 
of additional anthropogenic changes in climate either at a global or national level.
1.2.1 Climate Change: the effects to date
The climate is changing because the natural mechanism known as the ‘greenhouse effect’, 
which acts to warm the earth, is being increased by anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse 
gases. The increase in greenhouse gases reduces the efficiency with which the earth’s surface 
radiates energy to space. Change in the net radiative energy available to the global earth- 
atmosphere system is termed radiative forcing. The current positive radiative forcing tends to 
warm the earth’s surface.
Globally, and for the UK, carbon dioxide is the most significant human-influenced greenhouse 
gas. Worldwide, carbon dioxide contributes 60% of the radiative forcing from the changes in
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the concentrations of the key greenhouse gases1 (IPCC 2001a). Around three-quarters of global 
carbon dioxide emissions over the past twenty years have come from fossil fuel burning, with 
the remainder being due to land use change, especially deforestation (IPCC 2001a). In the UK, 
carbon dioxide is a more significant proportion of national greenhouse gas emissions than the 
global average, accounting for 80% of the total (DETR 2000a). In addition, in the UK land use 
change only accounts for 3% of carbon dioxide emissions, the remaining 97% being from fossil 
fuel burning. Thus, just less than 80% of the UK’s contribution to radiative forcing and 
subsequent climate change comes from burning fossil fuels.
In addition to carbon dioxide, there are five other greenhouse gases which have been included in 
international negotiations: methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and 
sulphur hexafluoride. The most significant of these are methane and nitrous oxide. Methane 
emissions come primarily from agriculture, waste, coal mining and natural gas distribution. 
Nitrous oxide is generated from agriculture, industrial processes and fuel combustion (DETR 
2000a). The other greenhouse gases are emitted from a small range of industrial processes and 
products. With the exception of methane, these other gases are much easier to control through 
technological change than is carbon dioxide. These gases are not the subject of this thesis, 
which will concentrate solely on carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning.
The evidence for increased concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere is 
incontrovertible, and the impacts on climate are becoming increasingly clear. The atmospheric 
concentration of CO2 increased from 280 parts per million (ppm) in 1750 to 376 ppm in 2003 
(Keeling & Whorf 2004). This is an increase of 34% since 1750. Today’s CO2 concentration has 
not been exceeded in the past 420,000 years and is likely not to have been exceeded during the 
past 20 million years (IPCC 2001b). IPCC also found that the rate of increase of carbon dioxide 
in the atmosphere over the past century is unprecedented at least during the past 20,000 years.
As a result of greenhouse gas emissions, global temperature over land and sea has risen by 
about 0.6°C (± 0.2°C) since the beginning of the twentieth century (IPCC 2001b, EEA 2004). 
Furthermore, temperatures on land have warmed more than the oceans. So, for example, central 
England temperatures rose by almost 1°C in the twentieth century and the 1990s was the 
warmest decade in central England since records began in the 1660s (Hulme, Turnpenny, & 
Jenkins 2002). In the summer of 2003, a new temperature record of 38.5°C was set in the UK 
(Met Office 2004). This was part of a wider European heat wave, which caused an estimated 
35,000 deaths (EEA 2004), about 14,000 of those being in France and 2,000 being in the UK
1 These are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur 
hexafluoride.
(UNEP 2004). It is not possible to attribute this extreme event definitively to climate change, 
because climate extremes happen naturally by chance. However, it has been estimated that the 
risk of such a heat wave occurring has been doubled by anthropogenic climate change (Stott et 
al. 2004).
Rising temperatures have not been the only consequence. There is strong UK evidence for 
changing rainfall patterns and extremes of climate. For example, winters over the past 200 years 
have become wetter relative to summers throughout the UK and a larger proportion of winter 
precipitation in all regions now falls on heavy rainfall days than was the case 50 years ago 
(Hulme, Turnpenny, & Jenkins 2002). Within Europe the number of disastrous weather or 
climate-related events per year doubled over the 1990s compared with the previous decade.
Four of the five years with the greatest economic losses have occurred since 1997, and losses in 
an average year cost 10 billion Euros (EEA 2004).
1.2.2 Climate change: future prospects
The most authoritative global projections of future climate change are provided by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). IPCC also provides the leading scientific, 
economic and social assessments of climate change and its consequences. Their latest projection 
is that the average surface temperature over land and sea is likely to increase by between 1.4 and 
5.8°C by 2100 from 1990 temperatures, and that nearly all land areas are likely to warm by more 
than this average (IPCC 2001b). This temperature range is broad because it covers various 
possible economic, social and technical scenarios, each of which results in differing emissions 
of greenhouse gases. Higher emissions will lead to higher temperatures. The likely effects on 
humans and the natural environment of high emissions scenarios range from the death of coral 
reefs (Radford 2001) and extinction of species (Norris, Rosentrater, & Eid 2002, Thomas et al. 
2004) to the creation of millions of environmental refugees (Conisbee & Simms 2003). Many 
countries will be under threat from rising sea levels, drought, storms, heat waves and extreme 
economic and social disruptions. Sea level is predicted to rise by up to a metre over the current 
century. This could, for example, lead to a loss (via inundation) of over 20% of Bangladesh’s 
land area, where an eighth of the population currently live (IPCC 2001b). The consequences of 
allowing the higher emissions scenarios to become reality are global, highly damaging and 
almost unthinkable.
Changes in the UK will not be as severe as in some other areas of the world. However they will 
be enough to completely change the experience of living in Britain and to require changes in 
many aspects of the economy. The degree of change will depend on the emission scenario. By 
the 2080s, under all emissions scenarios, the climate will be warmer, wetter in winter and drier 
in summer (Hulme, Turnpenny, & Jenkins 2002). This research also showed that a day-time
summer temperature might be expected to exceed 42°C in lowland England once a decade by 
the 2080s. In addition, snowfall amounts will decrease throughout the UK; by the 2080s large 
areas of the UK are likely to experience quite long sequences of snowless winters. Some climate 
change experts predict that the Scottish ski industry will cease to exist within 20 years (Seenan 
2004). The number of people at high risk from river and coastal flooding could increase from
1.6 million today to between 2.3 and 3.6 million by the 2080s (Office of Science and 
Technology 2004). Initial calculations for the Association of British Insurers suggested that 
climate-related property insurance claims could be two to three times higher in 2050 than at 
present (Dlugolecki 2004). The research also identified a risk that the frequency and seriousness 
of extreme weather events might reach a point where property-related insurance could become 
unaffordable or unavailable. The Department of Health has predicted that health effects would 
include the re-introduction of malaria and an additional 2,000 deaths per year from heat stroke 
(DoH 2001). Although, given the experience in summer 2003, this seems likely to be a 
considerable underestimate of deaths from future higher temperatures and heat waves. These 
examples give an illustration of the some of the negative effects expected as a result of climate 
change.
However, the individual effects of climate change on the UK will not all be negative. For 
example, the increased temperatures are likely to reduce the number of excess winter deaths, 
which currently stand at between 20,000 and 50,000 per year (DTI 2001). In many sectors of the 
economy, it is not yet possible to know whether climate changes will lead to positive or 
negative effects -  there is likely to be an element of both. For example in the agricultural sector, 
rising temperatures and longer growing seasons will give the opportunity to diversify and grow 
a greater range of crops, while changing rainfall patterns might require irrigation or water 
storage facilities to ensure summer water supplies. A changing climate could see new pests and 
diseases affecting crops and livestock and, as public taste responds to a changed climate, there 
may be shifting demands for existing farm produce (UKCIP 2004). While many of the 
consequences for the UK ecology, society and economy, under different climate change 
scenarios, are not yet understood, it is clear that the UK will not be immune from the world­
wide political and economic disruptions which could be caused by serious climate change.
Since the 2001 IPCC reports, research news about climate change and its expected effects has, if 
anything, become more alarming. Two different studies from the UK Hadley Centre have 
suggested that increased carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere may lead to higher 
temperature rises than those reported in IPCC’s work (Clarke 2003, Murphy et al. 2004). The 
work of Murphy et al indicates that a doubling of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere would lead 
to range of temperature rises of 2.4 - 5.4°C, almost one degree Celcius higher than the 1.5 -  4.5 
°C range reported by IPPC (2001a). There has also been alarming research about the prospects
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for mass extinction brought about by climate change. Researchers at Bristol University have 
shown that six degrees of global warming was enough to wipe out up to 95% of the species 
which were alive on earth 250 million years ago (Press Association 2003). Other researchers 
suggest that climate change over the next 50 years is expected to drive a quarter of land animals 
and plants into extinction, in a medium emissions scenario (Thomas et al. 2004). The 
consequences of greatly increased climate change could hardly be more serious.
1.2.3 The global and UK response
The world’s governments have responded to the threat of climate change. In 1992, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was created. Its objective is for the world to 
achieve “stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (United Nations 1992). 
However, the Convention did not define what level of carbon dioxide concentrations in the 
atmosphere would be dangerous or propose a date by which concentrations should be stabilised.
In order to put the objective of the Convention into action, the Kyoto Protocol was created 
(United Nations 1997). It was designed to be the first legally binding treaty aimed at cutting 
emissions of the main greenhouse gases. More than 150 nations signed it in 1997. Under its 
terms, industrialised nations (known as ‘Annex 1 ’ countries) committed themselves to a range 
of targets to reduce emissions between 1990, the base year, and the average emissions of the 
five years 2008-2012 (usually described as the 2010 target). The Member States of the EU 
jointly agreed to undertake an 8% reduction of six key greenhouse gases by 2010. The intention 
is to achieve this by a mixture of reductions for some nations and a cap on increases for others. 
The UK target is a reduction of 12.5% under the EU burden sharing arrangements. At present, 
non-industrialised countries do not have reduction targets. The net effect of Kyoto, if the targets 
are met by all the Annex 1 countries, will be to reduce industrialised countries’ emissions by 
5%. The Protocol’s scientific advisers, the IPCC, say this will delay the effects of climate 
change by, at most, ten years.
The importance of the Kyoto Protocol, given that it aims to achieve only a minor reduction of 
greenhouse gases from Annex 1 countries, is both as a symbol of determination to limit climate 
change and as the first step in a series of future international treaties. However, the omens are 
not good. Firstly, the world’s biggest carbon emitter, the USA, responsible for 23% of the 
global total in 2000 (Marland, Boden, & Andres 2003), has said it will not ratify the Protocol 
nor meet its previously agreed emissions reduction target. This was a major blow to the process 
and has undermined the authority and effectiveness of the Protocol. Nevertheless, it can go 
ahead without the USA, and in November 2004 Russia finally ratified the Protocol. It will 
therefore become legally binding on 16 February 2005 (Hogan 2004). Secondly, many of the
countries which have agreed to Kyoto are not on course to achieving their targets. In the EU, the 
latest assessment is that ten of the fifteen (pre-2004) Member States are likely to miss them by a 
wide margin (Gugele, Huttunen, & Ritter 2003). Even those countries which were allowed 
significant increases in emissions under the EU burden-sharing arrangements, including 
Portugal, Spain and the Republic of Ireland are failing in their commitments. At present, it 
seems unlikely that the Kyoto Protocol will achieve its aims let alone lead the way to future 
treaties.
In contrast to most of its European partners, the UK is on target to meet its Kyoto target 
(Gugele, Huttunen, & Ritter 2003). However, as discussed in Chapter 2, most of the savings will 
come about because of fortuitous changes in the fuels used for electricity generation rather than 
because the UK is firmly on path to a lower carbon economy. The UK has also set itself 
relatively ambitious targets in addition to its obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. On the basis 
of a feasibility analysis carried out by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution 
(RCEP 2000), the government has committed itself to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 20% 
by 2010 from their level in 1990. It has also declared that it is aiming for a 60% reduction by 
2050, achievable in the view of the IPCC using existing technology. This target represents an 
important advance on Kyoto and in setting this target the UK government has shown admirable 
global leadership. Other European countries have now also adopted long term reduction targets. 
For example, the French government has set a target of emissions in 2050 of 0.5 tC per capita, a 
reduction of over 70% from current levels (French Interministerial Task Force on Climate 
Change 2004). These UK and EU targets and the likelihood of reaching them, and the policies 
introduced, are discussed further in Chapter 2.
Although the UK has adopted ambitious long-term and shorter-term carbon reduction goals, at 
the same time, decisions which can only lead to increases in carbon dioxide emissions, such as 
expanding airport capacity to facilitate an increase in air travel, are still being taken (DfT 
2003b). The government belief seems to be that carbon dioxide emissions can be tackled 
primarily through technology changes (Blair 2003), and that more fundamental questions about 
lifestyles and ‘sustainable’ economic growth do not have to be addressed. This thesis will 
question these assumptions.
In summary, there has been a global response to climate change which recognises the 
seriousness of the problems and many developed countries have pledged to act to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. However, as Chapter 2 will demonstrate in detail, there have been 
few bold actions to match the brave words used by politicians when talking about climate 
change. At present, despite the pledges, the world is heading on the path towards six degrees 
Celsius or more of global warming within the next one hundred years, with all the consequences 
this would entail.
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1.3 Scope and aims
This thesis concerns carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels in the UK, because these are the 
most significant national source of greenhouse gases. The requirement to save 60% of carbon 
emissions by 2050 is taken as a starting point, as the minimum the UK must achieve from the 
domestic sector (and all other sectors) in order that the UK makes a fair contribution to global 
efforts to reduce carbon dioxide emissions.
The research questions are:
• Is a strategy of relying largely on improvements in energy efficiency likely to achieve 
the required savings in the UK domestic sector?
• If not, could personal carbon rations offer an alternative route to savings?
In order to answer these questions, this thesis will:
• Present data on the UK’s energy use and carbon emissions, and show how including 
international aircraft emissions changes the picture.
• Review the role that demand-side energy efficiency has played in reducing energy use in the 
domestic sector since 1970.
• Evaluate whether current UK energy policy, based primarily on energy efficiency, is likely 
to be successful in delivering 60% carbon savings by 2050
• Explore, using a model, how plausible changes in behaviour or society could put at risk the 
potential carbon savings which previous studies have shown might be achieved through 
technology and energy efficiency improvements.
• Introduce and develop in more detail a new concept -  personal carbon rationing -  which 
would ensure a minimum of 60% reductions in carbon emissions can be achieved by 2050.
• Investigate the effects that carbon rationing would have on different sections of society, and 
compare its likely effects with those of an alternative policy option, energy taxation.
• Present original case study data showing the variation in current carbon emissions between 
individuals.
• Identify key further research necessary to advance the discussion about carbon rationing.
The focus of this thesis is household energy use and subsequent carbon emissions, and this 
sector is situated within the wider context of the whole UK economy. The boundaries of the 
research are extended beyond household energy use in two particular cases. First o f all, in 
Chapter 2 research is carried out into the effect of including international air travel emissions in 
the UK’s official emissions total. This was done in order to give a more accurate picture of the 
UK’s progress in reducing carbon emissions. Secondly, in Chapter 5 where carbon rationing is 
introduced, personal transport energy use and its carbon emissions are included in the rationing
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scheme. This is because the policy mechanism of personal carbon rationing makes more sense 
when proposed for household and personal transport together than for household energy alone. 
However, the focus remains on household energy use and wider discussion of transport policy is 
not included within this thesis.
1.4 Thesis structure
The structure of the thesis is shown in overview in a flow diagram in Figure 1.1. Following this, 
each chapter is briefly summarised.
Figure 1.1: Overview of thesis structure
Context:
Identifying the true challenge of 
achieving 60% savings.
Chapter 1: Climate change and the global context 
Chapter 2: The UK’s contribution to climate 
change and the role of the domestic sector. 
Identifying emissions not currently counted.
Question 1:
Is a strategy of relying largely on 
improvements in energy 
efficiency likely to achieve the 
required savings?
Chapter 2: The effects of efficiency policy on 
energy consumption since 1970.
Chapter 3: Modelling savings from efficiency: 
past experience, current practice and pitfalls 
Chapter 4: Identifying the potential of social 
change to outstrip technological means to deliver 
efficiency savings.
Question 2:
Could personal carbon rations 
offer an alternative route to 
savings?
Chapter 5: Introducing carbon rations, explaining 
the principles and practical details.
Chapter 6: Critically evaluating carbon rations, 
investigating their effects on individuals and 
different social groups, comparing with taxation.
Chapter 7: Discussion and conclusions
Chapter 2: Energy use and climate change
Chapter 2 sets out the key facts about energy use and carbon dioxide emissions, discusses recent 
trends in each of these. Two important sources of carbon emissions, which are not included the 
conventional UK total -  international airline emissions and emissions from imported goods -  
are identified and quantified. The likelihood of meeting UK government and international
carbon reduction targets is debated. Within the review of energy policy there is a particular 
focus on demand side measures, primarily energy efficiency. The role that energy policy and 
energy efficiency has played and could play in the future shaping of energy use and carbon 
dioxide emissions is debated. The fall in carbon dioxide emissions the UK has experienced over 
recent years is explained, and the implications for future emissions are outlined.
Chapter 3: Energy and carbon dioxide emissions modelling and future scenarios
This chapter explores and compares different approaches to modelling energy futures, describes 
a number of current energy projections and compares previous projections with what has 
subsequently happened. Analysis demonstrates that top-down economic models have 
consistently underestimated future energy use in the domestic sector. In addition, projections 
using bottom-up models have identified savings far in excess of those which have actually been 
delivered. Although current bottom-up models suggest 60% savings could be achieved by 2050, 
largely via energy efficiency improvements, there are good reasons to believe these potential 
savings have also been over-estimated. Several socio-economic scenarios, which can be used to 
look at energy futures, have also been reviewed. The scenario approach suggests only a change 
of values towards sustainability will result in significant savings. Finally the interaction of 
different modelling approaches is discussed, and lessons are drawn for future analysis.
Chapter 4: Modelling energy use and carbon dioxide emissions
Chapter 4 describes how an existing model of energy use in UK housing, developed by David 
Johnston (2003a), has been re-created and validated for use in this thesis. Johnston 
demonstrated that technological improvements to the housing stock could result in 60% carbon 
savings by 2050. However, detailed research shows how internal temperature, hot water demand 
and other variables could change so as to increase energy use and carbon emissions far beyond 
those envisaged by Johnston. Two new future scenarios, High Energy and Low Energy were 
created. A combination of the maximum improvements to energy efficiency with the High 
Energy scenario would lead to savings of just 17% of carbon emissions by 2050 compared with 
those in the base year of 1996. Conversely, in the Low Energy scenario, behavioural and social 
change could lead to greater carbon emissions savings by 2050 than those achievable through 
technology improvements. Finally, brief analysis of supply side options shows that the future 
carbon intensity of the domestic energy supply could increase, rather than fall as is commonly 
assumed.
Chapter 5: Introducing carbon rationing
Chapter 5 introduces the concept of personal carbon rations, defines their characteristics and 
considers the underlying principles. Then the existing literature on carbon rationing and similar 
policies is summarised to show how the definition in this thesis emerges from earlier work.
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‘Contraction and convergence’, the most promising basis for a global agreement on carbon 
reductions, is described and the connection with UK carbon rationing is explained. Following 
this, practical aspects of introducing rationing are discussed. Firstly, Britain’s most important 
example of mass rationing, food rationing during the second world war, is described and lessons 
are drawn from that experience for carbon rationing. Then policies and initiatives which could 
support people in living within their ration are described. These include greatly improved 
carbon information at the point of purchase of fuels, equipment and houses. Alterations to 
existing polices to support carbon rationing are suggested.
Chapter 6: Analysing carbon rationing
Chapter 6 takes a more critical look at carbon rationing and analyses it in further detail, both in 
terms of its own objectives and compared with other policy alternatives. New empirical data on 
personal carbon emissions are presented which show a variation of a factor of twelve between 
the emissions of thirty two individuals. The effects of carbon rationing on different groups in 
society, particularly those on lower incomes and single person households, are analysed. The 
characteristics which tend to lead to higher or lower emissions are summarised. Critiques of 
carbon rationing both in principle and in terms of practical concerns are addressed. The 
alternative policy of carbon taxation is discussed in some detail, and the advantages of carbon 
rationing in comparison are outlined.
Chapter 7: Summary, discussion and conclusions
The final chapter re-visits and summarises the key findings of the thesis and relates them back 
to the central question of the thesis: how can 60% carbon savings be achieved from the domestic 
sector by 2050? Linkages between different parts of the research and findings from different 
chapters are emphasised. There is reflection on the methodologies used to undertake the 
research. The original contribution to knowledge made by this thesis is clearly outlined and 
defended. Finally, areas for further research and unanswered questions are identified, and 
suggestions for changes to government data gathering and policies are made.
1.5 Methodological overview
This thesis combines a number of different approaches to investigate the central question of how 
60% reduction in carbon emissions can be achieved from the domestic sector by 2050. The key 
methods used are:
• critical review of existing literature;
• numerical analysis using secondary data sources;
• bottom-up energy modelling;
• collection and analysis of original quantitative and qualitative data.
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Table 1.1 summarises the methodologies which are used in each chapter of the thesis. Extensive 
use is made of existing secondary data because the thesis question concerns the whole UK 
domestic sector. It is beyond the scope of this research to collect nationally representative 
original data, and in any case much of the necessary quantitative data are available from 
government statistics. This thesis focuses chiefly on presenting original analysis using existing 
data, undertaking original modelling and presenting and developing a new policy idea, rather 
than generating new empirical data. However, original quantitative and qualitative data of an 
exploratory nature are also included in the thesis in Chapter 6.
Table 1.1: Summary of methodologies used in each thesis chapter
Chapter Literature
review
Analysis using 
secondary data
Energy
modelling
Analysis using 
original data
Chapter 1 ✓
Chapter 2 ✓ ✓
Chapter 3 ✓ ✓
Chapter 4 ✓ ✓ ✓
Chapter 5 ✓
Chapter 6 ✓ ✓
Because different methods of analysis are used in different chapters, and each chapter contains 
original work, the details of specific methods are contained in individual chapters, rather than 
having a separate chapter on methodology.
This PhD is in the field of energy policy -  which is itself a multi-disciplinary area of enquiry. It 
includes elements of physics, climate science, geography, engineering, social sciences, 
philosophy, policy analysis and economics. This thesis focuses on numerical, technical and 
policy analysis. There is relatively little economic and social science analysis.
Research and policy in this area is currently changing. Significant changes to government policy 
and new research up to the end of November 2004 are included where possible. Changes after 
that date are not reflected in the text.
1.6 Conventions in this thesis
The key conventions in this thesis are:
• All energy figures relate to final (delivered) energy, unless primary energy is specified.
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• TWh is used as the measure of UK and domestic energy use, this is so that the unit of 
measurement matches that used in key government statistics (e.g. DTI 2004a). MtC has 
been chosen as the measurement unit for carbon dioxide emissions for the same reason.
• Throughout the thesis, reference to the UK’s total carbon emissions is on the IPCC 
measurement basis and does not include international air emissions, unless specifically 
stated.
Definitions are given in the text and in the glossary at the start of the thesis. Similarly, 
abbreviations are listed at the beginning of the document.
1.7 Note on joint research
During the time research was being undertaken for this thesis, the author also conducted parallel 
research for a book: ‘How we can save the planet’, Mayer Hillman with Tina Fawcett, published 
by Penguin Books in 2004. Some of the themes and areas of research are the same as those 
covered in this thesis. However, that work was for a general readership, and additional effort 
was required to bring the research up to doctoral level. Where Mayer Hillman’s ideas or jointly 
developed ideas are used in this thesis they are acknowledged as Hillman & Fawcett (2004). 
However, if the research was undertaken or ideas developed solely or primarily by the author, 
they are included as the author’s original work without further attribution.
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Chapter 2: Energy use, energy policy and carbon 
dioxide emissions
2.1 Chapter overview
The aims of the chapter are to present key facts about energy use and carbon dioxide emissions, 
to analyse recent trends in each of these, and to describe current UK energy policy and consider 
whether it is likely to provide an adequate response to the challenge of climate change. The rise 
in energy use and the changing patterns of usage since 1970 are described. The main focus is on 
household energy use, but reference is also made to wider energy use issues where appropriate. 
Within the review of energy policy there is a particular focus on demand side measures, 
primarily energy efficiency. The role that energy policy and energy efficiency has played and 
could play in the future shaping of energy use and carbon dioxide emissions is debated. The fall 
in carbon dioxide emissions the UK has experienced over recent years is explained, and the 
implications for future emissions are outlined.
Findings include:
• The evidence over the past thirty years is that energy efficiency has not delivered energy 
savings for the domestic sector;
• New analysis shows that when the full global warming effect of international air travel is 
included, UK carbon dioxide emissions have not fallen since 1990.
Some of the subjects raised initially in this chapter are considered further in later chapters. 
Chapter 3 deals in detail with modelling of energy use. Chapter 4 includes more information on 
energy saving options, including efficiency measures, renewable energy provision and 
behavioural change.
2.2 Methodology
In this chapter, existing secondary data are used to present a background picture of energy use 
and subsequent carbon dioxide emissions in the UK. The data have been chosen to illustrate 
aspects of energy use most relevant to the thesis area of study. This information is also used to 
investigate the role energy efficiency has played in the domestic sector since 1970, and the 
extent to which it has delivered energy savings. In addition, existing statistics on UK carbon 
dioxide emissions and the emissions from air travel are combined to give a new insight into total 
carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel usage.
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UK government policy on energy policy, domestic energy use and carbon emissions reduction is 
described. It is then reviewed critically, making use of the literature, to debate whether current 
emissions reductions targets are likely to be met. Potential contradictions in existing policy 
goals are identified.
2.3 Energy use overview
2.3.1 Introduction
In the last one hundred years energy consumption has increased vastly in comparison with 
previous times. For example, Smil (2000) estimates that in the year 2000 the world had at its 
disposal about 25 times more useful commercial energy than it did in 1900. McNeill (2000) 
suggests that more energy has probably been deployed since 1900 than in all of human history 
before 1900. Most of this energy has come from burning fossil fuels. Developed countries in 
particular depend very largely on these fuels for their energy needs. The UK is typical of this, 
deriving 90% of its total energy requirement from fossil fuels (DTI 2003a). It is hard to 
overstate the importance of burning fossil fuels for current patterns of economic, social and 
cultural life. It is this fact which makes drastic curtailment of fossil fuel use to prevent further 
climate change such a challenge.
This section outlines patterns of energy use in the UK, with a particular focus on the domestic 
sector.
2.3.2 Primary and final energy consumption
Energy consumption is usually measured in one of three different ways: primary energy, final 
energy (sometimes called delivered energy) and useful energy. The definitions here follow those 
used by the UK’s Department of Trade and Industry (DTI 2004a).
Prim ary energy is a measure of the energy content of primary fuels plus primary electricity. 
Primary fuels are those obtained directly from natural sources, e.g. coal, oil and natural gas. 
Primary electricity is that obtained other than from fossil fuel sources, e.g. nuclear, hydro, wind 
and other non-thermal renewables1. Primary energy includes energy used or lost in the 
conversion of primary fuels to secondary fuels (for example in power stations), energy lost in 
the distribution of fuels (for example in transmission lines) and energy conversion losses by 
final users.
1 For electricity not generated from fossil fuels or other combustible fuels, conventions are needed to 
define primary energy content. For electricity generated from hydro and wind, primary energy equals 
final energy. For nuclear energy, primary energy is defined as the heat in the steam at the nuclear plant, 
before it is transformed into electricity (with an average efficiency o f  38.05% in 2003 (DTI 2004a)).
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Final energy, also known as delivered energy, is the energy consum ed by final users. It is 
therefore net o f  fuel industry ow n use and conversion , transm ission and distribution lo sses, but 
includes conversion  losses o f  final users. It is the energy use as metered at the doorstep o f  a 
building. This is the m easure o f  energy w hich  w ill be m ost com m only used in this thesis.
Useful energy is that energy availab le after deduction o f  the losses incurred w hen final users 
convert energy supplied into space or process heat, m otive power, light or other energy services. 
D TI states that “statistics on useful energy are not sufficiently reliable to be given... there is a 
lack o f data on utilisation efficiencies and on the purposes for which fuels are used. ” (2004a:21)
B ecause o f  the losses in each stage o f  transformation: primary energy > final energy >  useful 
energy.
In the U K  over the past thirty three years, both primary and final energy use have increased. At 
the sam e tim e, the proportion o f  d ifferent fuels used to supply national energy dem and has 
changed considerably, as illustrated in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: UK total annual primary and final energy use by fuel, 1970 and 2003
Source: DTI 2004a
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Primary electricity includes that generated in nuclear stations, by natural flow hydro-electricity 
and wind energy. Secondary electricity is that generated by combustion of a fuel, usually coal, 
oil or gas.
Both primary and final energy use have increased between 1970 and 2003, primary energy by 
10.8% and final energy by 8.2%. The ratio between primary and final energy for the UK was 
similar for both years, with final energy being 69.5% of primary in 1970 and 67.9% in 2003. 
Since the ‘missing’ energy is accounted for by conversion, transmission and distribution losses 
this shows that losses have increased over time, but this is not because production and delivery' 
of final energy have become less efficient. As the graph shows, the percentage that electricity 
makes up of final energy has increased from 11.3% to 18.8% between 1970 and 2003. 
Generation, transmission and distribution losses involved in producing electricity account for 
most of the difference between primary and final energy, and so increasing electricity 
production increases losses. Because the efficiency with which electricity has been produced 
has increased, an expansion of electricity use has not greatly increased the losses between the 
primary and final energy stages.
Figure 2.1 also demonstrates that the usage pattern of primary energy fuels has changed 
markedly over the past thirty three years -  with gas increasing hugely as a proportion of primary 
energy, oil decreasing somewhat, and coal decreasing considerably. There has also been an 
expansion in the supply of primary electricity, mostly due to an increasing contribution from 
nuclear power.
The proportion of final energy used by different sectors of the economy has also changed 
significantly since 1970 (Figure 2.2). Final energy use by industry has almost halved, while the 
transport and domestic sectors have experienced growth. Transport, which includes business as 
well as personal transport, is now the largest energy-using sector at 35% of the total. While this 
is the usual way in which the statistics are presented, it would also be possible to look at the 
amount of energy used in buildings (in the domestic, service and industrial sectors) other than 
for process energy. Total energy use in buildings is estimated to be about half of the UK total, 
considerably outweighing transport energy use (ODPM 2004).
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Figure 2.2: Annual final energy use in the UK by sector, 1970-2003
Source: DTI 2004a
2.3.3 Domestic energy use
Domestic energy use, also known as household energy use, is all the energy used within 
households in the UK. It represents a significant and growing proportion of UK final energy 
demand. In 2003, it amounted to 30.3% of the total final energy (DTI 2004a). It has been 
growing steadily over recent decades and continues to grow at over 1% per year (DTI 2003a). 
Understanding the reasons for increasing growth in energy use is key to knowing how this trend 
can be reversed. This section outlines how and why energy use in households has changed over 
recent decades.
Growth in energy use has been driven by the increasing numbers of households since 1970 
(Table 2.1) as energy use per household has changed little over the period. In fact, final energy 
use per household has declined slightly from 23,200 kWh to 22,500 kWh in 2001 (in line with 
the higher temperature of 6.6°C in 2001 compared with 5.8°C in 1970) (Shorrock & Utley 
2003). The annual energy consumption per household over the period 1970-2001 has varied 
relatively little, the average was 22,100 kWh, with the maximum and minimum values being 
within 7% of the average. Annual variations generally reflect changing external temperatures. 
Of household energy use in 2001, 62% was used for space heating, 23% for water heating and 
the remaining 15% for cooking, lights and appliances (Shorrock & Utley 2003). This pattern has 
changed relatively little since 1970, the biggest change being that the proportion of energy used 
by lights and appliances has almost doubled, whilst that used for cooking has fallen 
considerably.
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It is perhaps surprising that energy use per household has not increased, given that its relative 
cost has decreased considerably since 1970. In real terms (i.e. adjusted for inflation) household 
fuels have become less expensive; the price of gas has fallen by 39% between 1970 and 2003, 
and electricity prices have fallen by 15%2 (DTI 2004a). Over the same period incomes have 
grown considerably, so energy prices have fallen dramatically relative to incomes. Energy costs 
were just 2.9% of the average household budget in 2001/02 (ONS 2003a), which is less than the 
average spend on alcohol. This compares with an average of 6.3% in 1970 (Shorrock & Utley
2003). Despite this, in 2001 there were still an estimated three million UK households in fuel 
poverty, that is to say they would have to spend at least one tenth of their income to afford 
adequate energy services (DEFRA & DTI 2003). Nevertheless, in general the opportunities for 
using energy in the home have expanded and the cost of doing so has decreased over recent 
years.
The key reason that energy consumption has not increased per household, is that improvements 
in energy efficiency have enabled people to access greater energy services (e.g. warmer rooms) 
without having to increase their energy use. The factors influencing the change in household 
energy use since 1970 are summarised in Table 2.1. This shows in index form how various 
factors determining total GB household energy use have changed from 1970 to 2001. For space 
heating, energy consumption is determined both by how effectively the building retains heat, 
and by the efficiency of the heating system (and, of course, by the people). Both the efficiency 
of the building fabric and of heating systems has improved significantly since 1970. There has 
been a strong rise per household in the energy used in lights and appliances. Although energy 
use per household has changed little, due to increasing household numbers the total across the 
sector has risen. Thus there have been both downward and upward pressures on energy use, but 
the upward pressures have outweighed the impressive efficiency increases in both housing and 
the heating equipment.
2 Recently there have been price rises. Domestic electricity prices rose by 3.2% in real terms in the year to 
Q2 2004. Domestic gas prices rose by 4.5% in real terms in the year to Q2 2004.(D T I 2004c)
Table 2.1: Final energy use and characteristics of GB housing stock, 1970 and 2001
Actual values Indices (1970 = 
100)
1970 2001 1970 2001
Energy use in housing stock (TWh) 417 548 100 132
Number of households (million) 17.99 24.42 100 136
Average energy use per household (kWh) 23,200 22,500 100 97
Heat loss per average dwelling (W/°C) 376 259 100 69
Weighted average space heating efficiency 
(%)
49 70 100 143
Electricity consumption in lights and 
appliances per household (kWh)
1,680 2,840 100 170
Average energy use per individual (kWh) 8,000 9,780 100 122
Source: Based on Shorrock & Utley 2003
There are different responses to this data. One is to conclude that energy efficiency has not led 
to energy savings, because improved efficiency has allowed people to increase their use of 
energy services (Bell, Lowe, & Roberts 1996). An alternative interpretation is that demand for 
energy services would have risen in any case and that, without energy efficiency measures, 
energy consumption would have been much higher. This is the approach taken by Shorrock & 
Utley (2003), who suggest that their energy model shows that a saving of 46% has been 
delivered by energy efficiency, relative to what the level of consumption would have been in 
2001 if no efficiency improvements had been made since 1970. However, the baseline used for 
this calculation is ‘counterfactuaf; it is an estimate of what would have happened if the 
interventions had not taken place. The type of assertions made in creating this baseline are 
impossible, in principle, to either verify or falsify (Jackson, Begg, & Parkinson 2001). 
Therefore, while the statement that energy efficiency has not resulted in sector wide savings 
over the past three decades can be made with certainty, the claim that without efficiency, energy 
consumption would have been much higher is open to debate.
2.4 UK carbon emissions
2.4.1 Introduction
The UK’s carbon dioxide emissions are globally significant. UK emissions in 2003 were 153 
MtC (DEFRA 2004a), which accounts for over 2% of the world total (Marland, Boden, & 
Andres 2003). Each UK citizen is currently responsible for about two and a half times the global 
average per capita emissions. Partly because the UK was the first country to industrialise its 
economy and use fossil fuels, its contribution to the total emissions since 1750 is much higher 
than the current contribution: overall, it has been responsible for 15% of global emissions 
(Marland, Boden, & Andres 2003).
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Contrary to experience in most countries, UK carbon emissions have fallen in recent years 
(Section 2.4.2). However, the situation is not as positive as the data first seem to indicate. 
Section 2.4.3 investigates why UK emissions have fallen. Then two important classes of 
emissions which are not currently included in the UK total are investigated. Firstly, original 
analysis illustrates the difference that including international airline emissions makes to total 
UK carbon emissions (Section 2.4.4). Secondly, preliminary data on the emissions emitted 
abroad to supply the UK with goods is presented (Section 2.4.5).
2.4.2 UK carbon emissions data since 1970
Because carbon dioxide emissions are produced from tens of millions of fixed and mobile 
sources (e.g. homes, cars and factories), national emissions have to be calculated rather than 
measured. There are different methodologies for calculating carbon emissions; the two principal 
methods have been established by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Houghton 
et al. 1996) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) 
(UNECE/EMEP 2001). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) methodology 
includes land use change and all emissions from domestic aviation and shipping, but excludes 
international marine and aviation bunker fuels. UNECE excludes land use change and also 
international shipping, but includes aviation emissions below 1,000 metres to cover take-off and 
landing cycles (DETR 2001). For these reasons national totals reported under the two 
definitions are slightly different. Neither methodology includes emissions from international 
aviation -  this is discussed further in section 2.4.4.
Figure 2.3 illustrates UK carbon dioxide emissions since 1970. Current official UK estimates of 
carbon dioxide emissions are calculated in line with IPCC reporting guidelines. However, data 
are only available on that basis from 1990 onwards. For earlier years, the only UK figures 
available are calculated on a UNECE basis. As Figure 2.3 illustrates, the difference between the 
two is relatively small, with IPCC emissions 3-4% higher than UNECE emissions. All carbon 
emissions figures from 1990 onwards are given on the IPCC basis unless otherwise stated. In 
1970, carbon emissions were 185.3 MtC (UNECE method), in 1990 they were 164.8 MtC, and 
in 2003 emissions were 152.7 MtC — that is around a fifth lower than in 1970.
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Figure 2.3: UK carbon dioxide emissions, 1970-2003
Sources: DEFRA 2004a, DEFRA 2003a
Also included in Figure 2.3 are the UK’s three current carbon reduction 
targets, already mentioned in Chapter 1. To recap, these are:
• the Kyoto target of 12.5% reduction of the basket of six greenhouse gases from 1990 
levels by 2010;
• the UK government’s domestic target of a 20% reduction of carbon dioxide emissions 
from 1990 to 2010;
• the UK government’s long term goal of a reduction of carbon dioxide emissions from 
current levels by 60% by 2050.
The prospects of achieving these targets are discussed in section 2.5.
2.4.3 Interpreting the UK’s falling carbon dioxide emissions since 1970
Carbon emissions have fallen while energy use has risen because the UK has switched to less 
carbon-intensive fuels. Since 1970 total UK primary energy use has switched away from coal 
and oil, while the share of gas and primary electricity has increased (Figure 2.1). Primary 
electricity is almost carbon free, while gas is the fossil fuel of lowest carbon intensity (i.e. 
lowest carbon emissions per kWh) at around 60% that of coal, as the data in Table 2.2 show. 
Due to the changes in fuels used for electricity generation, the carbon intensity of electricity has 
fallen by 60% since 1970, and by 36% since 1990 and stood at 0.136 kgC/kWh in 2003.
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Table 2.2: Carbon intensity of the UK’s major energy sources
Energy source Carbon intensity, kgC/kWh
Coal 0.082
Oil 0.068
Gas 0.052
Primary electricity near to zero
All electricity’" 1990-0.22
2002-0.136
Sources: DEFRA 200 a except for *, see Chapter 4, Section 4.9 for details of calculation
The switch towards lower carbon fuels has largely come about for reasons unrelated to climate 
change. It has been driven by factors including comparative fuel prices, increasing availability 
of natural gas, government policy, expansion of the role of nuclear power and changing fossil 
fuel power station technologies. Of the reduction in carbon dioxide emissions between 1990 and 
1999, it has been estimated that just 40% was in response to climate change policy, with the 
remainder being due to special circumstances that cannot be repeated in future (Eichhammer et 
al. 2001). These special circumstances included the liberalisation and privatisation of the 
electricity and gas markets, reduced support for the UK coal industry and the introduction of the 
combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) technology - all of which made gas a more attractive fuel, 
particularly to electricity producers. Chapter 4 discusses the prospects for further reductions in 
the carbon intensity of the UK’s energy mix.
2.4.4 Carbon emissions including all aircraft emissions
Presently, UK total carbon emission figures (IPCC basis) do not include the contribution of 
international aviation. In this section, existing data has been combined to provide an original 
estimate of UK total emissions including those from international air travel (Figure 2.4).
35
190
185 -
180
c
1 _  s o
E i-to &  
c
i  165 I
=  CO
8  E
re ® 160 -
i f
” 5 155 -« 3
2 S’
D
175 -
UK carbon emissions, including equivalent carbon emissions 
from international air travel
c
o•Q
150 -
UK carton emissions, IPCC basis
145 -i
140 -!--------------------1-------------------- 1-------------------- 1-------------------- 1-------------------- 1-------------------- .-------------------- .
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Figure 2.4 UK total carbon emissions and carbon equivalent emissions including 
international air travel, MtCe, 1990-2003
Sources: DEFRA 2004a, DEFRA 2003a, ONS & NETCEN 2004
Emissions from international aviation add significantly to the UK total. Air travel emissions 
from the UK were estimated at 8MtC in 2002 (DTI 2003b), which would add another 5% to 
national carbon emissions. Since then, further information about carbon dioxide emissions from 
the airline industry has been published for 1990-2002 (ONS & NETCEN 2004). This 
information shows that carbon dioxide emissions from air travel (domestic and international) 
were actually 10.1 MtC in 2002. Importantly, aircraft emissions add more powerfully to the 
greenhouse effect than the carbon dioxide component alone. The current best estimate is that 
they have three times the effect of carbon dioxide3 (RCEP 2002). This makes their effective 
addition to carbon emissions 30.3 MtCe -  that is million tonnes of carbon equivalent. However, 
the figure of 30.3 MtCe includes domestic and international air transport. Domestic air 
transport, which constitutes 5% of the global warming from UK national air travel (Bishop & 
Grayling 2003), is already included in IPCC emissions. Therefore, the figures for emissions 
from air transport have been multiplied by 0.95 and then added to the IPCC total. This takes 
total emissions including international air travel in 2002 to 179 MtCe, a 19% increase on IPCC 
figures (Figure 2.4).
3 However, the question o f  how to compare properly the effects o f  aircraft emissions and those emitted at 
ground level is very complex and considerable further research is underway on this topic. The factor o f  
three used here is provisional. The next authoritative statement about how to account for aircraft 
emissions is not expected from IPCC for a number o f  years (Jardine 2005).
36
There is little difference between emissions in 1990 and 2002, once international air travel is 
included. Carbon equivalent emissions from international air flights have risen by 13.3MtCe 
between 1990 and 2002 -  just less than the 14.4MtC drop in IPCC emissions from 1990 to 2002 
for the remainder of the economy. Not only are the emissions from international air travel 
already very significant, they are expected to grow rapidly into the future. On current forecasts, 
including overseas visitors, as many as 500 million passengers will use UK airports by 2030, 
nearly three times the present number of 180 million (DfT 2003a). The important role of 
international air travel makes it vital that these emissions are included in national and 
international greenhouse gas reduction targets.
The exclusion of international aircraft emissions from current targets is recognised as 
problematic by some commentators. For example, there have been calls for international aircraft 
emissions to and from developed countries to be included in UNFCCC national greenhouse gas 
targets by 2010 (Bishop & Grayling 2003). The Sustainable Development Commission has 
called for DfT and Defra to clarify the basis on which greenhouse gas projections are being 
made to ensure that full account is being taken of the radiative forcing of aviation (SDC 2004a). 
However, according to press reports, the UK government is keen to draw as little attention as 
possible to aircraft emissions to the extent of excluding them from official reports (Brown 
2004b, Brown 2004a).
Throughout the remaining thesis, reference to the UK’s total carbon emissions is on the IPCC 
measurement basis and does not include international air emissions, unless specifically stated.
2.4.5 Carbon emissions emitted abroad ‘on behalf o f the UK
Current national emissions figures could be underestimating the UK’s true global warming 
impact, if this country ‘exports’ some of its carbon emissions by importing more energy- 
intensive goods than it exports. That is, if other countries use energy and emit carbon on our 
behalf. There is economic evidence that the UK is likely to be an emissions exporter because far 
more goods are imported than exported. The UK is now considered a ‘post-industrial’ society 
and as Figure 2.2 shows, energy use in the industrial sector has fallen considerably since 1970, 
while that used in the service sector has risen. The UK has long imported more goods than it 
exports; the last surplus on trade in goods was in 1982 (National Statistics 2004b). In fact, the 
balance of trade in goods has shown a deficit in all but six years since 1900, with the value of 
imports exceeding that of exports. Other researchers who have raised the question of the UK’s 
responsibility for emissions generated abroad (e.g Anderson, Shackley, & Watson 2003, Francis
2004) agree that the preliminary evidence points to the conclusion that the UK is ‘exporting’ 
emissions, but suggest much more detailed research is still required.
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A recent press release from WWF accompanying their Living Planet report stated that the UK is 
responsible for almost 30% higher carbon dioxide emissions than the IPPC-based figures 
released by the government (WWF 2004a, WWF 2004b). The WWF emissions figure includes 
the carbon emissions embodied in imported food, goods and raw materials and excludes those 
from exports. WWF also include carbon emissions from international aviation (but do not adjust 
them to get the full carbon equivalent figures). Using this 30% figure, and subtracting the 6% 
that the carbon emissions from international air travel add to the UK total (Section 2.4.4), the 
conclusion is that imports add 24% to the UK carbon emissions total. This figure can only be 
regarded as indicative, as full details of WWF calculations are not included in their report and 
so their methodology cannot be critically examined (WWF 2004b). However, it does support 
the suggestion that significant additional carbon dioxide emissions are being emitted elsewhere 
in the world on behalf of the UK. Considerably more detailed research is still required to 
identify the true emissions being created abroad to meet UK demand for goods.
2.4.6 Discussion
The analysis in the three preceding sections has shown that:
1. while the UK’s total carbon emissions have fallen since 1990, much of the reduction 
was fortuitous rather than as a result of fundamental shifts to a low carbon economy;
2. when international air travel emissions are included, UK emissions in 2002 were 19% 
higher than those reported on an IPCC basis;
3. initial evidence indicates the UK is likely to be responsible for significant additional 
carbon emissions generated overseas, due to our imports of energy intensive goods.
Together this evidence indicates that the challenge of achieving a 60% reduction by 2050 will 
be more difficult than currently acknowledged. Both the challenge of making savings and the 
true level of emissions for which the UK is responsible have been underestimated.
2.5 Energy and climate change policy overview
2.5.1 Introduction
Energy policy encompasses both supply and demand side issues. National supply side issues 
include the future of nuclear energy, support for the coal industry, renewable energy policy, oil 
exploration, and liberalisation and regulation of the privatised energy industries. Demand side 
issues include energy efficiency, household-level renewables and combined heat and power 
schemes. Some of the factors which determine patterns of energy use, such as international
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energy prices, are hard for national governments to influence and are beyond the traditional 
boundaries of energy policy.
In this thesis ‘energy policy’ is primarily used to mean demand-side energy policy. Firstly the 
overall goals of UK energy policy (demand and supply side) are described and discussed. This 
is followed by an outline description of current policy in the household sector. Then there is a 
discussion of whether current policy is likely to make sufficient savings to meet the UK’s 2010 
Kyoto and domestic goals for carbon emissions reduction.
2.5.2 Goals of UK energy policy
In 2003, the UK government published the Energy White Paper, the first major energy policy 
document for many years (DTI 2003b). This identified four goals for energy policy:
1. “To put ourselves on a path to cut the UK’s carbon dioxide emissions -  the main 
contributor to global warming -  by some 60% by about 2050, as recommended by the 
RCEP, with real progress by 2020;
2. To maintain the reliability of energy supplies;
3. To promote competitive markets in the UK and beyond, helping to raise the rate of 
sustainable economic growth and to improve our productivity;
4. To ensure that every home is adequately and affordably heated.”
The first goal is a clear demonstration of the concern of the government about climate change, 
and a promise to move towards a lower carbon economy. This commitment was widely 
welcomed by a wide range of organisations from Greenpeace to British Nuclear Fuels (ENDS 
2003a). The second goal concerning reliability or ‘security of supply’ is a traditional concern of 
governments. Most householders are now dependent on centralised supplies of gas and 
electricity which cannot be stored at household level (this compares with 1970 when the most 
popular heating fuel, solid fuel, could be stored in some quantity by householders (Shorrock & 
Utley 2003)). If anything, reliability has become of greater importance over time; an 
increasingly centralised energy system makes reliability of supply more critical to people’s 
well-being. The third goal makes explicit the government’s view of the link between energy, 
and energy prices, and economic growth. The fourth goal puts elimination of fuel poverty at the 
centre of government energy policy.
These goals may conflict with each other. In fact, it has been recognised that trade-offs will 
have to be made (House of Commons Environmental Audit Committee 2003). The most likely 
conflict is between the first and third goals. All other things being equal, a competitive energy 
market leading to higher economic growth is likely to be in conflict with the goal of reducing 
carbon dioxide emissions. The issue of whether ‘sustainable economic growth’ which protects
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the climate is possible is fundamental to responding to climate change. It is a question which is 
currently being addressed by the government’s Sustainable Development Commission (SDC 
2003), but was not addressed in the Energy White Paper itself.
2.5.3 Definition of energy efficiency
The efficiency of any energy conversion system is defined as the useful energy output divided 
by the total energy input (Ramage 1997). This definition is relatively straightforward to apply in 
the case of systems providing easily measured outputs such as space heating or electrical power. 
So, for example, efficiency figures for gas boilers are available and they communicate how 
much of the chemical energy in the gas is converted into heat energy to be delivered to 
radiators, and conversely how much is Tost’ as heat in the wrong place (in the exhaust gases 
from the boiler) under test conditions. Similarly, the energy efficiency of a fossil fuel power 
station is the percentage of chemical energy in the primary fuel which is turned into electrical 
energy. However, defining and measuring useful energy outputs can be more difficult for 
equipment and systems supplying more complex services.
The complexity of defining ‘useful energy’ in some cases is illustrated with two examples. In 
order to develop a test for the efficiency of water heaters, the issue of ‘tapping patterns’, i.e. 
how much hot water was demanded and how many times hot water was demanded throughout 
the day, was critical (NOVEM 2001). Depending on the tapping patterns used for the test, the 
measured efficiency of different hot water heaters varies. So in real life, the useful energy 
delivered by hot water systems depends how the householder uses their system, and is not just a 
function of the equipment. Difficulties in defining what constitutes an energy service also make 
measuring efficiency problematic. For example, should the efficiency of a frost-free freezer be 
measured against the same criteria as a conventional freezer? This question goes beyond 
measuring the efficiency of a refrigeration system, because for frost-free freezers the service 
being offered includes not having to de-frost a freezer manually. Thus, although energy 
efficiency is a simple concept, creating usable definitions for household equipment, and relating 
efficiency under test conditions to real life efficiency, can be surprisingly complex.
2.5.4 Energy efficiency in different policy contexts
Energy efficiency has been used as a means to meet three different policy goals over recent 
decades: energy conservation, economic efficiency and carbon emissions reduction. The oil 
price energy crises in the 1970s prompted governmental and public interest in better 
management of energy. There was considerable concern that fossil fuels were in short supply 
and that the world was running out of them. Energy conservation became an explicit focus of 
government attention, with public education campaigns such as ‘Save it!’(Jones 1995). At this 
time energy efficiency was seen a means to achieve energy conservation. During the 1980s, oil
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prices fell and the focus on energy conservation diminished. There was considerable attention 
on justifying public investment in energy efficiency from an economic standpoint. Economic 
arguments were developed to demonstrate that the market would deliver less than optimum 
levels of efficiency due to market imperfections such as lack of information. During this period, 
energy efficiency was partly promoted as a means of improving economic efficiency. In the mid 
to late 1990s, climate change concerns became an increasingly important factor in energy 
policy. Energy efficiency was once again seen as an important policy, this time as a tool for 
achieving carbon emission reductions and also for helping to reduce fuel poverty (DETR 
2000a). This re-invention of the role of energy efficiency to fit the energy policy goals of the 
time could be argued to put too much reliance on efficiency policy to deliver targets other than 
the more efficient use of energy.
2.5.5 Meeting 2010 carbon reduction targets
The UK government expects to meet its Kyoto target and is optimistic that it will reach the 
domestic 20% reduction in carbon dioxide by 2010 (Beckett 2003). There is general agreement 
that the UK is likely to meet its Kyoto target (e.g. IEA 2002b, EEA 2003). However, there is a 
substantial body of opinion which doubts the 20% target can be met given the current policy 
measures. The Sustainable Development Commission (the government’s independent advisory 
body on sustainable development) published a detailed report in 2003 (SDC 2004b) on the 
likely effect of the government’s Climate Change Programme. They suggest that emissions of 
C 02 will fall by at most only 12.6% by 2010, and perhaps substantially less. A recent report 
from the Institute of Public Policy Research also concludes that, unless there is radical policy 
change, the government will not meet its 2010 target (Mitchell & Woodman 2004). Other 
organisations have questioned the likely effects of particular parts of the programme. Research 
carried out by the ENDS Journal suggests that many of the commitments made under the 
industrial voluntary emissions trading scheme will not result in additional savings (ENDS 
2003b). Similarly, the Association for the Conservation of Energy believes that the savings from 
the Climate Change Levy have been overstated (Waller 2003). Perhaps surprisingly, provisional 
forecasts by the Department of Trade and Industry also suggest that the government is off 
course for its 2010 C 02 reduction target (DTI 2004e). Emissions in 2010 are expected to be just 
15% lower than in 1990, even taking into account the expected effects of climate change 
policies (more details about this forecast are included in Chapter 3). Remember that this 
discussion excludes the effect of international aviation.
2.5.6 Longer term carbon reduction goals
The UK’s long term goal for carbon reduction is based on work by the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution (RCEP), which recommended that the UK should adopt a target of 
60% reduction of carbon dioxide emissions from 1997 levels by 2050 (RCEP 2000). This target
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was based on ‘contraction and convergence’4 principles with the aim of ensuring that an upper 
limit of 550ppm carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is not exceeded globally (this is around twice 
the level of carbon dioxide there was in the atmosphere pre-industrial Revolution). It was 
adopted as government policy in the 2003 Energy White Paper (DTI 2003b). However, the UK 
government has not adopted the principles of contraction and convergence as the basis for a 
future global agreement, and it is unclear how it intends to promote a global limit of 550ppm. 
This issue is discussed further in Chapter 5, Section 5.5.
This 2050 target is based on a particular judgement about the risks of increasing climate change 
and what level of risk should be accepted. RCEP judged a maximum atmospheric concentration 
of 550ppm would limit climate change to that which would be manageable. Several 
commentators suggest this is not sufficiently risk averse and that a lower limit of 450ppm would 
be a more responsible target (Athanasiou & Baer 2002, Hillman & Fawcett 2004, Meyer 2000). 
A 450ppm target would require greater than 60% savings by 2050 in the UK. While the focus in 
this thesis is on the 60% target, in future more stringent targets may be acknowledged as 
necessary, and the implications of this are discussed briefly in Chapter 5.
2.6 Energy policy for the domestic sector
2.6.1 Demand side measures
Following the publication of the Energy White Paper (DTI 2003b), a more detailed document, 
“Energy efficiency: the government’s plan for action”, has been produced (DEFRA 2004b).
This explains how energy efficiency will contribute to the goals of UK energy policy and 
identifies the carbon savings it is expected to achieve in each sector. It builds on earlier work in 
the DETR’s Climate Change Policy document (DETR 2000a). The government now expects 
domestic energy efficiency to deliver 4.2MtC carbon savings by 2010 (Table2.3). This is 
somewhat less than the 5 MtC suggested in the Energy White Paper (DTI 2003b).
4 Contraction and convergence (C&C) is a framework for global carbon reductions. It ensures that over 
time firstly global carbon emissions would contract and secondly there would be global convergence to 
equal per capita shares o f  this contraction (Meyer 2000). C&C is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.
Table 2.3: Measures and programmes to deliver carbon savings to 2010 in the domestic 
sector
Measure Carbon 
savings (MtC)
Measures already in the UK Climate Change Programme 1.5
Energy Efficiency Commitment ffom 2005, Decent 
Homes
1.4
Warm Front 0.2
Community Energy 0.1
Building Regulations 2005 0.8
Other measures 0.2
Total domestic 4.2
Source: DEFRA 2004b
DEFRA (2004b) identifies key risks for delivery of Energy White Paper energy efficiency 
goals. The most significant high risk areas include poor enforcement, efficiencies being 
swamped by rising use of energy consuming products, and delays in reaching agreement on EU 
and international policies. Overall, DEFRA suggests that there is a ‘medium’ risk that energy 
efficiency measures will not deliver the required carbon savings.
The measures in Table 2.3 are continuations of existing policies, each of which is explained 
briefly below.
• Measures already in the UK Climate Change Programme are earlier incarnations of the 
Energy Efficiency Commitment, Warm Front and Community Energy programmes (see 
below for details) and Building Regulations 2002.
• The Energy Efficiency Commitment (EEC) is the current obligation on gas and electricity 
retailers to achieve energy savings. It is described by the government as “the principal 
policy mechanism driving increases in the efficiency of existing homes” (DEFRA 2004b). 
Savings are achieved most commonly by subsidising consumer purchase of efficient lights, 
appliances and loft and cavity wall insulation.
• Decent Homes is a government programme delivered through local authorities and social 
landlords to improve the efficiency (and other characteristics) of the social housing stock.
• W arm Front is a programme in England which improves efficiency and heating systems in 
homes of people on low income, with the overall aims of reducing fuel poverty and 
improving health.
• Community Energy is a programme encouraging the use of combined heat and power.
• The savings ffom Building Regulations 2005 will come from higher standards for new 
boilers in existing homes in England and Wales.
43
There are other important policies which also influence energy use. The key influence on new 
housing is Part L of the national Building Regulations, which specifies the energy efficiency 
standard a property has to meet. The true influence of Part L does not show up in Table 2.3 
because it relates primarily to new housing, the creation of which by definition increases energy 
use within the sector (because rates of new building much exceed the rate of demolition -  as 
discussed further in Chapter 4). The scope of Part L has been increasing over recent years, in 
2002 it set standards for the efficiency of replacement windows in existing buildings -  moving 
beyond controlling just new housing for the first time (ODPM 2001). This move to increase 
control over existing buildings will continue in future regulations. The 2005 regulations aim to 
set higher standards (exceeding the current EU standard) for the minimum efficiency of new and 
replacement boilers in all houses (ODPM 2004). These regulations are still in the consultation 
phase, so final details are yet to be confirmed.
Other key policies include EU energy labels for lights, appliances and boilers, without which 
some UK policies would be unable to operate. There are also EU policies in place on either a 
mandatory or voluntary basis setting minimum efficiency standards for several types of 
appliance, including boilers, fridges and freezers, TVs and VCRs.
An important policy which comes into force in January 2006 is the EU Energy Performance of 
Buildings Directive, which will require the supply of energy performance certificates when all 
buildings are constructed, sold or rented out (DEFRA 2004b). Other provisions of the Buildings 
Directive are already largely covered by the UK’s Building Regulations. The government has 
the option of delaying introduction of the Directive’s provisions until 2009, but it is not yet clear 
whether they will do so.
2.6.2 Household level renewable energy
Most renewable energy policy is focused on increasing the supply of renewable electricity into 
the public distribution system. The overall goal is that 10% of electricity should be from 
renewable sources by 2010. The prospects of reaching this goal are discussed in Chapter 4. 
However, there are also some measures to encourage householders to install domestic 
renewable energy systems. There are grants available to install solar water heating and other 
small-scale renewables through the £10 million Clear Skies programme set up in 2003, to run 
for four years (DEFRA 2004b). However, this enabled fewer than 1,600 grants to individual 
households in the first year of operation -  demonstrating the small scale of the programme.
2.6.3 Discussion
Improving energy efficiency has been, and remains, by far the most important government 
policy for the domestic sector, with renewables in the domestic sector only having a small role.
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Within energy efficiency policy, emphasis is on technology improvement through regulation or 
voluntary agreements (e.g. Building regulations, EU appliance efficiency standards) and also on 
subsidies for efficiency improvements (e.g. EEC, Warm Front) which are paid for either by 
energy consumers or general taxpayers. There is no significant use of economic instruments, 
and the government is currently committed to not raising taxes on domestic energy (HM 
Treasury 2002).
The recent ‘Energy efficiency’ document (DEFRA 2004b) did not include any novel policies, 
all are continuations of existing schemes. Increasing demand for energy services was identified 
as a high risk factor threatening the planned savings, but no specific policies were introduced to 
address it. Historically this has also been the case, with little policy on reducing demand beyond 
occasional information campaigns such as the ‘are you doing your bit?’ campaign, and elements 
of the Energy Saving Trust’s information campaigns. The other particularly serious omission is 
the lack of a framework for increasing the efficiency of existing homes. Instead there is a 
patchwork of policies affecting purchase and installation of efficient technologies and additional 
insulation. While building regulations provide a framework for regulating the efficiency of new 
homes5, there is no comprehensive equivalent for existing homes. The new EU Buildings 
Directive will be a step towards remedying this situation by introducing labelling, but it may not 
come into force until 2009. In any case, as it only applies at the point of sale or renting, it will 
take decades to affect the whole of the existing UK housing stock. The assessment that current 
policies are only at ‘medium’ risk of not delivering the government’s target savings by 2010 
seems remarkably optimistic, given that very similar policies over recent years have not 
prevented energy use in the domestic sector from rising. The risks that rising consumption poses 
to projected savings from efficiency improvements are analysed in detail in Chapter 4.
2.7 Summary and conclusions
Energy use
Energy consumption in the UK economy and in the domestic sector is rising. Despite many 
changes in technology and ownership of household equipment since 1970, patterns of energy 
use by end use have changed relatively little and the average energy consumption per household 
has remained about the same (although without the improvements in efficiency that were 
achieved over the period, it would almost certainly have risen considerably). Per person, energy 
use has increased. For the economy as a whole, over the past thirty years there has been a shift 
towards lower carbon energy sources, especially natural gas and nuclear power, and away from
5 At least in theory, although there is some concern about how well the standards are implemented and 
enforced in reality (Lowe & Bell 1998)
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the most carbon-intensive fuel, coal. Chapter 4 will consider how much more scope there is for 
adopting lower carbon fuels in the UK.
Carbon dioxide emissions
The UK’s record on carbon dioxide emission reductions initially appears very impressive, 
emissions have fallen considerably since 1970 and it is likely to be one of the very few nations 
to meet its Kyoto reduction targets. This is in spite of rising energy demand. Further 
investigation indicates the situation is not as positive as it seems. Firstly, much of the reduction 
in carbon emissions was largely due to changes in fuel sources, for reasons unrelated to climate 
change policy. Secondly, when international airline emissions are taken into account, UK 
emissions have not fallen since 1990. The prospects for future savings based on current policies 
are uncertain, particularly when the carbon equivalent emissions from international air travel are 
included. The remainder of the thesis works towards identifying a new policy which could 
deliver secure carbon savings in the domestic sector.
Government policy
From the preceding discussion it is possible to draw the following provisional conclusions 
regarding current government policy on energy and climate change:
• The UK needs a negotiating strategy for achieving a global carbon reduction framework 
beyond Kyoto, without this its 60% target for 2050 will lose its meaning as a contribution to 
preventing maximum atmospheric concentrations of C 02 exceeding 550ppm.
• The UK government is highly unlikely to meet its own goal of 20% carbon emissions 
reduction by 2010, and could miss it by a large margin.
• As the fastest growing source of carbon dioxide, international air travel emissions should be 
included in UK government figures and environmental indicators as a matter o f urgency, 
without waiting for an international agreement on accounting for international air 
movements.
• There are several inherent tensions and contradictions in the goals of the government’s 
energy policy, including the question of whether economic growth is consistent with 
reducing carbon emissions.
• Energy efficiency has been used to try and deliver goals other than the more efficient use of 
energy over recent decades. This has not been successful in the domestic sector. For 
example, energy efficiency on its own has not been sufficient to enable savings to be made 
in comparison with previous years (i.e. energy conservation). This is not to deny that 
improved efficiency has helped reduce energy use compared with what would have been 
expected otherwise.
• There has been, and remains, very little policy oriented towards energy saving.
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Energy efficiency has been the most important policy tool in the domestic sector. Its uptake has 
been encouraged primarily by regulation, information and subsidies. However, although the use 
of energy has become much more efficient in households, this has not resulted in energy saving 
at a household level due to a contemporaneous increase in demand for energy services. Given 
that UK policy for the domestic sector is almost wholly reliant on efficiency to make energy and 
carbon emissions savings, this is of concern and is considered further in following chapters. 
Chapter 3 considers modelling methodologies, and investigates past modelling of potential 
savings from energy efficiency. Chapter 4 uses bottom-up energy modelling to explore the 
possibility of increased energy demand outstripping savings from increased efficiency.
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Chapter 3: Energy and carbon dioxide emissions 
modelling and future scenarios
3.1 Chapter overview
This chapter explores and compares different approaches to modelling energy futures, describes 
a number of current energy projections and compares previous projections with what has 
subsequently happened. Top-down, bottom-up and scenario modelling are all described, with 
future projections from prominent studies being presented and critically evaluated. The 
Department of Trade and Industry’s top-down energy projections from the late 1980s onwards 
are compared with subsequent energy use data -  and the discrepancies between the projections 
and reality are discussed. Projections from two bottom-up studies from earlier decades are 
presented, compared with actual energy use and lessons are drawn from these for present day 
modelling studies. Following this, the different modelling methods are compared and the 
interactions between different approaches are identified. Bottom-up modelling combined with 
insights from scenario methods is best suited for use in this thesis. However, the weaknesses of 
bottom-up modelling are identified and discussed.
3.2 Methodology
This chapter uses literature review to identify the main approaches for looking at the future of 
energy use in the UK and in the domestic sector in particular. General approaches of looking to 
the future are presented briefly and the key approaches for looking at household energy use are 
located within this overview. The two key approaches for the domestic sector are identified as 
top-down and bottom-up. Key examples of each type of model are identified and their results 
are summarised and presented, and they are compared with each other. This research forms the 
background against which the decision is taken about which type of modelling is most suitable 
in theory to help answer the thesis questions.
Projections from top-down and bottom-up studies made some years ago are compared with 
subsequent actual energy use data. Comparing past projections with what has actually happened 
is a surprisingly rare activity. In this chapter it gives new insights into both the performance of 
projections, the reasons why they might not resemble subsequent real-life energy use, and what 
the consequences of these differences might be. Particular attention is focussed on analysing the 
reasons why two particular examples of bottom-up modelling projected far lower energy 
consumption than has actually occurred. The results of this analysis are broadened to a general 
discussion about the weaknesses of bottom-up models and assessments of the likely savings
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from energy efficiency both in principle and practice. Data on the energy consequences of 
installing efficiency measures are compared with the savings modelled prior to their adoption.
3.3 Approaches to thinking about the future
Domestic energy modelling is largely concerned with making projections about the future and 
exploring alternatives, rather than understanding past and present aggregate energy 
consumption. Current patterns of household energy use and consequent emissions of carbon 
dioxide in the UK are reasonably well understood. Much of the understanding of energy 
consumption has emerged from modelling-based research, as opposed to from end-use 
measurement within households. There have been few monitoring studies because of their 
relative expense and difficulty compared to modelling (Oreszczyn & Lowe 2004).
Exploring the future of energy use is fraught with difficulties. As the physicist Niels Bohr 
supposedly said: “it is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future For decades, 
governments, industry and researchers have been producing energy projections which are often 
proved badly wrong only a few years later. Important variables in the world of energy change 
unexpectedly and relatively quickly: energy prices, fuel preferences, technologies. In addition to 
the difficulties of allowing for the unexpected, the factors determining energy demand and their 
relationships are imperfectly understood, and always in flux. Despite the difficulties, many 
reasons for looking into the future remain, and so the activity continues. Indeed concerns about 
climate change have increased interest in looking into the future because of the long-term nature 
of the threat.
A wide range of organisations publish their views about the future of energy use. They include 
government departments (DTI 2000), university and other researchers (Shorrock & Dunster 
1997, ICCEPT 2002), business (Shell International 2001), non-governmental organisations 
(McLaren, Bullock, & Yousuf 2002) and ‘futurists’ (Margolis 2001). The range of researchers 
and modellers bring to bear different techniques, degrees of expertise and academic credibility, 
and varying aims and objectives in thinking about the future of energy use. It is important to 
recognise that the aims of the thinking about the future can vary, as can the techniques used.
As the Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU), a government research unit, note, futures work 
considers possible, probable and preferable futures, and a particular study can be about any or 
all of these three (PIU 2001a). Depending on its aims, research about the future can:
• describe likely developments
• plan / prepare for future developments
• explore alternative possibilities
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design a different future and propose means of achieving it.
The projections undertaken by the Department of Trade and Industry for planning purposes (e.g. 
DTI 2000) are investigations of likely developments and probable futures. By contrast, scenario 
work tends to look at a wide range of possible futures in an imaginative and coherent way.
Often the most likely future is identified from amongst the imagined possibilities. Much of the 
work by researchers and campaign groups concentrates on identifying preferable futures and 
showing the potential for change (e.g. Johnston 2003a, DECADE 1997, Fawcett, Lane, & 
Boardman 2000, McLaren, Bullock, & Yousuf 2002). Chapman’s statement is characteristic of 
this group: “Rather than trying to predict the future I  am trying to do exactly the opposite -  to 
show the degree to which the future is under our control.” (Chapman 1975:121)
There is common agreement that energy futures studies should aim to produce projections, 
which are an account of what might happen, and not predictions, which are about what will 
happen (DECADE 1997). As a UK government report stated “Predictions are usually wrong, 
often misleading and sometimes positively counterproductive” (Cabinet Office Strategy Unit 
2000). The distinction between predictions and projections, and the ways in which they are 
used, is not always clear cut in practice, however.
PIU (2001a) have identified the six methodologies most commonly used by professional 
futurists. The two most common methods used in energy futures studies are quantitative trend 
analysis, often used to produce models of energy use, and scenario methods. These are 
described in detail below. The other techniques are: qualitative trend analysis; Delphi survey 
(gathering information or beliefs anonymously from a panel of experts); wild cards (identifying 
events which although they have a low probability of occurring would have a big impact if they 
did), and; future workshops (a participative process, usually identifying preferred futures). 
Individual techniques tend to be suited to different questions, levels of detail and time scales.
Quantitative trend analysis uses numerical analysis of past trends and relationships to act as a 
guide to the future. This type of analysis is based on assumptions about what the important 
forces and factors underlying present and future energy use are. There are different approaches 
to studying what drives energy consumption, and these have resulted in two different types of 
modelling based on quantitative analysis: ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’. Many studies using 
detailed quantitative modelling do not go beyond 20 years into the future because the 
uncertainties in projections become greater over time and the likelihood of significant 
unforeseen changes increases. Scenario methods also permit a variety of approaches and depths 
of analysis. For longer time periods, scenario approaches can be more useful. Commonly a
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combination of methods will be used, for example, scenario exercises are often based on a 
degree of quantitative modelling.
3.4 Top-down projections of energy use
3.4.1 What they are
‘Top-down’ is the description of energy models which take as their starting point the 
relationship between the economy and energy use. These models use econometric equations 
(and past data) to model the relationship between the two, at national or sector levels. By 
projecting forward economic factors, such as energy prices and economic growth, they provide 
projections of future energy consumption. They rely on aggregate economic behaviour to 
predict future changes in energy use and carbon dioxide emissions.
3.4.2 Current projections
The key source of top-down forecasts in the UK is the Department of Trade and Industry 
Energy Papers. The government has been issuing energy projections for the UK at varying 
intervals since 1977. The most recent finalised set of projections, Energy projections for the 
UK; Energy Paper 68 (DTI, 2000), presents the Government's projections of future UK energy 
demand and related emissions of carbon and sulphur dioxides to 2020. These projections 
underpinned the Climate Change Programme launched by the DETR in November 2000 (DETR 
2000a). The projections are based on an analysis of historical trends in energy use and its 
relationship to factors such as economic growth and fuel prices. They also reflect the effect of 
existing government policies on energy, but do not include the effects of the Climate Change 
Programme policies. Two different fuel price scenarios (low and high) are generated, and 
energy demand is then calculated for three variations on the rate of economic growth: low, 
central and high -  resulting in six scenarios. These projections contribute to policy development 
and assessment of the UK's efforts to meet its national and international greenhouse gases 
targets.
The DTI projections suggest there will be a growth in energy use, but that up to 2010 carbon 
dioxide emission will decline. Primary energy demand is projected on central scenarios to grow 
at 0.7-0.8% per year to 2010; final energy demand is expected to grow at about 1% per year. 
Growth is expected to be strongest in the transport sector; the domestic and service sectors also 
show strong growth. However, the structural shift in the economy away from heavy industry is 
expected to continue, giving low growth in this sector. Despite growth in energy demand, 
carbon dioxide emissions are likely to fall up to 2010, due largely to the continuing switch to 
gas in the electricity supply industry, but after that to begin rising to 2020. In the central
51
scenarios, C 02 emissions are expected to still be just (1-3%) below 1990 levels by 2020, but are 
on an upward trend.
DTI has recently published provisional updates to these energy projections (DTI 2003c, DTI 
2004e). These projections take account of the government’s policies to reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions, unlike those in Energy Paper 68. The projection for energy use in the domestic sector 
is lower than that made for the CH scenario in Energy Paper 68, see Figure 3.1. Overall, carbon 
dioxide emissions for the whole economy are expected to be 142 MtC in 2010, a 15% reduction 
on 1990 levels (DTI 2004d). This projection includes the expected effects of the UK’s climate 
change policies as well as the EU Emissions Trading Scheme.
Cambridge Econometrics also publishes forecasts for carbon dioxide emissions based on their 
integrated energy-environment-economy model of the UK (Cambridge Econometrics 2003).
Full details of the modelling are only available to subscribers, however, summaries are made 
public. Projections are published every six months. According to the July 2003 projection, 
carbon dioxide emissions in 2010 will be 12.5% lower than in 1990. The projection six months 
earlier suggested higher emissions in 2010, at 8.5% lower than 1990. The difference in 
projections reflects different assumptions about emissions from the power generation sector and 
the impact of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. This change in projections published just six 
months apart not only demonstrates the sensitivity to input assumptions common to all models, 
but also the vulnerability of emissions reductions targets to factors which may be beyond the 
influence of UK energy policy.
3.4.3 Lessons from previous top-down forecasts
Over time, DTI projections for energy use by the domestic sector have changed. This is not in 
itself surprising, what is perhaps surprising is how much the projections have changed over a 
relatively short time. Figure 3.1 shows projections for the domestic sector which were published 
between 1989 and 2000. The year of the projection refers to the year it was published, the actual 
projections usually start a few years before that date, because they begin with the latest actual 
energy use data available to the researchers at the time they created the projections. The 
projections are provided for five or ten yearly intervals, and linear projections have been made 
(by the author) between these years.
It would be wrong to put too much weight on precise comparisons between the projections 
without more detailed analysis, because there have been some methodological changes over the 
period. For example, in 2000 figures were only provided for the two ‘central’ scenarios, rather 
than the six variations calculated in previous years. Bearing that warning in mind, it is still 
worthwhile discussing how the projections have changed over time.
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Figure 3.1: Various DTI projections for annual final energy’ consumption in the UK 
domestic sector up to 2010/2020
Sources: DTI 1989, D T I 1992, DTI 1995, DTI 2 000
It is striking that there is little or no overlap in the range o f  projections for 201 0  published  only  
a few  years apart in 1992, 1995 and 2000 . W ith the exception  o f  those published in 1989, the 
projections for 2020  or 2010  occupy a rather narrow range. S ince 1992, projected energy  
consum ption has been increasing.
H aving com pared the projections, it is useful to com pare them with actual energy u se over the 
period (Figure 3 .2). For clarity, the 1992 and 1995 projections are excluded  from  Figure 3.2 . A  
provisional projection to 2010  published in 2003 is also included in this graph. This 2003  
projection1 includes the expected effects o f  p o lic ies designed to reduce carbon d ioxid e  
em issions, but only one ‘central’ projection has been provided. A full set o f  n ew  energy  
projections is awaited from  DTI.
Since 1992, projected energy consum ption has been increasing, how ever not su ffic ien tly  to keep  
up w ith what actually has happened. Present consum ption is higher than the ranges projected in 
1992 and 1995, and indeed in 2000. Projections m ade in 2000  did not include the expected  
effects o f  C lim ate Change Programm e p o lic ies that were designed to reduce carbon em issions
1 A provisional update o f carbon dioxide emissions projections was produced in 2004, but details of final 
energy were not included in this document, so 2003 remains the latest available energy projection. (DTI 
2004d).
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(DETR 2000a). As a consequence, the 2000 projection would have been expected to have been 
higher than actual energy consumption, but the opposite has been the case. The 2003 projection 
expects energy use to reduce to 2010 -  it is too soon to know whether this expectation will be 
fulfilled, but recent trends make it seem unlikely. The 2003 projection was made in the context 
of government expectation that its existing policy measures would lead to 20% carbon savings 
by 2010 from 1990, a view it not shared by many observers (as discussed in Chapter 2). This 
may explain why the 2003 projection seems ‘optimistic’ compared with subsequent reality. As 
Figure 3.2 illustrates, actual energy consumption since the late 1990s most closely matches the 
upper limit of the 1989 projection. However, this may be by coincidence, rather than because 
the underlying model represents current drivers in energy consumption more accurately than 
later versions.
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Figure 3.2: Annual final energy consumption in the UK domestic sector, actual figures 
1980-2003 and three DTI projections up to 2010/2020
Sources: DTI 1989, DTI 2000, DTI 2004a, DTI 2003c
The difference between subsequent reality and these professionally researched and relatively 
short-term projections, substantiates the introductory remarks about the difficulty of predicting 
future energy use. All four projections since 1992 have underestimated actual energy 
consumption. Given that the projections are designed to underpin policy making, this suggests 
they will have encouraged less vigorous policy on energy reduction than was necessary to make 
the relevant savings. For risk-averse policy making, a wider (and more accurate) range of 
projections would seem to be required.
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3.5 Bottom-up projections of energy use
3.5.1 What they are
Bottom-up modelling techniques are based on a different understanding of energy use from top- 
down models. Bottom-up models consist of highly disaggregated, physically-based data and 
relationships. They can be used for both the energy demand and supply sectors. The data input 
required for demand side models largely consists of quantitative data on technologies, 
efficiency, ownership, usage and lifetime of energy-using equipment and the physical 
characteristics of the housing stock. Economic variables, such as income and fuel prices, are not 
explicitly modelled within bottom-up methods. There is a systematic problem in bottom-up 
modelling, which is that new uses of energy which have not been invented at the time of 
modelling cannot be included, so bottom-up models are likely to underestimate future energy 
demand.
Bottom-up models tend to be used for different purposes than top-down projections. Bottom-up 
modelling is used by many different researchers to demonstrate the detailed possibilities for 
saving energy or reducing carbon dioxide emissions, usually as a result of improvements in 
energy efficiency (Table 3.1). The results of such research can influence policy makers. For 
example, the recent study from Imperial College (ICCEPT 2002) has been credited as being 
important to the government, with Tony Blair speaking about it in glowing terms in an 
environmental speech (Blair 2003). He particularly stressed the fact that the report promised 
60% savings without huge shifts in the economy or significant changes in lifestyle.
3.5.2 Current projections
Several recent UK bottom-up studies concerned with household energy use are summarised in 
Table 3.1. For this thesis, the two most important models are that created by BRE (Shorrock & 
Dunster 1997) and Johnston’s model (Johnston 2003a) which is based on that o f BRE. These 
are discussed in much more detail in Chapter 4. The methodology of the studies differs, some 
look at measures which are economically favourable as well as technically feasible and for 
which policy suggestions are presented, whereas others include all technically feasible 
solutions. However, each is based on detailed bottom-up modelling and relies primarily on 
energy efficiency measures to make savings, so there is an important degree of commonality.
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Table 3.1: Recent bottom-up energy studies and the potential for savings identified
Study Year Country Energy sector Savings*
BRE study 1 
(Shorrock & Dunster 
1997)
1997 UK Household energy use 14% energy saving 2020 
compared with 1995.
University of Oxford 1 
(DECADE 1997)
1997 UK Electricity for lights 
and appliances
28% electricity from 1996 
to 2010
University of Oxford 2 
(Fawcett, Lane, & 
Boardman 2000)
2000 UK Electricity and gas 
domestic lights, 
appliances & water 
heating
17% carbon /13% energy’ 
from 1998 to 2020
BRE study 2 
(Shorrock et al. 2001)
2001 UK Household energy use 17% energy saving 2000- 
2020 under their 
‘efficiency’ scenario
Energy Saving Trust 
submission to PIU energy 
review (Epple 2001)
2001 UK Household energy use 12.5% energy saving 
2000-2010, a further 
12.5% 2010-2020 (24% 
2000-2020)
European Climate 
Change Programme 
(Anon 2001)
2001 All EU All sectors 16% greenhouse gases 
from 1990/1995 to 2010
Imperial College study 
(ICCEPT 2002)
2002 UK All sectors 60% carbon savings by 
2050
German study 
(Thomas et al. 2002)
2002 Germany All sectors of the 
economy, gas and 
electricity.
Approx. 10% energy' 
saving from 2002 to 2010.
David Johnston 
(Johnston 2003a)
2003 UK Household energy use 50% energy and 61% 
carbon from 1996 to 2050
* Note: Studies often also give figures compared with a ‘reference case’ or ‘business as usual’ 
scenario, however, in this table only savings compared with actual energy consumption / carbon 
emissions in the stated year are reported.
Given the methodological differences between the studies, it would be misleading to compare 
their results in much detail. However, the overall conclusion is that both in the near and far 
term, there seem to be considerable technical opportunities for energy and carbon savings which 
have been identified and quantified using bottom-up methodologies. The UK studies in Table 
3.1 show a range of potential energy savings from the domestic sector between 1995/2000 and 
2020 of between 13% and 25%. In many cases specific policy suggestions have been made on 
how to secure the savings.
Rather than comparing these very recent studies with actual energy use, earlier bottom-up 
energy projections are compared with subsequent reality in the following section.
56
3.5.3 Lessons from earlier bottom-up studies
A considerable number of energy projections and scenarios have been created during recent 
decades. Of these, two important, detailed UK studies from the late 1970s / early 1980s are 
briefly presented and their projections are compared with what actually happened to energy use 
in the domestic sector. The two studies are:
Leach, G. et al (1979) A low energy strategy for the UK.
Olivier, D. et al (1983) Energy efficient futures: opening the solar option.
These studies have been chosen because they are both bottom-up studies, which used very 
similar approaches and techniques to those used in current studies looking at the potential for 
saving energy or carbon (e.g. Fawcett, Lane, & Boardman 2000, Johnston 2003a). In fact, both 
also have elements of other types of modelling. Leach et al includes explicit modelling of 
economic factors and Olivier et al includes both socio-economic scenarios and bottom-up 
modelling. The point of comparing the scenarios with what actually happened is not to point out 
‘mistakes’ made by the authors in their projections or assumptions, rather it is to reflect on what 
can be learnt from past studies, twenty or more years on. Both studies looked at all sectors in the 
economy, but only the domestic sector is discussed here.
A low energy strategy for the UK (Leach et al 1979)
The intention of Leach et al was to demonstrate systematically, and in detail how the UK could 
have 50 years of prosperous material growth and yet use less primary energy than it did at the 
time of writing. Two scenarios were developed: high and low. The difference between them 
was the assumed rates of GDP growth (GDP roughly doubles by 2025 in the Low case, and 
trebles in the High case), which in turn affected the detailed sectoral assumptions. The scenarios 
were based on comprehensive bottom-up modelling.
Key domestic sector assumptions included:
• within 30 years all existing dwellings would have loft and cavity wall insulation
• building regulations ensure that the heat loss standard for 1990 homes is 50% that for 1975 
homes
• electric and gas heat pumps reach mass market production in the 1980s and take 15% of 
space heating market by 2000
• major electrical appliances (cookers and white goods) halve their energy consumption 
between 1975 and 2010.
Energy-efficient futures: opening the solar option (Olivier et al 1983)
Olivier et al’s report, the result of four years work by a team of people, aimed to provide a wide 
range of scenarios as a reference point for a discussion of alternative policy options. Four
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scenarios were presented: two of them (Al and A2) were 'technical fix' futures, based on rising 
material living standards and high economic growth. The other two (B1 and B2) were 'conserver 
society' futures, based on a lower economic growth rate, the emergence of a 'post-industrial' 
economy, and the development of less environmentally damaging lifestyles. Scenarios Al and 
B1 were based on a relatively vigorous exploitation of energy efficiency improvements and 
renewable energy systems; the other two (A2 and B2) assume slower change in these directions. 
The kernel of all four scenarios was an energy policy whose highest priorities were: (1) a rapid 
and wide-ranging programme of improvements in energy efficiency; (2) a gradual phasing-in of 
renewable energy sources.
To give a flavour of the degree of change envisaged, the following assumptions were included 
in scenario Al:
• In new 1990s houses, very good insulation and basic passive solar design features reduce 
space heat demand by 95% relative to the building regulations current at the time of writing.
• Post-2000 construction is sufficiently heat-tight to have negligible space heating demand; 
internal heat gains and passive solar provide virtually all the heat needed to keep buildings 
warm and comfortable in the UK climate.
Comparison with what actually happened
Domestic energy scenarios are shown in comparison with what actually occurred (Figure 3.3). 
Energy consumption has increased 1975-2000, so that consumption in 2000 was 26% higher 
than in 1975, whereas Leach et al suggested a reduction of 36% could be achieved. The highest 
and lowest Olivier et al scenarios, B1 and A2, show a range which falls lower than Leach at al 
in 2000 and beyond. Scenario A2 projected energy use in 2000 to be just one third of what it 
actually was in reality.
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Figure 3.3: Comparison of projections for domestic energy sector UK, 1975-2025, with 
actual energy use, 1975-2003
Sources: DTI 2004a, Leach et al. 1979, Olivier et al. 1983 
Discussion
The fact that these scenarios bear little relation to what has happened to domestic energy use 
should not reflect negatively on their authors. Their scenarios were not intended to be 
predictions of the future, they were meant to illustrate what might have happened had the UK 
tried to be a low energy economy - which it manifestly has not. Nevertheless, it is still worth 
asking why the energy use projections for 2000 were so much lower than what actually 
happened.
Some of the key values in the projections for each scenario are compared with what has actually 
happened (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2: Comparison of projections by Leach et al and Oliver et al with actual values
Projections Reality
Houses with cavity wall 
insulation (%)
100% by 2010 (Leach) 23% in 2001
(Shorrock & Utley 2003)
Accessible lofts with loft 
insulation (%)
100% by 2010 (Leach) 94% in 2001
(Shorrock & Utley 2003)
Space heating provided 
by heat pumps
15% by 2000 (Leach) Almost zero
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Appliance energy 
consumption (cookers, 
fridges and freezers, 
washing machines, 
dishwashers, dryers)
Half of 1975 value by 2010 
(Leach)
No significant change to 
efficiency of hobs, ovens and 
kettles. Efficiency of most 
white goods improved 
(Fawcett, Lane, & Boardman 
2000). But UK electricity 
consumption by domestic 
lights and appliances increased 
by around 75% between 1975 
and 2001. (Shorrock & Utley 
2003)
Heat loss standard for 
buildings
Half of 1975 value by 1990 
(Leach)
Building Regulation heat loss 
standards (U values) for walls 
and roofs were less than half 
the 1976 standard by 1990. 
This led to the overall heating 
energy requirement being one 
third lower in 1990 than in 
1976. (Chu & Oreszczyn 
1991)
Heating requirement of 
new 1990s home
95% lower than that of new 
homes in early 1980s 
(Oliver)
Heating requirement for 1990 
standard new home about 20% 
lower and for 1995 new home 
around 40% lower than in 
1982. (Lowe & Bell 1998)
Heating requirement of 
post-2000 homes
Near to zero (Olivier) 2002 new homes should use 
around 25% less energy than 
in 1995. Nowhere near to zero. 
(ODPM 2004)
Of all these projections, the two matched in reality were the Leach et al target for loft insulation 
and the improved heat loss standards for dwellings between 1975 and 1990, otherwise the 
energy efficiency targets modelled have not been achieved.
The key differences between scenarios and reality were:
• scenarios assumed far greater take-up of existing energy efficiency technologies, such as 
cavity wall insulation, than has been the case;
• scenarios assumed more advancement of emerging energy efficient technologies, e.g. heat 
pumps, super-insulated houses than actually occurred;
• because new uses of energy cannot be anticipated and included in bottom-up projections (as 
the authors recognised) the scenarios underestimated consumption from new electrical 
goods.
The methodology for undertaking a bottom-up projection over the last twenty years has changed 
very little. One difference is that a ‘business as usual’ projection is now usually included in 
modelling exercises. In addition, there is now more data available on the ownership and usage 
of end-use equipment in the home. Previous experience with modelling such as this should give
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pause for thought when faced with optimistic technologically-based assessments of potential 
savings. Current energy saving projections are no less vulnerable to the issues identified above 
than earlier exercises, i.e. there is no real evidence that lessons have been learnt.
3.6 Scenarios
3.6.1 What they are
The word ‘scenario’ has been used earlier to describe future projections generated by top-down 
or bottom-up models. In this section ‘scenario’ has a more specialised use, as described by 
Gallopin & Raskin:
Scenarios are stories about the future with a logical plot and narrative governing the manner 
in which events unfold. ...Compelling scenarios need to be constructed with rigor, detail and 
creativity, and evaluated for plausibility, self-consistency, and sustainability. ... Scenarios also 
clarify alternative worldviews and values, challenge conventional thinking, and encourage 
debate. Since they embody the perspectives o f their creators, either explicitly or implicitly, they 
are never value-free.” (Gallopin & Raskin 2002:10)
This definition of scenarios describes well the types of scenarios developed for the UK as 
Foresight Scenarios (SPRU 2002) and internationally by the IPCC (2001b). Scenarios are 
different from bottom-up and top-down models in that they are only ever about the future, 
whereas bottom-up and top-down analyses are descriptions of the past and present, which can 
be used to look forward to the future.
3.6.2 Current scenarios
Two scenario exercises are discussed in detail. The first, the “Foresight” scenarios, are for the 
UK. The other detailed account is of the EPCC’s global scenarios. In addition, a brief description 
is given of other scenario exercises, which differ significantly from these two.
Foresight scenarios
The UK’s national Foresight Programme has developed four scenarios of environmental futures 
for 2010 - 2030, which were first published in 1998 (Office for Science and Technology 1998) 
and updated in 2001 (SPRU 2002). The Foresight scenarios have been framed in the context of 
two basic dimensions of change: social values and governance systems (Figure 3.4). The social 
values dimension takes account of social and political priorities as well as the economic patterns 
resulting from them. At one end of the spectrum ‘individual’ values are dominated by economic 
and political liberalism, at the other end ‘community’ values are shaped by a more 
communitarian ethic emphasising social networks and responsibility. The governance system 
dimension represents the structure of political authority and decision-making. The two extremes
61
are characterised as ‘interdependence’ and ‘autonomy’. For interdependence political power is 
distributed away from national governments, both upward to supra-national bodies and 
downwards to regional government. Autonomy indicates that public and private decision 
making is largely retained at the national and regional level within the UK.
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Figure 3.4: Foresight environmental scenarios for the UK
These dimensions are taken as axes which define the four scenarios: World Markets 
(interdependence and individual), Global Sustainability (interdependence and community), 
National Enterprise (autonomy and individual) and Local Stewardship (autonomy and 
community).
The Foresight scenarios have been used by PIU to investigate whether 60% carbon savings 
could be achieved by 2050 (PIU 2002). They showed that 60% reductions are only achieved in 
the Global Sustainability and Local Stewardship scenarios -  i.e. in those with changed social 
priorities where sustainability is a driving force (Table 3.3).
Table 3.3: Carbon dioxide emissions, preliminary estimate, UK, 2050
Scenario Annual carbon 
emissions (MtC)
% change from 
2000
2000 138
World Markets, 2050 166 20%
National Enterprise, 2050 150 9%
Global Sustainability, 2050 54 -61%
Local Stewardship, 2050 55 -60%
Source: PIU 2002
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The Global Sustainability (GS) and Local Stewardship (LS) scenarios both achieve 60% 
reductions although by very different means. GS requires extensive use of hydrogen and some 
carbon sequestration, in addition to major increases in renewable energy use and energy 
efficiency. LS achieves 60% reductions because of lower economic growth and social change. 
PIU note that WM and NE could not achieve a 60% decrease in carbon emissions even if they 
had carbon-free electricity generation.
IPCC
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has created four ‘families’ of scenarios 
(neutrally named A l, A2, B l, B2), which encompass four combinations of demographic 
change, social and economic development, and broad technological developments (IPCC 
2001b). Figure 3.5 gives a brief overview of the scenarios, with Al featuring high levels of 
economic growth and globally based activity and little concern for the environment, contrasting 
with B2 which features more regionally based economies and high levels of environmental 
concern. Three scenarios have been developed for the Al family which explicitly explore 
energy technology developments at the same primary energy demand: A1FI which is fossil-fuel 
intensive, AIT which is non-fossil fuel intensive, and A IB a ‘balanced’ mix of fossil and non­
fossil fuel energy. IPPC state that there is no single central or “best guess” scenario, and 
probabilities or likelihoods are not attached to individual scenarios. None of the scenarios 
includes any action to combat climate change.
More economic
More global
Al
550-950 ppm
A2
850 ppm
Bl
500 ppm
B2
600 ppm
More regional
More environmental
Figure 3.5: IPCC scenarios for energy use and carbon dioxide emissions, showing carbon 
concentrations in the atmosphere by 2100
The projections for primary energy demand vary four-fold between the different scenarios, with 
the Al scenarios having four times the energy demand of B l. In all cases there is growth from
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1990 levels, the lowest level of growth being in Bl where energy demand in 2100 is about one 
and a half times what it is today. The differences in primary energy demand and the types of 
energy used to meet the demand translate into a range of carbon emissions, with the carbon 
dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere by 2100 varying between 500ppm and 950ppm 
depending on the scenario. So, without action to reduce carbon dioxide emissions, IPCC do not 
foresee a scenario whereby atmospheric CO2 concentrations are below 500ppm in 2100. 
Although IPCC do not attach probabilities to any of their scenarios, A1F1 which generates the 
highest emissions at 950ppm by 2100 is the scenario which is, in the author’s view, most like 
‘business as usual’ development of current trends.
Other scenarios
Two other scenario exercises, which differ considerably from the IPCC and Foresight scenarios, 
are described briefly. Shell, who pioneered the use of scenarios in the 1970s, have developed 
two scenarios for the global energy system which halt the rise in carbon dioxide emissions by 
2050 leading to a stabilising of atmospheric carbon levels below 550 ppm (Shell International
2001). The scenarios contrast an evolutionary progression from coal, to gas, to renewables (or 
possibly nuclear), ‘Dynamics as Usual’, against the potential for a hydrogen economy supported 
by developments in fuel cells, advanced hydrocarbon technologies and carbon dioxide 
sequestration, ‘The Spirit of the Coming Age’. World primary energy demand from 2000 to 
2050 would double in Dynamics as Usual and almost triple in The Spirit of the Coming age.
The contribution of energy from hydro, biofuels and other renewables would increase in those 
fifty years by a factor of eight and ten respectively. The Shell scenarios are very technologically 
optimistic. Indeed, they have a very clear agenda - which is to show that business will be able to 
restrict the damage from climate change through technology. They are unique in identifying a 
business as usual scenario which results in stabilised carbon emissions.
Gallopin and Raskin (2002) look at a broader range of scenarios than Shell. They present three 
basic scenarios, Conventional Worlds, Barbarization and Great Transitions, for each of which 
two variations are outlined. Conventional Worlds scenarios offer visions of gradual adjustment 
and essential continuity of future values and institutions with those of the industrial era. 
Barbarization scenarios consider the grim possibility that the march of conventional 
globalisation is knocked off course by a general crisis. Great Transitions are scenarios in which 
global society undergoes profound change in response to planetary challenges. This would be a 
values-led shift towards an alternative global development vision which would focus on values 
such as spiritual, cultural and intellectual fulfilment, quality of community and enjoyment of 
nature. In contrast to Shell, the authors see no possibility of restricting carbon emissions under 
business as usual (Conventional Worlds) development. Current trends will not ‘bend the curve’ 
of development toward an environmentally and socially sustainable global future.
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Discussion
The scenarios mapped out in the Foresight exercise and by IPCC are based on similar axes 
defined in one dimension by the geographical integration of economic and political activity and 
in the other by varying social values. Thus, there is an equivalence between Al and World 
Markets, A2 and Provincial Enterprise, Bl and Global Sustainability and B2 and Local 
Stewardship. In the Foresight studies it is only those scenarios with changed social values 
(towards environmental values) which can achieve significant carbon savings. However, 
according to IPCC, a business as usual scenario which incorporated very high levels of 
renewable energy or nuclear (AIT) could result in emissions almost as low as those from the 
more environmentally focused scenario B l. In the UK, a significant additional contribution to 
national energy supplies from either nuclear or renewable energy within the next twenty years 
seems extremely unlikely (Hillman & Fawcett 2004).
The scenarios developed by both Foresight and IPCC which generate highest emissions (World 
Markets and A l) are those which most closely follow current trends. IPCC and Foresight have 
failed to imagine a world which could be worse in terms of climate change than a continuation 
of recent patterns of development. Not only does this underline the importance of developing in 
a different way from ‘business as usual’, it also suggests that the true ‘worst case’ scenario 
could be even worse for the environment than those envisaged by IPPC and Foresight. There 
might be even more destructive patterns of development than those underway today, which 
could result in greater climate change more quickly, delivering a worse future than currently 
imagined.
3.7 Comparison of modelling methods
The three key methods of modelling energy futures have now been reviewed individually. This 
section compares top-down and bottom-up modelling, and then bottom-up modelling with 
scenario methods. The extent to which these methods are complementary or contradictory is 
debated.
3.7.1 Contrasting top-down and bottom-up modelling
Creating a model is a way of understanding the world. Economists tend to favour top-down 
models that do not explicitly include technology; technologists favour bottom-up models that do 
not explicitly include economic factors such as the price of energy. Given the different 
understandings of the world they embody, can top-down economic models and bottom-up
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technical and stock models both be equally valid? Are they complementary or contradictory 
ways of understanding the same phenomena?
There are good arguments to suggest that these types of model are complementary. Shorrock 
and Dunster (1997) write that: the factors that feed into econometric models and physical
models are not independent - they are simply different ways o f describing the same 
phenomena.” They go on to argue that although physical models do not explicitly include 
household income, this is indirectly included in the model through its effects on the energy 
using equipment that people own and how they use it. In addition, there is a degree of 
interaction between bottom-up and top-down models. For example, the DTI use numbers 
generated from bottom-up modelling by the DECADE team at the University of Oxford in their 
econometric model (DTI 2000). This suggests the modelling methods can be complementary 
rather than contradictory.
On the other hand, Shorrock and Utley, authors of the Domestic Energy Fact File series, state 
that their modelling shows that energy prices have had no effects on energy consumption over 
recent decades:
“Fuelprices, income and energy expenditure are considered ... and it is shown that, overall, 
fuel price variations have not had much direct effect on domestic energy use over the past thirty 
years or so. Rather, physical factors ... offer the best explanation o f the observed pattern o f 
domestic energy use. ” (Shorrock & Utley 2003:17)
According to this analysis, physical bottom-up modelling is sufficient to understand what has 
happened, and, by implication, what will happen in the future. There has been no response by 
the DTI to this assessment (Shorrock 2004). However, price is only one component of 
econometric modelling, and lack of price sensitivity (over the range experience in the past 30 
years) clearly does not mean economic factors have no influence on energy use.
The different world views encompassed by top-down and bottom-up modelling approaches can 
have consequences in terms of policy prescriptions. In top-down models, the price of energy is a 
key determinant of energy consumption and modifying price is naturally seen as a key policy 
instrument. In contrast, those who create bottom-up models are likely to suggest a diversity of 
detailed technical improvements which can be brought about by various policy instruments 
rather than energy taxation.
3.7.2 Contrasting scenarios and bottom-up modelling
Scenarios and bottom-up models are designed to do somewhat different jobs. The general 
approach in bottom-up studies is to contrast a business as usual projection, with one where 
many efficiency measures are introduced. The efficiency projection is based on the same
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patterns of ownership, usage and service standards as in the business as usual case. In other 
words, only technology changes and lifestyles remain unaltered. However, this understanding of 
future possibilities contrasts with that offered by the Foresight scenarios, and other scenario 
exercises, whereby the types of technologies adopted and the energy savings made depends on 
social values. PIU (PIU 2002) suggest that only in futures where sustainability is an important 
social goal will significant carbon savings be made. The difference between these types of 
future vision arises because bottom-up projections are designed to illustrate the possibilities for 
change that technology offers rather than to provide a comprehensive and coherent picture of 
possible future worlds. Bottom-up models cannot represent society.
However, if insights from the scenario approach about the linkage between technologies, social 
values and lifestyles are not incorporated into bottom-up projections then the technology 
improvement scenarios may be misleading. Why would radical technological solutions (such as 
external cladding of solid wall properties or solar water heating) be implemented in the absence 
of equally radical social change? Though technological solutions are plausible in terms of the 
technology, economics and policies to introduce them, they can lack plausibility in terms of a 
believable future society. The technological improvement scenarios offered by bottom-up 
studies are thought to be uncontroversial because they do not challenge current trends in ever- 
increasing demand for energy services. However, arguing for a technology-based approach 
alone is not a ‘value-free’ position: it defends the current values of unrestrained economic 
growth and non-intervention in consumption, values which may not be compatible with 
sustainable development or significantly reduced carbon emissions (SDC 2003).
3.7.3 Discussion and implications for this research
All types of modelling have limitations. Attempting to look fifty years into the future is in itself 
an exercise which is problematic. However, the justification for this time scale is two-fold. 
Firstly, it acknowledges the long-term nature of the problem. The government has already set a 
carbon dioxide reduction target for 2050, which makes the same point. A long-term strategy for 
reducing carbon emissions is required. Secondly, a long-term vision is important to ensure that 
actions taken in the near future do not preclude further savings in future. This is particularly the 
case for housing, where houses built today are likely to last for hundreds of years (see Chapter 
4). Long-term analysis provides the framework for better short-term policies.
One of the two key questions posed in this thesis is whether improvements in energy efficiency 
can lead to savings of 60% by 2050. Econometric models have been shown to have a poor 
record of projecting future energy use over the short term (10-20 years). Further, it is doubtful 
that trying to fmd out whether 60% carbon savings could be achieved by 2050 is a legitimate 
question for top-down models. This is not the sort of question they are designed to answer.
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Bottom-up modelling presents the best basis for analysing the prospects for sector-wide savings 
from energy efficiency. Using a bottom-up model to look forward this far in the future has many 
limitations, not least that errors in projections will increase considerably over time. Section 3.8 
discusses in detail the limitations of trying to model savings from energy efficiency.
In order to draw on experience from scenario exercises, the bottom-up model created in Chapter 
4 will be used to investigate different social scenarios. Two scenarios, High Energy and Low 
Energy, will be created. The social values implicit in these scenarios will align with ‘individual’ 
(High Energy) and ‘community’ (Low Energy) values, as described in the Foresight scenarios.
3.8 The problems of modelling savings from energy efficiency
3.8.1 Introduction
Evidence in this chapter and Chapter 2 has shown that, while savings from energy efficiency 
measures can be calculated, this may bear no relationship to the saving which are subsequently 
achieved in reality. This section first takes a closer look at the problems of modelling savings 
from energy efficiency. Following this, the limitations of focusing on individual properties 
rather than the wider housing stock are considered.
3.8.2 Modelling problems
The problems can be categorised as:
• Data problems -  difficulties in making future estimates to use within models
• Modelling problems -  inherent problems with bottom-up modelling and the relationship 
between energy use in models and in real life
• General problems.
These are discussed in turn below, with a focus on the risks of over-estimating the potential for 
savings from improvements in efficiency.
Data problems
To create future projections in bottom-up models, assumptions have to made about the 
development of efficiency in existing and new products, ownership and usage over time of each 
individual technology modelled.
Analysis of early modelling studies shows that the key energy saving options and technologies 
have barely changed over the past 20-25 years (this is also illustrated by comparing two ‘homes 
for the future’ designed twenty years apart, see Appendix 1). Some technologies which it was 
hoped would make a contribution to energy saving, such as solar water heating and heat pumps,
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are still only minor players, whereas other technologies for which there was previously 
optimism, such as district heating and solar heating, have not materialised and are unlikely to 
make major impacts without significant government support in the UK. No significant new 
energy-saving technologies have been introduced over the past twenty or so years, although the 
efficiency, attractiveness and cost effectiveness of many, e.g. compact fluorescent lamps 
(Palmer & Boardman 1998), has improved greatly. In modelling, significant efforts are often put 
into looking for potential new energy saving technologies (e.g. heat pumps, micro-CHP), 
whereas history shows new energy using technologies, such as PCs and digital entertainment 
equipment, and greater use of existing technologies have so far been much more influential on 
energy use. There is always the danger that hope and enthusiasm for new technologies, 
particularly at an early stage of development, will outpace what they subsequently deliver.
In order to calculate efficiency savings, estimates have to be made of the rate of take up and 
ultimate extent of take up of more efficient technologies. If estimates are based on the 
assumption that people will act in their own economic interest and take up efficiency options as 
quickly as possible and that the ultimate level of take up will be determined by the number of 
households for which it is cost effective, savings will be over-estimated. As Wade & Leach 
state:
“The lack o f take up o f well-proven and cost-effective energy efficiency technologies is a 
familiar problem, yet it is one for which the solution remains elusive.” (2003:133)
Take up rates in reality can be slow. Shorrock and Utley (2003) use historic ownership data of 
hot water tank insulation, draught proofing, loft insulation and other measures to estimate likely 
future trends for individual measures. Their analysis shows that at present rates of growth it 
might take until 2050 before cavity wall insulation is present in all homes for which it is 
suitable. It also demonstrates that even the fastest growing markets can take around thirty years 
to reach saturation.
The future use of technologies has to be estimated in sufficient detail to allow future energy 
consumption to be calculated. So, for example, for washing machines the number o f uses per 
year at each temperature must be estimated. Such estimates will be created with reference to 
past data and trends in washing machine usage, projections of number of people per household, 
trends in fabrics and their required washing temperatures and washing powders and so on.
The most difficult aspect of estimating the future usage of technologies lies in understanding the 
relationship between changing technology, particularly increases in efficiency, and consequent 
changes in usage. It is widely acknowledged that energy efficiency improvements can be used 
to gain more energy services rather than to reduce energy use, a phenomenon known as take-
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back. The key end use where take-back occurs is space heating. Evidence shows that the colder 
people’s homes are prior to efficiency improvements, the more of the gain in efficiency they 
take back as increased warmth (Milne & Boardman 1997). The government assumes that people 
in fuel poverty will take 75% of the benefits of better heating systems and improved home 
insulation to increase heating levels (DEFRA 2004b). On the other hand, there is evidence that 
replacing ordinary lighting with energy efficient lighting does not significantly increase hours of 
lighting use (DECADE 1997). Thus the amount of take-back seems to depend on unmet needs 
or wants; there is no universal rule.
Modelling problems
The inability of bottom-up modelling to anticipate new uses of energy, as already mentioned, is 
a well-known but nevertheless serious limitation of these models. New uses of energy already 
on the horizon include domestic air conditioning, outdoor space heating, high power showers, 
and increasing uses of digital entertainment equipment, and all of these have the potential to 
lead to considerably increased energy consumption in the domestic sector.
Research shows that expected savings from energy efficiency have often been over-estimated, 
in comparison with subsequent monitored savings. By contrast, the author does not know of any 
research which shows unexpectedly large savings from energy efficiency schemes or policies. 
There can be many different reasons for real-life energy savings being less than those modelled, 
including:
• Failure of real life efficiency to match that achievable in theory for many different 
reasons, e.g. substandard installation of efficiency measures such as insulation
• take-back of savings as increased service (discussed above)
• unexpected behaviour by householders
• faults in modelling (where the data inputs are correct, but the model is flawed).
Henderson et al. (2003) analysed monitored data on energy consumption in electrically heated 
households before and after energy saving interventions under the ‘EESOP1 ’ (Energy 
Efficiency Standards of Performance) programme which operated from 1994 to 1998. The 
energy efficiency measures installed varied by household, and included cavity wall insulation, 
loft insulation and efficient light bulbs. They found that the savings monitored were about half 
of those expected. Their hypothesis is that this is primarily because standards of heating in the 
properties were lower than modelled (both before and after interventions) so that the expected 
savings were not there to be made. Thus in this case the assumptions which informed the 
modelling were likely to be at fault.
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Oreszczyn (2004b) explains how the modelling of the energy characteristics of conservatories 
varied very considerably from their real life usage. Initially, modelling suggested that the 
addition of a conservatory could lead to saving of around 5% (or 1,000kWh) of the heating 
energy requirement of the house. However, research demonstrated that in reality people were 
heating their conservatories, rather than using them as unheated spaces as had been assumed. 
Heating a conservatory attached to a new house can almost double the heating load (Chu & 
Oreszczyn 1991). In this case unexpected behaviour led to the initial discrepancy between the 
modelled and real-life energy impact of conservatories.
As mentioned briefly already, there has been very little monitoring of energy use in UK 
households. The largest sample sizes have been around 100 (e.g. LEEP 1996). Without detailed 
monitoring of a significant sample of dwellings, there is little suitable data with which to 
validate the details of modelling. This increases the risk that, while models can correctly 
represent total UK energy use for the past and present, modelling of the individual components 
of energy use is incorrect. This will lead to poor future projections.
General problems
There are economic arguments which question the economy-wide effect of efficiency. Herring 
(2000) argues that improvements in energy efficiency will lower the implicit price of energy, 
and thus of energy services, hence stimulating demand for energy and energy services and 
resulting in increased consumption.
Finally, greater energy efficiency can be part of the process that creates new demand for energy 
consumption ‘needs’, where need is not a fixed standard, but is socially and culturally 
determined with yesterday’s luxury fast becoming today’s essential. Would heating the whole 
house, rather than just the living areas, have become common practice without more efficient 
central heating systems and better insulated houses? It seems unlikely. In this, energy efficiency 
is part of the broader technological and economic advance which is serving to bring energy- 
using equipment and activities (e.g. cars, central heating systems, long-distance holidays) within 
reach of most British people. It is very difficult to disentangle the role of energy efficiency in 
constructing these energy consumption ‘needs’, but there is little doubt it is playing a part in this 
process.
Conclusion
None of the factors listed above make it inevitable that bottom up models will lead to over­
estimation of the savings from efficiency measures, except perhaps the last. However, in 
practice over-estimation has been common, and these factors should be acknowledged in future 
modelling.
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3.8.3 The limitations of focussing on individual properties
Bottom-up modelling largely considers energy consumption and reductions possible at the level 
of the individual property. For existing housing, most energy efficiency options apply only to 
individual properties. However, for new housing schemes, larger scale issues such as orientation 
and built form, which affect the whole development, could have an effect on energy 
consumption. This section identifies possible demand-side energy and carbon reduction options 
which operate on a collective level.
Most examples of low energy (or low carbon) housing in the UK are single homes or very small 
developments of dwellings, and as such it is difficult to use existing empirical UK data to 
identify whether additional benefits are gained when low energy housing is designed on a larger 
scale. In addition, there are relatively few examples of low energy housing of any type, and 
even fewer examples for which monitored energy data is available (Johnston 2003a). Lovell 
(2003) reports that in the English East Midlands, which is considered one of the most innovative 
regions in the UK, low carbon housing formed just 0.08% of new housing built in the region in 
the period 1991-2000. The largest of the low carbon housing schemes Lovell identified 
consisted of less than fifty dwellings. Thus there are few UK examples which can be 
investigated to see whether and how larger groups of dwellings can save significantly more 
energy than single dwellings.
Probably the most celebrated sustainable housing development in the UK on a relatively large 
scale is BedZED in Sutton, London, constructed during 2000/01. BedZED is a compact mixed- 
use urban development with 82 housing units, with over 2500 m2 of space for offices, studios, 
shops and community facilities. The housing is a mix of one- and two-bedroom flats, 
maisonettes and town houses and is laid out in three parallel terraces (Bill Dunster Architects
2002). A number of the energy features of BedZED can be replicated in single properties, e.g. 
super insulation, low energy lighting and efficient appliances, advanced glazing, use of 
conservatories to increase solar gain, PV cells providing electricity and solar shading in 
summer. However, other features were a function of the overall design and whole development, 
a terraced built form which minimises heat loss, orientation being organised so that one building 
does not steal sunlight from its neighbours, integration of work spaces to take advantage of 
north-facing aspect in a positive way, and wood-fuelled combined heat and power (CHP) 
providing carbon emissions-free hot water, heating energy and electricity. There has not yet 
been a full report on the performance of BedZED which identifies the contribution of different 
elements to its eventual energy use and carbon emissions. However, existing information on 
how built form and orientation influence energy consumption is discussed below.
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The built form of a property can have a significant effect on its energy use. In the 1970’s BRE 
carried out work looking at the energy consumption of dwellings with the same floor area but of 
different built form (Table 3.4). This showed that a detached house used more than twice as 
much heating energy as an intermediate flat, and 60% more than a terraced house. The work 
was repeated in 1995, by which time the difference in heating energy requirements of varying 
built forms was less pronounced, but still existed. However, the proposed standards for 2005 
show very similar ratios of energy use by built form to those in 1975. The data demonstrate the 
difference built form can make to heating energy requirements, with flats being the most 
efficient built form and bungalows the least.
Table 3.4: Influence of built form on heating energy requirements for new properties of 
the same size
Index of heating energy, detached house = 100
1975 1995 2005 proposals
Detached house 100 100 100
Bungalow n/a 122 n/a
Semi-detached house 85 93 89
Top flat 71 n/a n/a
mid-terrace 63 84 69
Intermediate flat 44 n/a 43
Sources: BRE 1975, ODPM 2004
Note: These calculations are on a slightly different basis as the 1995 and 2005 figures were 
initially calculated for the average floor area for properties of that built form and then 
normalised in this table, rather than being calculated from the start for properties of the same 
floor area as was the case for the 1975 data.
However, as Owens (1986) points out, flats and terraced houses usually serve a different sector 
of the market from detached homes. In general, ‘moving up through the housing market’ has 
meant moving to less energy-efficient built forms. However, this is not universally true within 
the UK, flats are more popular and represent a much greater percentage of dwellings in Scotland 
than in the other UK countries (Shorrock et al. 2001). The cultural and economic value attached 
to different built forms may not be fixed, but must be acknowledged.
A lot of work has been undertaken on the potential for passive solar gain to offset traditional 
space heating. In particular a great deal of work was done on this topic in the 1970s and 1980s, 
and this is when most solar housing projects were built (Taylor & Bruhns 1999). The research 
generally showed that the contribution of solar heating to a house’s total energy use (as a result 
of specific solar design) was actually relatively small (Vale & Vale 2000).
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In conclusion, the properties of individual dwellings are key to their energy efficiency. Built 
form is still important in influencing energy use. However, because of the social and functional 
differences between built forms, it is likely to be difficult to move towards more efficient forms 
for much of the housing market. The influence of orientation is lower than might be thought.
3.9 Summary and conclusions
A wide range of researchers and institutions use models to look at the future. Projections are 
created for different purposes: to illustrate possible futures, to show futures which should be 
avoided or encouraged, to help today’s decision makers, to defend the status quo or to argue for 
change. The focus of this thesis is to identify means of reaching a preferable future.
Modelling based on quantitative methods is a long-established means for identifying carbon 
savings in the domestic sector. In the UK there is a lot of experience of producing calculations 
for suggested futures, but insufficient reflection on and analysis of past experience. DTI 
projections continue to underestimate future energy consumption. Given that the projections are 
designed to underpin policy making, this suggests they will have led to less vigorous policy than 
necessary to make savings. For risk-averse policy making, a wider range of projections than 
provided by this sort of analysis is required.
Many plausible and defensible technological projections for making savings have been 
developed, most of which look at a twenty year period. However, as for past exercises, these 
depend on widespread adoption of energy efficient technologies and the development of new 
technologies. Detailed analysis of earlier modelling and data from UK energy efficiency 
programmes shows how vulnerable assumptions about efficiency savings are. While this does 
not suggest that bottom-up modelling should not be undertaken, it does suggest much more 
attention should be paid to past experience, and that more conservative estimates of energy 
savings from efficiency should be employed. Further, insights from scenario modelling should 
be incorporated where possible. Most scenario exercises show that only a change in social 
values (towards sustainability) will result in 60% carbon or energy reductions by 2050, which 
brings into question the reliability of expected savings based on technical changes alone.
At present, the UK does not appear to be moving towards a lower carbon future. With the single 
exception of the Shell scenarios, all the business as usual projections referenced in this chapter, 
whether top-down, bottom-up or scenario-based, suggest that the UK will not achieve 
significant carbon reductions in the domestic sector within the next 20-50 years.
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This chapter has identified the techniques most suitable for addressing the research questions of 
this thesis as bottom-up modelling with some contribution from scenario methods. The 
following chapter looks in detail at a particular bottom-up model, explores the savings it 
suggests are available from technological change, and demonstrates how these savings could be 
negated in a scenario where changes in behaviour lead to high growth in energy demand.
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Chapter 4 -  Modelling energy use and carbon dioxide 
emissions
4.1 Chapter overview
Chapter 3 has shown that many studies suggest considerable savings are still available from 
improvements in energy efficiency, while warning of the limitations of such estimates. The 
starting point for this chapter is Johnston’s (Johnston 2003a) bottom-up modelling work which 
suggested carbon savings of 60% could be achieved by 2050 through efficiency improvements. 
Johnston’s model was chosen because both the method and input data are fully publicly 
available via his PhD, and so it was possible to re-create this bottom-up model.
However, this chapter challenges the robustness of the projected savings, both in terms of the 
difficulties of achieving theoretical savings in real life, and under scenarios of increased demand 
for energy services. Variations in energy demand from social and behavioural / lifestyle changes 
are discussed in some detail. The key variables driving demand are: internal temperature, 
personal hot water usage, household size and consequently the number of households, the rate 
of demolition and replacement of old property, and energy use by lights and appliances. The 
combined effect of alterations in these variables is considered in ‘High Energy’ and ‘Low 
Energy’ scenarios, which demonstrate the wide range of possible future energy consumption. 
Under the ‘High Energy’ scenario, the energy saving technologies identified by Johnston would 
not be adequate to ensure a reduction of carbon dioxide emissions by 60% by 2050, indeed only 
17% savings could be achieved. The ‘Low Energy’ scenario identifies non-technological routes 
to carbon and energy savings, which could exceed 60% by 2050.
Following this discussion of demand side influences on energy use and carbon emissions, there 
is a brief discussion of potential changes to the supply side mix of fuels used to generate 
electricity and to supply heat to the housing stock. The consequences for carbon dioxide 
emissions are outlined.
As well as presenting a bottom-up model and introducing new data and analysis, this chapter 
aims to add to the arguments in the previous chapter which challenge the credibility of 
projections of energy savings from existing models, leading to the conclusion that a new policy 
approach to achieving carbon savings is required.
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4.2 Methodology
The analysis in this chapter is based largely on Johnston’s (2003a) bottom-up model, the full 
details of which are explained in the following section. The energy projections from Johnston’s 
model are presented, and analysed with respect to historic and more recent energy consumption 
data, taking into account external temperatures. His projections are also compared with linear 
projections to 2050 which are based on actual domestic sector final energy 1970-2003.
Johnston’s model was recreated as an Excel spreadsheet model based on the details in his thesis. 
The re-created model was tested against the original to check that the outputs match, and errors 
were corrected. Where new data has become available since the original model was published, 
this is presented. Selected new data is combined into a new ‘Tina Fawcett - business as usual’ 
(TF-BAU) scenario and compared with Johnston’s BAU scenario to identify the difference the 
new data make.
Barriers to the technological improvements Johnston investigated in his energy saving scenario 
are illustrated, by investigating key technologies in more detail. The key barriers, both technical 
and non-technical, to their adoption are outlined, both by comparison with past experience of 
technology adoption and other key factors.
The model was used to develop new scenarios based on social and behavioural change. The 
potential social and behavioural changes have been identified by focusing on changes that 
would have a major effect on energy use, analysing how these factors have changed over recent 
years and looking at experience in other countries. One of these factors is rates of demolition -  
and existing data sources have been combined to get a more accurate picture of current 
demolition rates. Another factor is internal temperature, and a comprehensive review of data on 
internal temperature in UK houses which combines modelled and monitored values from a 
number of different studies has been undertaken. In addition, theories of thermal comfort are 
described and used to gain insight into changing internal temperatures in the UK. Once possible 
future developments have been identified, the maximum and minimum values are combined 
together in two scenarios, to give a high energy and low energy scenario.
Finally, the future carbon intensity of energy sources in the UK is discussed. Secondary data is 
used to calculate the current carbon intensity of electricity. Existing projections of the carbon 
intensity of electricity from different sources are compared. The prospects for increase of the 
low carbon sources of electricity -  renewables and nuclear -  are outlined.
77
4.3 Johnston’s model
4.3.1 Description
The model developed by David Johnston for his PhD research (Johnston 2003a) is a selectively 
disaggregated physically-based bottom-up energy and carbon dioxide emission model of the UK 
housing stock. The model covers both the energy demand and supply side and was used to 
develop three illustrative scenarios of energy use and C 02 emissions. The model has been 
constructed around two separate but inter-related components: a data model and a BREDEM - 
based energy and carbon dioxide emission model (Figure 4.1). The BREDEM-based model is 
based upon the Building Research Establishment’s Domestic Energy Model Version 9.60, 
which is used for SAP, the Standard Assessment Procedure method of energy rating individual 
homes (BRE & DETR 1998). Johnston had to create his own model because BREDEM and its 
associated database, together known as BREHOMES, although widely used in policy are not 
both publicly available, and so it is not possible to test hypotheses with them.
Data sources
Data
model
Illustrative
scenarios
BREDEM- 
based energy 
and C02 
emissions 
model
Total UK 
housing stock 
energy use and 
C02 emissions
Figure 4.1: Structure of Johnston’s model
A considerable amount of data is required for the model, including annual present and future 
values (1996-2050) for population, levels of insulation, ownership of appliances and various 
other energy related characteristics of the UK housing stock. Some figures are unchanged 
throughout the period e.g. overall dwelling dimensions -  but most change each year. In order to 
simplify the amount of input data required, the model was constructed around just two 
‘notional’ dwelling types: a pre-1996 ‘old’ dwelling and a post-1996 ‘new’ dwelling (1996 was 
the most recent year for which comprehensive data were available when Johnston began work 
on his PhD). This is much simpler than the BREHOMES model (based on BREDEM), which 
contains over 400 categories of dwelling defined according to age, built form, tenure and the 
ownership of central heating (Shorrock & Dunster 1997). Johnston’s model does not include
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any data on tenure and makes a simplified assumption that the average built form is semi­
detached.
Johnston constructed three main scenarios, with variations on the latter two:
Business as usual (DJ-BAU) -  this scenario is based on BRE’s ‘reference case’ scenario 
(Shorrock et al. 2001). It features gradual efficiency improvements, combined with saturation of 
demand for services such as heating and hot water.
Demand side (DJ-DS) -  technical energy efficiency improvements to the pre- and post-1996 
housing stock, also some accelerated demolition of old housing.
Integrated scenario (DJ-IS) -  as for the Demand Side scenario, but also including energy 
supply side changes which result in electricity with lower carbon intensity (thus the demand side 
and integrated scenarios have the same final energy use but different carbon emissions).
Each scenario comprises annual information relating to each ‘notional’ dwelling, such as Up­
values and seasonal space and hot water heating efficiencies. The data are input into the 
BREDEM-based energy and CO2 emission model. This is primarily demand side oriented, but it 
also includes a very simple supply side model. The supply side model consists simply of 
assumed future values for the carbon intensity of electricity, based on possible generating fuel 
mixes up to 2050. The BREDEM-based model then utilises this information to calculate the 
delivered energy use and CO2 emissions attributable to each ‘notional’ dwelling, for the 
particular year in question. This process is undertaken for the years 1996 to 2050 inclusive. 
Finally, information on the total number of ‘notional’ dwellings in each year is then used to 
scale the delivered energy use and C 02 emissions up to the level of the whole UK housing 
stock.
Johnston introduced minor variations from the BREDEM 9.60 methodology, the most notable 
of which are:
• A single- rather than two-zone heating approach (discussed in further in Section 4.6.8);
• Heating and hot water systems are assumed to be fuelled by either gas or electricity. There 
is no provision for oil, solid fuel or other sources of energy;
• Hot water requirement calculation is based on number of people per household rather than 
on the floor area of the property.
The first two variations were introduced in order to simplify the modelling process and reduce 
the input information requirements. Changing the method for calculating hot water demand was 
felt by Johnston to offer a more realistic representation of hot water use than the BREDEM 
method.
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By simplifying the fuels in the model to gas and electricity, Johnston focused on the two major 
fuels for heating and hot water, the next most important is heating oil, followed by solid fuel, 
which is still losing market share. In 1996, gas and electricity together accounted for 86.4% of 
household final energy use, by 2002 this had increased to 88.1% (DTI 2003a). Johnston 
increased the percentage of space and water heating supplied by electricity and gas. For 
example, central space heating was modelled as 80% gas and 20% electricity in 1996. Despite 
this simplification, the carbon emissions from Johnston’s model for 1996 matched those 
reported by the government. The emissions per kWh of the fuels not modelled (oil and solid 
fuels) are in-between those of gas and electricity, so a mixture of gas and electricity is a good 
substitute for the other fuels in carbon terms.
One of the key challenges of Johnston’s research was to find suitable values for the 
characteristics of his notional dwellings. Figures for the average size of windows, orientation of 
houses and ventilation characteristics, for example, are not easily come by. Combining such 
data as were available, along with his own best estimates where data were missing, in a model 
to get values which match the measured energy consumption of the housing stock was a 
considerable achievement.
Johnston validated the model by comparing its results with published data from BRE (Shorrock 
& Walters 1998) and actual stock energy consumption data for 1996. The BAU projection from 
the model was also compared with the ‘reference case’ projection developed using the BRE’s 
BREHOMES model (Shorrock et al. 2001).
4.3.2 Results
Compared to emissions of carbon dioxide in 1990 the following emission reductions were 
projected to occur by 2050:
• a 37% reduction under the business as usual scenario (DJ-BAU) by assuming a 
continuation of current trends in fabric and end-use efficiency measures and the carbon 
intensity of electricity generation, e.g. ownership of condensing boilers rising gradually 
to 76% of the stock by 2050, a steady improvement in the U-values of all building 
elements;
• a 61% reduction under the demand side scenario (DJ-DS), by applying additional 
demand side measures to the business as usual scenario, e.g. all solid walls are insulated 
by 2050, solar water heating is installed for all new houses after 2010 (see Section 4.7 
for full details);
• a 67% reduction under the integrated scenario (DJ-IS), by applying a number of 
electricity generation measures to the energy supply side of the demand side scenario;
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• a reduction in excess of 80% is technically feasible given existing technology, if a 
significant proportion of gas-fired space heating systems are replaced by electrically- 
driven heat pumps. However, this represents a strategic shift in the application of both 
demand side and supply side technologies.
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Figure 4.2: Projected annual carbon emissions UK domestic sector, Johnston’s scenarios, 
1996-2050
As Johnston states, his work has demonstrated that: “by the middle o f this century it is 
technically possible, using currently available technology, to achieve the sorts o f reduction in 
the CO2 emissions o f the UK housing stock that are likely to be required to stabilise the 
atmospheric C 02 concentration and mitigate the effects o f climate change” (2003a: 180). 
However, he also concludes that: “There appear to be no easy, trouble-free technological 
options for the UK housing stock” (2003 a: 180).
4.3.3 Discussion
Johnston’s model has a considerable number of strengths:
• details of its construction and the data and projections used are publicly available and 
clearly explained;
• it is based on a calculation method which is widely accepted and used in the UK;
• it is relatively straightforward to replicate;
• it has proven to be useful for investigating scenarios over the next fifty years.
DJ-BAU
DJ-DS
DJ-IS
 1     ! , ,
2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
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In addition, there are currently no alternative models documented and available in the public 
domain.
However, there are also a number of limitations of the model:
• it contains only two types of housing, so it is not possible to investigate scenarios
specific to particular construction types other than by assuming an impact on the 
average heat transfer of properties;
• supply side modelling is relatively crude;
• in common with other physically-based, bottom-up models, the likely effect of various
economic variables, such as fuel prices, are not estimated.
There are also the limitations inherent in the idea of using any model to project forward 50 
years. Even in a model such as this, where good historic data is available to inform the 
projections, uncertainty increases significantly over time. This uncertainty is attached to the 
assumptions and projections rather than the calculations. However, inspired by the requirement 
to make carbon savings over the long term, a considerable number of organisations are using 
modelling to look forward fifty years, as discussed in Chapter 3. Although fifty year projections 
have to be used with caution, there is evidently agreement that they have a valuable role in 
helping to think about the future.
It has been decided to replicate Johnston’s model and use it for this thesis research because its 
advantages significantly outweigh any disadvantages.
4.4 Analysis of Johnston’s projections
When Johnston’s projections are considered in comparison with the historic record of energy 
use since 1970 it becomes apparent that his BAU scenario is conservative in terms of the 
expected development of energy use (Figure 4.3). Both the BAU and Demand Side scenarios 
show decreasing energy consumption from 2000 onwards. The projections for both scenarios 
decrease more rapidly from 2040 for a number of reasons: the internal temperature stops rising 
and stabilises at 21°C for pre-1996 dwellings, which form the majority of the stock; household 
numbers fall slightly; and the rate of demolition of older, more energy consuming properties is 
accelerated.
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Figure 4.3: Actual and projected annual final energy use, UK domestic sector, 1970-2050
Sources: Johnston 2003a, DTI 2004a
Both past trends and current circumstances suggest energy consumption could increase 
considerably more than in the BAU scenario. As Chapter 3 demonstrated, historical evidence 
shows that it is very easy to underestimate increases in future energy demand. A simplistic 
linear projection of final energy use trends 1970-2003 (shown in Figure 4.3) to 2050 results in 
energy consumption increasing by 40% from 2000 levels. This contrasts with Johnston’s BAU 
projection of a 22% reduction by 2050. There is considerable risk that Johnston’s estimates of 
future energy use (and those of BRE to 2020 which are similar (Shorrock et al. 2001)) will be 
exceeded by a significant margin. The key factors which could lead to increased use of energy 
are considered in more detail in later parts of the chapter.
Because Johnston’s projections date from 1996, it is possible now to compare them with official 
government figures for household energy in the years following Johnston’s work (Figure 4.4), 
and to take account of the effect of external temperature on actual energy use figures. The 
external temperature data here are for Great Britain, and is the average temperature over the six 
coldest months of the year (January -  April, November and December) (calculated from data in 
DTI 2004a).
83
590  -
570 -
0
*  550 +n> c
ro3
C
C
(0L_oo
<u
i / io
CO0)
EoTD
*
D
530 -  
510 -  
490 -- 
470 
450
T  12.0
x x
DJ-BAU
Actual energy use
Temperature
11.0
O
£ 3 
TO
10.0
Q.
E 
0
ro c
I 
I
t
-  9.0
8.0 -5? 
0  
0
+ 7.0 ro
0 
>  ro
+ 6.0 £  
c  o
5.0 >< 
V)
4.0
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Figure 4.4: Comparison of DJ-BAU projections, actual energy use and external 
temperature, 1996-2003, UK domestic sector
Sources: Johnston 2003a, DTI 2004a
A comparison of Johnston’s model projections with DTI actual energy use data suggests that 
there may be systematic differences between the model outputs and actual energy use. The 
model over-estimates energy consumption 1997-2000 (none of which were cold years, unlike 
1996). More importantly, the data show an upward trend in energy consumption in real life 
whereas the model indicates steady energy consumption.
Johnston’s model could be validated further by comparing its estimates of energy consumption 
in years prior to 1996 with actual data. However, this would involve a considerable amount of 
additional work and is not a priority for this research.
4.5 Replicating Johnston’s model
Based on the description and data in Johnston’s thesis, a version of his model was created -  
identified as ‘TF model’. TF model was created in Microsoft Excel. The BREDEM-based 
calculations on which TF model is based are described in Appendix 2. Johnston’s thesis 
contained a clear description of the data inputs to the model, and tables of inputs and outputs 
were provided. However, given space constraints not every input figure could be included, and 
therefore some assumptions and interpolations have had to be employed based on interpretation 
of the thesis text. As a result, TF model contains some numbers which are likely to be slightly 
different from Johnston’s (‘DJ model’).
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The electricity consumption for cooking and lights and appliances is modelled in a very simple 
way, and so there were no problems in exactly replicating Johnston’s results. However, the 
modelling of space and water heating is much more complex, and the results from TF model do 
not match Johnston’s precisely. The comparisons for space and water heating for DJ-BAU are 
shown below.
Table 4.1: Comparison between TF and DJ model outputs, business as usual projection
Space heating (TWh/yr) Water heating (TWh/yr)
TF model DJ model Difference (%) TF model DJ model Difference (%)
1996 349 341 2.3 134 133 -0.5
2000 351 341 3 131 131 0.1
2010 344 340 1.2 123 124 1
2020 336 336 -0.2 113 114 0.6
2030 323 326 -0.8 103 104 1
2040 315 313 0.6 95 97 1.3
2050 258 253 1.8 87 88 1
Space heating
The TF space heating figures vary from Johnston’s by up to 3%. The difference is not 
systematic, which indicates that it is unlikely to be caused by a simple error in the author’s 
modelling. Johnston was of the opinion that this level of difference from his results could be 
explained by small differences in input values (Johnston 2003b).
Water heating
The TF water heating energy consumption figures are similar to Johnston’s, and vary by a 
maximum of 1.3%. Again, the most likely explanation for the difference is the small difference 
in input values. However, this coincidence of values was achieved by including primary circuit 
losses for electric water heating as well as for gas water heating -  and according to SAP Table 3 
(BRE & DETR 1998) there should be no such losses for electric water heating. This is because 
primary circuit losses are those which occur between the boiler and the storage tank, and which 
are not relevant for electric systems where the energy source is in the tank and there is no 
primary circuit. If primary circuit losses are excluded for electric water heating, the energy 
required for water heating is lower than calculated in Johnston’s thesis. However, according to 
SAP this is the correct calculation and it appears that Johnston made a mistake in his model.
When losses from primary circuits for electric storage water systems are excluded, the total 
amount of energy needed for water heating decreases (Table 4.2). The difference between the 
two calculations decreases over time because primary circuit losses are expected to decrease
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considerably over time as boiler systems are replaced by those which include better controls and 
insulation and thus have lower primary circuit losses.
Table 4.2: Comparison between different methods of calculating water heating energy use, 
business as usual scenario
DJ model 
(TWh/yr)
TF model adjusted to exclude 
primary circuit losses for electric 
systems (TWh/yr)
Difference (%)
1996 133 125 6.4
2000 131 123 6.3
2010 124 117 5.7
202d 114 109 4
2030 104 100 3.3
204q 97 94 2.9
2050 88 86 1.8
This was the only instance where it appears that Johnston’s model deviated from the procedure 
described for SAP (other than deliberately). No other errors were found or fixed. All subsequent 
data produced by the TF model excludes primary circuit losses for electric systems.
Having successfully replicated Johnston’s model, the following sections use the author’s version 
of the model to investigate a number of different issues. Note that where figures are quoted from 
Johnston’s thesis they are his original numbers, not the slightly different ones generated from 
TF model.
4.6 Variations to data inputs to Business as Usual scenario
4.6.1 Introduction
New information has become available since Johnston completed his modelling, and here key 
new data which could change the outcome of the business as usual scenario are identified. The 
effect of including this new data on the BAU projection, together with the alteration to water 
modelling identified earlier, is calculated. The combined effect of error fixing and new data is 
illustrated in a ‘TF-BAU’ scenario. However, other aspects of DJ-BAU, e.g. rates of adoption of 
more efficient equipment and insulation measures, changes in usage patterns, have not been 
reconsidered. Instead, after the effects of new data have been explored, emphasis is placed on 
looking at a range of future possibilities (Section 4.8).
4.6.2 Household numbers
In Johnston’s model, household numbers were based on 1998-based population projections. 
Since then there have been a number of revisions to population projections, the latest of which
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is based on 2002-based projections. The 2002-based projection from the Government Actuary’s 
Department (GAD) is the one which will be used in this thesis. The next revision to population 
projections is not due out until October 2005 (Shaw 2004).
The GAD population projections can be combined with existing household size projections to 
give a new set of household number projections. There is little difference between the 1998- 
based and 2002-based projections until 2020. However after this point the difference between 
the two increases, such that the 2002-based household figures are 1.4% higher in 2030, 2.8% 
higher in 2040 and 3.9% higher in 2050 than the 1998-based projections. The increases arise 
primarily because of higher life expectancy assumptions, but also as a result of differences in 
the base population used for the projections, and higher expectations of the number of future 
immigrants (Shaw 2004). Using the 2002-based population projections in the model leads to an 
increase in energy consumption of 1.5% in 2040 and 2.3% by 2050.
4.6.3 Internal temperature
In Johnston’s BAU scenario, temperatures in the pre-1996 and post-1996 dwelling are assumed 
to rise to 21.0°C and then remain the same. This temperature is reached by 2040 in the pre-1996 
dwellings and earlier, by 2020, in the post-1996 dwellings. Saturation of internal temperatures 
in 2040 leads to a more dramatic reduction of energy use (space heating) from that point 
forward. The temperature figures are 24-hour averages for the whole house and the whole 
heating season.
Table 4.3: Mean internal temperature (°C) of the notional dwellings under all scenarios in 
Johnston’s model
1997 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050
pre-1996 dwelling 16.1 16.5 17.6 18.7 19.9 21.0 21.0
post-1996 dwelling 18.0 18.4 19.7 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0
Historic evidence for changing internal temperatures shows clearly that there is good reason to 
expect them to continue to increase over time (Figure 4.5). The increase over time is clear, with 
annual variations affected by external temperature. In colder weather lower internal 
temperatures are achieved.
Figure 4.5 shows two different types of internal temperature data, monitored and estimated data. 
The monitored data can be split into two groups:
• Nationally representative data (DoE 1991b, DoE 1996, DETR 2000d, Hunt & Gidman 
1982), these are shown as solid coloured points.
• A wide variety of data from smaller monitoring exercises, most of which were collated by 
Lowe, Chapman, & Everett (1985).
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Figure 4.5: Internal temperature monitored (in living rooms) and estimated, and external 
winter temperature, 1970-2001
All of the monitored data except Hong (2003) is based on spot measurements of temperature in 
the living room at one point in time, whereas the estimated data relates to whole house 24 hour 
average temperatures. Spot temperatures could be expected to be higher than 24hr averages as 
they are normally taken during the time the heating system is on (the precise relationship 
between spot temperature and 24hr temperature depends on the time of day the reading was 
taken, thermal characteristics of the house as well as the heating pattern employed by the 
householders).
The estimated data represent 24-hour average values for the whole property. These values are 
calculated by BRE from their BREHOMES model, by adjusting internal temperature such that 
the model outputs match to measured energy use figures for the whole domestic sector supplied 
by DTI (Shorrock & Utley 2003). This procedure will result in inaccurate temperature estimates 
if there are systematic errors in the model. For example, if the air leakage rates from properties 
(which are very variable, and not well characterised) are underestimated, then more energy will 
be lost through this route than the BRE model assumes, and the estimated internal temperatures 
will be higher than those achieved in reality. BRE themselves advise that the changes in internal 
temperatures over time are more accurate than the absolute value of the temperatures (Shorrock 
& Utley 2003).
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The English House Condition Survey (EHCS) temperature data is also available for halls as 
follows: 1986 -  16.3°C, 1991 -  18.3°C, 1996 -  17.9°C (DoE 1991b, DoE 1996, DETR 2000d). 
The Warm Front data also included bedroom temperatures at 18.3°C (Hong 2003). These 
temperatures are 1.2-1.7°C lower than those measured in living rooms. For clarity they have not 
been included in Figure 4.5.
Evidence subsequent to Johnston’s thesis shows that household temperatures have risen more 
quickly than he anticipated. Estimates of internal temperatures from BRE suggest that in 2001 
the 24-hour average temperature was 18.9°C (Shorrock & Utley 2003), which exceeds 
Johnston’s projections for 2010. In addition, spot temperature measurements in English halls in 
1996 reached an average of 17.9°C (DETR 2000d). Hall temperatures are thought to be 
representative of whole house temperatures, for spot temperature readings (Hunt & Gidman 
1982). Also, 24 hour monitoring data from a limited number of low income households in 2001 
showed average temperatures of 19.5°C in the living room and 18.3°C in the bedroom (Hong 
2003). Thus, based on this new information, the temperature projections in the TF-BAU have 
been adjusted as shown in Table 4.2.
Table 4.4: Mean internal temperature (°C) in TF-BAU
1997 2000 2010 2020 - 2050
pre-1996 dwelling 16.1 16.5 19.5 21
post-1996 dwelling 18.0 18.4 21 21
Temperature values from 1996 to 2000 are identical to Johnston’s, but after that progress 
towards a universal average of 21°C is accelerated with post-1996 dwellings reaching 21°C by 
2010 and pre-1996 dwellings reaching that temperature by 2020. Successive English House 
Condition Surveys showed an increase of 1.6°C in hall temperatures in the ten years between 
1986 and 1996 (these years had similar external temperatures). So the data shows that changes 
of at least one and a half degrees are possible in a decade. This is just one projection of many 
that could be made, but it fits better with the new temperature data available than does 
Johnston’s more conservative original (alternative future temperature scenarios are explored 
further in Section 4.8). This change in temperature projections leads to an increase in energy 
consumption of almost 30% in 2010 and 2020, which drops to 12% by 2030 and to zero by 
2040, by which time the temperatures in the two scenarios are equal.
Internal temperature plays a crucial part in fine tuning the outputs of both Johnston’s and BRE’s 
models. Temperature is used to ensure that modelled energy consumption matches actual totals. 
In the case of post-96 dwellings, Johnston adjusted the internal temperature so that energy
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consumption was in agreement with the theoretical space heating energy consumption of a 
dwelling built to the 1995 Building Regulations standard.
4.6.4 Floor area of dwellings
New data from EHCS in 2001 (ODPM 2003) suggest that the estimate of floor area for new 
dwellings reported in EHCS 1996 (DETR 2000d), and used by Johnston, was an underestimate. 
Their new figure for post-1980 dwellings is 83m2 as opposed to 76m2 reported in 1996 (Table 
4.5). The EHCS 2001 report does not offer any explanation for the difference between the most 
recent and previously reported figure. Researchers responsible for the EHCS were unable to 
explain this discrepancy, which they describe as ‘an aberrant result’, stating that there had been 
no change in the surveying methodology and that other factors did not seem sufficient to explain 
the change (McIntyre 2004). The figures can both be right only if the average floor area of 
dwellings built between 1996 and 2001 was considerably greater than those built 1980-1995, at 
104m2.
Table 4.5: Estimated floor areas of the English housing stock, 1996 and 2001 data
Data source National average 
floor area (m2)
P re-1980 average 
floor area (m2)
Post-1980 average 
floor area (m2)
1996 EHCS, (DETR 
2000c)
85 - 76
2001 EHCS (ODPM 
2003)
87 88 83
Johnston projects pre-96 dwelling to reduce by 5m2 from 1996 to 2050 as older, larger 
dwellings are gradually demolished. In contrast the average useable floor area of the post-96 
dwelling is assumed to remain constant (with increases in detached dwellings being offset by 
increased building of flats in response to government policy on higher densities). If  new values 
from the 2001 EHCS are substituted for Johnston’s, with the same trends after 2001, this results 
in a 3.7-3.9% increase in annual space heating energy use over the period 2010-2050.
4.6.5 Proposed revisions to building regulations, July 2004
As a result of targets set in the Energy White Paper (DTI 2003b) revisions to the energy 
efficiency component of building regulations (Part L) are to be brought forward from 2008 to 
2005. The currently proposed indicative targets1 for 2005 and 2010, which may be altered after 
the consultation period, are shown below (Table 4.6).
1 The 2005 Part L building regulations will require achievement o f  a target carbon em issions rate per 
square metre (TCER). Standards are no longer specified in terms o f  U-values, however if  these values are 
achieved, the building should meet the TCER.
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Table 4.6: Possible future building regulation standards for new housing
Standard Component / 
house type
Building
regulations
2002
Potential 
indicative 
targets for 
2005
Potential 
indicative 
targets for 
2010
Johnston’s 
values for 
2009
Johnston’s 
values for 
2025
Indicative standards 
for fabric insulation 
(W/m2K)
Roofs 0.16-0.25 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.10
External walls 0.35 0.27 0.20 0.25 0.15
Ground floors 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.22 0.10
Average of all 
windows, doors and 
rooflights
2.0-2.2 1.80 1.40 1.80 1.00
Airtightness standard 
(Permeability in 
m3/h/m2 at 50 Pa)
10 7 5 10 1
Source: Adapted from Johnston 2003a, ODPM 2004, ODPM 2001
The standards which Johnston used in DJ-BAU for 2002 are basically the same as those 
introduced by the 2002 building regulations. However, the current proposals for future building 
regulations in 2010 are more ambitious than those in the DJ-BAU scenarios for 2009, which are 
similar to those proposed for 2005. Building standards may be rising faster than Johnston 
expected. However, judgement on this must be reserved until the standards for 2005 are 
finalised.
If the potential standards for 2005 and 2010 are used to replace Johnston’s values from 2002 
onwards the actual reduction in energy consumption is not particularly great. Running the 
numbers through the model shows that the annual energy saving compared with Johnston’s 
scenario is less than 0.5%, with the greatest savings occurring around 2020 and decreasing to 
2050 as the U values converge.
As Chapter 2 noted, the 2002 amendment to Part L paid much more attention than previously to 
work in existing buildings by setting standards for replacement windows and boilers. With the 
proposals for further amendment in 2005, that trend has been continued with a suggestion that 
where the cost of building work on existing dwellings exceeds £8,000, opportunities should be 
taken to improve the energy efficiency of the dwelling. It is also proposed that most new and 
replacement boilers will have to be condensing, which, all other things being equal, would lead 
to lower energy use than in DJ-BAU. However, there is still debate about the timetable for 
achieving this requirement, with the government apparently not expecting condensing boilers to 
capture the whole new boiler market until 2009 (ENDS 2004b). The effect of these possible 
changes has not been modelled in this thesis.
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4.6.6 Effects of these changes on the BAU projection
The changes that have been identified, population, floor area, internal temperature and U values, 
plus the correction to the hot water calculation can be combined to give a TF-BAU scenario, see 
Figure 4.6. Not surprisingly, the change to internal temperatures dominates the effect on energy 
use. There is a much greater use of energy particularly in the period 2002-2020, after which the 
difference declines. By 2040, when both scenarios have the same internal temperatures, the 
remaining small difference (of around 3.5%) is due to the increased population, floor area and 
the revised hot water calculation included in TF-BAU. Although the difference between DJ- 
BAU and TF-BAU is small in 2050, over the period 1996-2050 TF-BAU results in an increase 
in cumulative energy consumption of 10%.
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Figure 4.6: Comparison of DJ-BAU and TF-BAU 1996-2050 and actual energy 
consumption 1970-2003, UK domestic sector
Source: DTI 2004a
Compared with the historic record of energy consumption 1970-2003, TF-BAU seems to have a 
somewhat high rate of increase up to 2010. The point of creating TF-BAU is not to suggest that 
it is an accurate projection of future energy consumption, but more to demonstrate how different 
Johnston’s projections could have been, given the new data now available. Of all the alterations, 
the key one is the internal temperature.
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4.6.7 New data not included in the model
There are other input factors for which new data has become available, or where Johnston’s 
approach could be questioned, but these have not been included in TF-BAU, for reasons 
explained below.
Types of water heating systems
In DJ-BAU, ownership of storage hot water systems in pre-1996 households remains constant at 
around 77% between 1996 and 2050. In the post-1996 housing stock, ownership is expected to 
fall from 83% in 1997 to 76% in 2050. However, half of new boilers are ‘combis’, that is there 
is a second heat exchanger in the boiler which works as an instantaneous water heater (Brinkley
2002). So Johnston’s figures overestimate the extent to which storage systems are likely to 
continue to dominate water heating.
To investigate what difference a switch away from storage to instantaneous water heating would 
make to energy consumption, the proportion of each type of system was varied in the TF model. 
The proportion of instantaneous gas water heating was increased to 50% by 2030 for pre-1996 
systems (to allow replacement of the current stock) and to 50% for post-1996 stock from 2002 
onwards. These changes resulted in a reduction in water heating energy use of 6-12% depending 
on the year. The difference is due to the variation in losses and efficiencies assumed between 
the different systems. However, because very little is known about how people use different 
types of water heating systems, whether these figures reflect what might actually happen is 
uncertain. For this reason, although there is a case for changing the TF-BAU case, it will 
actually be left as it is in Johnston’s model. Demand for hot water is discussed in greater detail 
in Section 4.7.1.
New version of SAP
Since Johnston developed his model, a new version of the government’s Standard Assessment 
Procedure for the energy rating of dwellings has been published (BRE 2001) and a 2005 version 
is out for consultation (ODPM 2004). The new 2001 version of SAP is version 9.70, Johnston’s 
model was based on version 9.60 (BRE & DETR 1998). The key changes were to introduce a 
Carbon Index (which is a number between 0 and 10 based on the carbon dioxide emissions per 
square metre associated with space and water heating, the higher the number the better the 
performance) and to raise the upper limit of the SAP scale from 100 to 120. These changes, and 
the other changes introduced, do not affect the calculations of energy consumption in Johnston’s 
model. Thus, the introduction of a new version of SAP does not require changes to the model 
and so the TF model is based on SAP version 9.60.
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Heating degree days, SAP and climate change
Johnston has made allowances for future changes in climate, using data supplied by the UK 
Climate Impacts Programme (Hulme, Turnpenny, & Jenkins 2002). Johnston used the UKCIP02 
Medium-High emissions scenario, in which the average temperature rise is 1.87°C by 2050. 
However, this average annual temperature change does not apply equally across the UK or 
throughout the year. There is a different temperature change predicted for spring, summer, 
autumn and winter. Summer sees the highest temperature rises. The pattern also varies within 
the country with the south east heating up the most, and the north west the least. The most 
useful figure for the model would be population density-weighted heating season temperature 
change. The average temperature rise during the heating system is likely to be lower than the 
annual average rise. However, as population density is highest in the south east, which will 
experience the greatest temperature rises, the average temperature rise experienced by 
households is likely to be higher than the geographical average temperature rise. UKCIP do not 
publish temperature figures in population-weighted format and it has been decided not to pursue 
this analysis further at this time.
Air change rate
In Johnston’s model, the mean air leakage rate is based on research carried out by BRE which 
monitored the air leakage of several hundred dwellings. In DJ-BAU for pre-1996 buildings a 
very small reduction in the mean air leakage rate is expected to occur as a number of the 
existing dwellings undergo post-construction airtightness work, but apart from this it does not 
change to 2050. However, over the period to 2050, the rate of cavity fill and double glazing 
increases considerably in pre-1996 dwellings, and this would be expected to lead to lower air 
change rates - so should the air change rate in the model be changed over time?
Recent research has indicated that changes to air infiltration rates in buildings can be more 
complex than expected. Under the English Warm Front programme (outlined in Chapter 2), 
dwellings were draught-proofed, and cavity wall insulation was installed, which was expected 
based on modelling to reduce the air change rate. However, tests before and after intervention 
showed this was not the case. The explanation is that at the same time, central heating was 
installed, which involved breaching the building envelope (e.g. holes in floors for pipework) and 
creating more opportunities for air infiltration (Hong et al. 2004). Thus, although the changes 
identified above might be expected to reduce the air infiltration rate more than Johnston 
expected, the data on the effect of changes to the building fabric on air infiltration are not good 
enough to be confident that the model should be changed.
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4.6.8 Making structural changes to the model
In theory it would possible to make changes to the structure of the model, to extend its 
capabilities. One possible change would be to include more ages or types of housing. There is 
some data available from the English House Condition Surveys about the physical 
characteristics of English housing based on age and type. Adding a greater variety of dwelling 
types would, for example, allow better analysis of the effects of increasing demolition rates, and 
demolition could be targeted on the worst housing rather than the average. Increasing the 
number of dwelling types would also allow a better focus on particular refurbishment methods, 
particularly wall insulation, which depend on the types of housing. It would not, however, add 
to our understanding of saving possibilities for hot water and electricity use for lights and 
appliances, because there is no evidence linking either of these with housing age or type. 
However, as Johnston concluded, adding more ages or types of housing would considerably 
increase the amount of data required. Given the aims of this thesis, this development of the 
model is not a priority. In addition, this research is being undertaken elsewhere (Boardman 
2003).
Another possible change would be to re-introduce two zone heating as this would make it easier 
to investigate scenarios where heating is concentrated on living areas. In Johnston’s model 
temperature is modelled as an average for the whole house over 24 hours. However, having just 
one zone for heating fits well with trends in whole house heating. The evidence is that although 
differences remain between living areas and the temperature in other areas of the house they are 
rather small. The latest EHCS data showed a 1.2°C difference between living room and hall 
temperatures in 1996 (DETR 2000d) and preliminary data from the Warm Front project also 
showed a 1.2°C difference between bedrooms and living room temperatures in 2001 (Hong 
2003). In addition, it is easy to reduce the whole house temperature a little to simulate cooler 
non-living room areas. So, re-introducing two zone heating is not a priority.
In summary, it has been decided not to make any major changes to the structure of Johnston’s 
model. The change which might be most useful, that of adding additional housing types, would 
involve a considerable amount of extra research, time it was felt was better spent pursuing other 
aspects of research.
4.7 Johnston’s technological savings future -  DJ-DS
4.7.1 Introduction
Johnston’s Demand Side scenario (DJ-DS), as illustrated in Figure 4.3, introduces a wide range 
of technological improvements on the demand side which, together with the underlying 
downward trend in energy consumption, are sufficient to result in a reduction of 58% in carbon
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dioxide emissions compared with 1996. Johnston provided a comprehensive summary of 
technical options for saving energy and carbon from the UK housing stock. The work 
particularly concentrated on bringing together evidence on saving energy from space and water 
heating. The technological improvements included in DJ-DS are based largely on technologies 
which have been used in advanced housing or demonstration projects, and their energy saving 
benefits have been measured and proven.
4.7.2 Johnston’s key technologies
Johnston identified many technological improvements which together would lead to the carbon 
and energy savings in his DJ-DS scenario. The key technologies and the years of their adoption 
for both pre- and post-1996 housing are described in Table 4.7. For post-1996 housing, the 
ultimately achievable standards are projected to be met by 2010. Tables showing the U-values 
for elements of construction in pre- and post-96 housing are included in Appendix 3.
Table 4.7 Key technologies in DJ-DS and their uptake in pre- and post-1996 housing
Technology Pre-1996 housing Post-1996 housing
Solid wall insulation All uninsulated solid walls to 
have 150mm of insulation by 
2050.
By 2010 wall insulation 
standard to meet very high 
standard, requiring either 
extra wide filled cavities or 
highly insulated solid walls.
Cavity wall insulation All cavity walls to be fully 
filled by 2050.
Loft insulation All accessible lofts to have 
insulation topped-up to 
200mm. Roofs with 
inaccessible lofts also 
insulated.
All to reach very high 
standard by 2010.
Windows and doors All replaced by 2050 -  to the 
relevant standards at time of 
replacement.
By 2010 meeting standards 
will require high specification 
triple glazing.
Air tightness 30% of stock to undergo post­
construction airtightness work 
by 2050. This leads to a change 
in average dwelling from 
13.1ac/h @ 50 Pa to 1 lach/h @ 
50Pa in 2050
Average new home built 
almost as air tight in 1997 as 
average pre-96 in 2050, at 
11.7 ac/h @ 50 Pa. Standards 
improve considerably over 
time, giving average of 3.5 
ac/h (a)y 50Pa by 2050.
Condensing gas boilers in 
gas heated properties
100% by 2050, except for CHP 
households
By 2010 many houses will be 
built that require no space 
heating. The remaining 
houses will use condensing 
gas fires (full central heating 
not required) or electric heat 
pumps.
Heat pumps for electrically- 
heated properties
100% by 2050
Combined heat and power 5% by 2050
Solar water heating 10% by 2050 100% by 2010
More efficient lights and 
appliances
Electricity consumption per household falls to just over half 
1996 value by 2020 and remains steady after that.
Cooking energy use Falls by about one quarter per household from 1996 value by 
2020 and remains steady after that.
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The other key DJ-DS assumption is that the demolition rate of housing is twice that in DJ-BAU, 
increasing the proportion of the stock that is made up of post-1996 housing.
As a result of all these improvements (and combined with increasing household numbers), final 
energy use by end use in the UK domestic sector in 2050 is reduced by the following amounts in 
DJ-DS compared with 1996:
• Space heating: -57%
• Water heating: -51 %
• Lights and appliances: -30%
• Cooking: no change
This gives a total reduction in final energy use of 50%. Combined with some fuel switching 
towards gas from electricity, the decreasing carbon intensity of electricity, and use of solar 
water heating, this leads to a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions from 1996 of 58.4%.
4.7.3 The barriers to achieving savings from technology improvements
General arguments have already been made in Chapter 3 about the optimistic assumptions 
which tend to be used in energy efficiency modelling with regard to take up rates, the efficiency 
savings of particular technologies and how they may actually be used in practice. This section 
focuses on three of the technologies identified in Table 4.7, solid wall insulation, new heating 
systems and solar water heating, and identifies where assumptions about their efficiency and 
take up may be optimistic. Behavioural factors are discussed in Section 4.8. Johnston himself 
observed that there were no ‘trouble-free’ routes to making energy savings - this section 
illustrates what a few of those troubles may turn out to be.
Solid wall insulation
External insulation for pre-1996 solid walled properties is a key energy saving technology in 
DJ-DS. By 2050 Johnston assumed that all uninsulated solid walls will be thermally upgraded 
by adding 150mm of insulation. At this level of insulation, solid walls would be more highly 
insulated than filled cavity walls. Developing cost-effective insulation for solid walls has been 
identified as a key area requiring more research, development and demonstration work (DEFRA 
2004b). Assuming sufficient insulation can be added to most walls at reasonable cost, two key 
problems with achieving such a high uptake of external insulation can be identified: creating a 
market and overcoming aesthetic objections.
Achieving a market for installing external solid wall insulation for private householders, and 
persuading people to pay for it is likely to be very challenging. In the social housing sector, 
there is experience of successfully installing solid wall insulation usually in cases where the 
building fabric also needs upgrading or there are problems with water penetration so that the
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insulation has multiple benefits. However, there is currently no market for solid wall insulation 
for private householders and it can be very difficult even to get quotes for having this type of 
work done for a single dwelling (Simmonds 2004). Cavity wall insulation is considerably easier 
and cheaper to install than solid wall insulation (Shorrock, Henderson, Utley, & Walters 2001). 
By 2001 32% of cavity wall properties had been insulated, a rise from 2.4% in 1974 (Shorrock 
& Utley 2003). There is effectively no market, in that almost all cavity insulation installations 
are subsidised either by energy companies or government. This does not bode well for solid wall 
insulation.
The aesthetics of adding insulation and rendering to the outside of many brick- and stone- 
fronted properties is likely to prove controversial, and would be restricted by current law for 
listed dwellings and those in conservation areas. There are about half a million listed dwellings 
in Great Britain, and before altering their appearance consent has to obtained from the local 
planning authority. In addition, it is unlikely that alterations would be permitted to homes in 
conservation areas if the alterations detract from the appearance or character of the area 
(Highfield 2000). There is no official estimate of the number of dwellings in conservation areas 
in the UK. However, there were more than 8,000 conservation areas in England in 2002, and it 
has been estimated that around 5% of the stock is of historic interest (Oreszczyn 2004a). In 
addition, brick is the traditional external finish in many areas of the UK, so that a switch to 
render might well be resisted. The millions of houses whose external appearance cannot 
currently be changed poses a challenge to universal solid wall insulation.
Thus, for economic / market and aesthetic reasons the assumption that solid wall insulation can 
be added to all pre-1996 solid wall properties is very optimistic.
Condensing boilers, CHP and heat pumps
Johnston identified three key technologies for improving the efficiency with which space and 
water heating is delivered: condensing gas boilers, CHP and heat pumps. The recent proposed 
changes to building regulations from 2005 (ODPM 2004) suggest that condensing boilers will 
make up most of the market for new and replacement boilers within the next few years. Thus 
Johnston’s DJ-DS projections may well be exceeded in terms of rate of adoption of condensing 
boilers.
CHP/district heating has been much more popular in some other EU countries than in the UK 
with over half of Danish households connected in 2000 (Griffin & Fawcett 2000) compared 
with only around 2% of UK properties (Everett 2003). There are hopes that micro-CHP systems 
for individual households, which simultaneously provide heat and electricity in a unit about the 
same size as a domestic heating boiler, will make expansion of CHP in the UK more likely.
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However, micro-CHP is still in an early stage of development, with field trials currently 
underway and results expected in summer 2006 (DEFRA 2004b). Recent reports suggest that 
these trials are behind schedule, with just five units currently being tested, compared with initial 
plans to test 6,000 units (ENDS 2004c). By EU standards, 5% of households using CHP by 
2050 in DJ-DS does not seem overly ambitious, but either a different technology (i.e. micro- 
CHP) or considerable institutional and social changes are likely to be required to change the 
historic UK reluctance to adopt CHP.
Electric heat pump systems are much less well established in the UK and EU than either 
community-level CHP or condensing boilers. In the UK, householders can currently receive 
subsidies through the government ‘Clear Skies’ programme for ground source heat pump 
systems (Clear Skies 2004). Heat pump technology has been long established, particularly for 
cooling, and the assumption that all electrical space and water heating by 2050 will be provided 
by heat pumps is technically feasible, although it currently seems unlikely.
Solar water heating
In the DJ-DS scenario, by 2050 10% of pre-1996 dwellings have solar water heating (SWH) and 
by 2010 all post-1996 dwellings have SWH. Issues around modelling energy supplied per SWH 
system are discussed in detail in Appendix 4. The latest estimate from DTI is that the use of 
active solar water heating has doubled in the last five years, contributing 63.4GWh of domestic 
hot water energy (DTI 2004a). If each SWH system delivers 1,000 kWh/year (see Appendix 4), 
this would be equivalent to 63,400 installations. Clearly the industry would have to scale up 
very considerably to be able to achieve up to 200,000 installations per year by 2010 needed 
under DJ-DS. There are a number of other barriers to installing SWH, which are discussed 
below.
For pre-1996 dwellings, the installation of SWH will require significant changes to the existing 
hot water delivery system. Suitable hot water storage capacity is an essential part o f any solar 
water heating system. For conventional storage hot water systems it is usually necessary to add 
an additional hot water cylinder or change the existing one to a twin coil cylinder (CAT 2003). 
This increases the cost and disruption of installing SWH systems.
For hot water systems powered by combi boilers (which make up half of new boiler sales, as 
discussed earlier), it is difficult to incorporate solar water heating. This is because combis are 
designed to take cold mains pressure water, and solar systems supply hot or warm low pressure 
water (CAT 2003). Reading Borough Council has managed a refurbishment project where solar 
water heating, with its own storage system, was combined successfully with combi boilers 
(LEARN 2003b). But when Reading’s system was specified only two combi boilers on the UK
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market were guaranteed to accept solar pre-heated water (LEARN 2003a). In addition to the 
small choice of suitable boilers, the space needed for the additional hot water tank could be a 
significant barrier to the uptake of SWH for people who want combi boilers.
SWH is not equally applicable in all situations. ETSU (1999) judged that only 50% of the 
housing stock in the UK was suitable for solar water heating. SWH provides the best results 
when located on an unshaded south facing roof and is not recommended for use on north facing 
roofs. SWHs placed on east or west facing roofs are estimated to produce 15% less energy than 
those on south facing roofs (ESD 2003). From this analysis it seems that Johnston’s figure of 
100% usage of SWH in new housing from 2010 onwards is optimistic, unless the new housing 
can be designed and aligned to provide suitable roof space. However, in terms of overall energy 
use, it makes a relatively small difference -  by 2050, installing SWH in just half of new 
dwellings results in an increase in energy consumption of only 1 % in the Demand Side scenario.
Discussion
This section has illustrated some of the barriers that will exist to achieving the technological 
improvements contained in Johnston’s Demand Side scenario. These include problems with 
compatibility with existing technology or buildings, lack of market incentives and policy 
measures to achieve change, and resistance to changing the appearance of buildings. To 
overcome these problems, there will have to be social, cultural and institutional change as well 
as technological change. This review has deliberately been illustrative rather than 
comprehensive -  identifying some of the barriers to technological progress. More broadly, the 
following section considers how changes in behaviour or lifestyles could put 60% carbon 
savings beyond the reach of even the optimistic assumptions in DJ-DS.
4.8 Investigating alternative lifestyle and behavioural futures
4.8.1 Introduction
This section looks in detail at social and behavioural variables and how changes in these factors 
could affect future energy demand. The purpose is to investigate to what extent plausible 
combinations of changes in behaviour could compromise future energy savings. It highlights the 
vulnerability of technological assumptions to changes in behaviour, and the possible interactions 
between technology and behaviour.
The key variables considered here are hot water demand, internal temperature, number of 
people per household, rates of demolition and energy consumption by domestic lights and 
appliances. For each variable, the range of future possible values is discussed. Then the 
maximum and minimum values are run through the model to investigate how much difference
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these changes could make to total energy use. Finally, the maximum and minimum values for 
each variable are combined to create High and Low Energy scenarios. The High Energy 
scenario reflects the social values which would prevail under the ‘individual’ Foresight 
scenarios, while the Low Energy scenario shares social values with the ‘community’ Foresight 
scenarios (Chapter 3). Savings are compared for their effect on DJ-BAU, so that these 
behavioural changes can be easily compared with the technological changes in DJ-DS. This 
analysis demonstrates the vulnerability of savings identified in DJ-DS (and similar scenarios 
created for other models) to changes in behaviour and demand for energy services.
A wide range of possible values is considered for the social and lifestyle variables under 
consideration. Johnston identified likeliness, relevance, consistency and transparency as the 
criteria for constructing his scenarios. This thesis takes a different approach in one respect - 
Tikeliness’ is not included as a criterion. The reason for this is, as demonstrated in Chapter 3, 
that the most likely scenarios are those which also generate the greatest increases in carbon 
dioxide emissions - in order to achieve a significant reduction in carbon emissions some 
unlikely things may need to happen. High values are chosen from the upper range o f what 
currently seems plausible, and low values are similarly as low as seems possible, in order to 
give a wide range of futures.
In the numerical analysis, Johnston’s BAU values are used until 2004 after which there is linear 
interpolation from 2005 to 2050, the year for which maximum and minimum values are defined.
4.8.2 Space heating energy demand and internal temperatures
Heating accounts for around 60% of total household energy use. Energy use for heating is 
determined by the amount of time that the property is heated, the temperature it is heated to and 
the proportion of the house that is heated (as well as the thermal and ventilation properties of the 
dwelling). All of these factors can be summarised in a single number -  the average temperature 
of the dwelling over 24 hours. Control of this temperature is the single most important 
behavioural determinant of a household’s energy use and subsequent carbon emissions. So, the 
key questions are what is this temperature most likely to be in future, what plausible future 
range of temperatures could occur and what theories of comfort have to tell us about these 
questions. In addition, how would a future range of temperatures affect energy consumption?
In order to estimate the potential range of future temperatures, it is helpful to investigate why 
temperatures have been rising over time, and what the main drivers in temperature change have 
been. The temperature achieved in a household is a function of the desired temperature, the 
technical capacity of the house and the heating system to achieve that temperature, and the 
financial capacity of the householders to pay for their desired temperature (DoE 1996). Energy
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efficiency and fuel prices have been changing so that it has become easier and cheaper to heat to 
higher temperatures. Houses are (slowly) becoming more energy efficient (DETR 2000d). In 
addition, most heating systems now have the capacity to reach the occupants’ desired 
temperature: central heating is now owned by over 90% of UK households (94% of English 
households had central or programmable heating in 2001 (ODPM 2003)). Fuel expenditure is 
falling as a proportion of income: energy only accounted for 3% of the average household 
expenditure in 2000/01, compared with 5% twenty years previously (ONS 2003a). Technical 
and financial constraints to higher temperatures are much reduced. For the majority of 
households, the desired heating regime is the principal determinant of the heating regime 
achieved. The question then arises - what temperatures do people want?
Changes in perception of comfort
Both modelling and measured temperature data shows clearly that internal temperatures have 
changed considerably in the UK (Figure 4.5), increasing by about six degrees over the past 
thirty years. A range of evidence illustrates how attitudes to temperatures have changed over 
time and also how the range of acceptable temperatures seems to be wider than is commonly 
assumed:
• In the English House Condition Survey (EHCS), the ‘cold’ standard in 1986 (<16°C 
living room and <12°C hall) had been re-classified as ‘very cold’ by 1996 (DETR 
2000d, DoE 1991b).
• In 1986, the EHCS survey (DoE 1991b) asked the following question: “Overall how 
satisfied are you with your heating?”2 Although people at the highest temperatures 
(>21 °C) were more satisfied than people at the lowest, there was a very wide range in 
the middle (between 21 and 12°C for the living room) at which over 80% of people 
declared themselves very or fairly satisfied. Over 60% of people at all temperatures 
were very or fairly satisfied.
• The percentage of people very or fairly satisfied with their heating has changed 
relatively little over the ten years from 1986 to 1996 from 81% in 1986 to 87% in 1996 
(DoE 1991b, DETR 2000d). This is despite a significant increase in measured 
temperature (during equally cold winters) from 18 to 19°C in the living room and from 
over 16 to nearly 18°C in the hall.
• In a nationally representative survey carried out in 1977, 49% of respondents agreed or 
agreed strongly that ‘it is not generally necessary to heat bedrooms’(Field & Hedges 
1977). Evidence shows attitudes have changed considerably over twenty years: by
2 Although this question is not identical to asking how content people are with the temperature in their homes, it can 
reasonably be used as an indicator of thermal comfort as people are unlikely to be satisfied with their heating if it 
leaves them uncomfortable.
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1996, just 3% of English households did not heat bedrooms at the weekend (DETR 
2000d).
This evidence reflects changing ideas about acceptable temperatures: as temperatures have 
increased, thinking about what counts as cold has changed with them. Although it is clear that 
people lived in colder homes in the past, the evidence indicates that this is not identical with 
universally lower thermal comfort. The EHCS data showed that although people at the highest 
temperatures in 1986 were more satisfied than people at the lowest, there was a (perhaps 
surprisingly) wide range of temperatures over which people reported equal satisfaction with 
their heating systems. Temperature is therefore not on its own a reliable indicator of comfort.
Likely future temperatures
Indoor temperatures are still increasing in the UK and are generally expected to continue to rise 
(see below). The ability of most households to achieve high temperatures is improving. Both 
increasing ownership of central heating (although it now has little further to spread) and an 
expected continuing drop in spending on energy as a percentage of income point to an 
increasing ability to achieve higher temperatures. Energy prices are of course subject to change, 
but central heating is unlikely to be removed in the near future -  meaning the technological 
influence on temperatures achieved and expected will be present for years to come. Given the 
malleability o f ‘normal’ comfort levels (Shove 2003), a continued rise in temperature should not 
be seen as inevitable, although it currently seems likely.
Researchers at BRE estimate that living room temperature during occupied periods is unlikely 
to exceed 21°C and that a temperature about 19°C would be considered adequate elsewhere in 
the dwelling, giving a 24 hour temperature average of 19-20°C as an ultimate comfort level 
(Shorrock & Utley 2003). A government paper which considered the temperatures which would 
prevail in different Foresight scenarios by 2050 (as described in Chapter 3) suggested a narrow 
range from 20°C in the Local Stewardship scenario to 22°C in the World Markets scenario 
(DEFRA 2001b). However, another government study using these scenarios assumed that all 
would converge on 21°C by 2020 (PIU 2001b). Johnston expected the average temperature to 
reach 21°C in both pre- and post-1996 housing (Johnston 2003a). The differences between these 
projections is fairly minor, with a general expectation that average internal temperature will 
increase until it reaches 20-22°C and then stabilise. But is it inevitable that temperatures will 
rise, or that they will stop rising at around 21°C?
There is evidence that some people are already choosing temperatures above 21°C. In the UK, 
one study showed residents in nine super-insulated homes exceeding a whole house 24 hour 
average of 22°C (Ridley 1995). Over 20% of English households in 1996 exceeded a spot
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temperature of 21°C in their living rooms (DETR 2000d). For comparison, in the USA a 
household survey in 2001 which asked people what the indoor temperature was during winter 
when somebody was at home (equivalent to a spot temperature measurement) found an average 
reported temperature of 21.1 °C (Energy Information Administration 2003). The range was from 
less than 17.2°C, reported in 4% of homes, to more than 23.3°C, reported in 19% of homes. A 
Swedish study measured indoor temperature measurements in 1200 homes during 1992 (Norlen 
& Anderson 1993). Indoor temperature was measured continuously for one month. Average 
temperatures were 20.9°C in single family houses and 22.2°C in multi-family buildings giving 
an overall average of 21.4°C (the authors did not try to explain the temperature difference 
between these sorts of dwellings). An indoor temperature of over 23°C was measured in 33% of 
the apartments in multi-family buildings. It is not clear whether people choosing these high 
temperatures are an indicator of what might happen in the future, or simply part of the normal 
variation around an average which may not exceed a 24 hour average of 21°C. However, the 
data do indicate the desire among some people for temperatures exceeding 21°C.
Understanding indoor temperatures - theories of comfort
Thermal comfort is defined as a person’s feeling of warmth. It is not the same as temperature, 
although there is a connection between the two. There are a number of approaches to explaining 
the relationship between temperature and comfort. The three approaches -  which are linked -  
can be characterised as physiological, adaptive and social / cultural. Firstly these theories are 
outlined. Then the theories are used to explore the question of what temperatures might be in 
future.
The physiological model of comfort suggests thermal comfort is determined by the heat flows 
between the human body and its environment in order to maintain an energy balance. The main 
factors which go to make up the sensation of thermal comfort are: air temperature; radiant 
temperature due to the temperature of surrounding surfaces; air movement; humidity; together 
with personal factors such as clothing and activity. This theory proposes that there is an 
identifiable temperature for each level of clothing and activity at which most people will be 
comfortable.
Much has been done to measure thermal comfort under laboratory conditions. This work has 
been used to derive standards for thermal comfort to be met in public and commercial buildings. 
Fanger (1970) was one of the key researchers. He developed a sophisticated method of analysis 
based upon extensive laboratory studies which enables the percentage of dissatisfied occupants 
of a room with particular thermal characteristics to be predicted (leading to concepts of the 
predicted mean vote and percentage people dissatisfied). A small percentage of people are 
expected to be uncomfortable at any specific environmental condition, due to different
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individual preferences. Fanger’s research has indicated a temperature of around 22°C is 
generally preferred by sedentary people wearing office clothing. This understanding of comfort 
is widely used within legislation and underpins projections of future energy use made in 
government reports such as the English House Condition Survey Energy Report series.
The key criticism of the physiological approach is that the results of field studies have not 
matched those found in laboratories. As Burberry states:
“Recent research has cast doubt on the validity o f specific fixed temperatures as a close guide to 
thermal comfort. There is evidence that people adapt their clothing and immediate environment 
to suit prevailing conditions and, within reasonable limits, are most comfortable when thermal 
conditions remain fairly stable, irrespective o f actual values. ”(1997: 73)
This research has led to the development of the adaptive approach to thermal comfort, which 
starts not from a consideration of the heat exchange between people and the environment, but 
from the observation that there is a range of actions that we can and do take in order to achieve 
thermal comfort (UNL 2003). The adaptive principle states that if a change occurs such as to 
produce discomfort, people react in ways that tend to restore comfort. It follows from this that 
comfort temperatures reflect average temperatures. This understanding of thermal comfort has 
emerged from research on temperature in workplaces, usually offices. It is not entirely clear 
what insights the adaptive principle has to offer on household temperature, where individuals 
have reasonable control over their environment and are also responsible for paying the fuel bills.
The adaptive theory of comfort does not necessarily contradict the physiological theory. 
However, it challenges the over-simplified interpretations of physiological theory, which 
suggest achieving a certain temperature will lead to comfort. It also stresses the limitations of 
steady state laboratory studies for predicting comfort in real life situations which are often 
transient.
What might be seen as a third paradigm of thermal comfort research concerns the social and 
cultural construction of comfort (Chappells & Shove 2003). This research reveals how comfort 
is (or has been) culturally relative and is framed by issues of social convention, symbolism and 
status that cannot be reduced to thermal, physiological or psychological parameters. A simple 
example of this is the temperatures people seek out and enjoy on sunny holidays are vastly in 
excess of what would be thought comfortable in a work situation. Anthropological studies have 
shown there is a wide range of temperatures at which people are comfortable. A related set of 
ideas concerns the socio-technical construction of comfort and the role of wider systems of 
provision in shaping domestic thermal norms. Although not disputing the physiological and
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adaptive approaches, the social / cultural approach takes into account other factors which affect 
people’s feeling of comfort and so claims a wider range of temperatures can be comfortable.
All three approaches to thermal comfort would endorse the statement made earlier that 
temperature on its own cannot be used as an indicator of comfort. Assuming a future 
temperature regime where most people are comfortable does not tell us what temperatures will 
be, unless we also know levels of activity, clothing, humidity, cultural ideas of acceptable 
temperatures and so on.
Temperature range for investigation
The temperature range to be investigated in the model is 16-23°C. According to Shorrock and 
Utley (2003) 16°C was the average internal temperature during the early 1990s. It is considered 
to be the lower minimum temperature safeguarding health (DETR 2000d). An average 
temperature of 16°C is likely to be characterised by higher levels of clothing and differentiated 
temperatures within the home with warmer living areas and cooler bedrooms. Better insulated 
homes would make achieving thermal comfort at lower room temperatures more possible, 
because of the lack of draughts and radiant cold from walls and windows.
The maximum value of 23 °C is a higher figure than usually used, but it is possible that changing 
ideas of thermal comfort could lead to this becoming the norm. This temperature was exceeded 
by a significant proportion of Swedish homes in 1992. An average temperature of 23°C would 
be consistent with high temperatures throughout the house, light clothing and low levels of 
activity.
According to BRE, the average 24hr internal temperature increased by approximately 1.5°C 
during the 1970s, and by 2-2.5°C during both the 1980s and the 1990s (Shorrock & Utley
2003). Some of this change in temperature was due to the increasing proportion of centrally- 
heated homes, which have higher temperatures, rather than temperature increases within 
centrally and non-centrally heated homes. Thus a maximum rate of change of 1.5°C per decade 
will be used in the model for both increasing and decreasing temperatures.
By 2050, a temperature of 16°C results in a total energy reduction of 32%, whereas an increase 
to 23°C would lead to an increase of 15% (Table 4.8). An additional scenario of temperature at 
18°C has also been calculated.
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Table 4.8: Effects of internal temperature scenarios on UK household annual energy 
consumption
Difference from DJ-BAU (%)
23°C max 18°C max 16°C max
2010 1.6 1.0 -12.3
2030 7.1 -14.7 -27.9
2050 14.8 -20.5 -32.2
There is considerable concern that, as external temperatures rise under climate change, there 
will be increasing demand for air conditioning in UK homes. ODPM (2004) has undertaken 
some preliminary research on the likely uptake of domestic air conditioning if summer 
temperatures increase. They state that if the temperatures experienced in 2003 were to become 
the norm, then ownership of air conditioning could increase to 30-40% in the South East of 
England. Future energy consumption by air conditioning has not been estimated for inclusion in 
TF-BAU. This is just one of the new uses of energy that is not included in modelling within this 
thesis, meaning that all future energy consumption estimates are likely to be underestimates (as 
discussed in Chapter 3).
4.8.3 Hot water demand
Hot water demand could change considerably over the next fifty years. In Johnston’s scenarios 
hot water demand is assumed to reduce from around 43 litres per person per day in 1996 to 
around 40 litres by 2050. This reduction occurs as a number of occupants install mains pressure 
spray-head taps and showerheads into their dwellings. This section considers two interlinked 
determinants of hot water demand. The first is personal demand for hot water, the second is 
change in technologies related to hot water which may affect how much hot water can be 
delivered how quickly and consequently affect hot water demand. Both could lead to greater 
changes in demand than envisaged by Johnston.
Over recent decades household water usage has increased. Today’s households use 70% more 
water than in the 1960s (Hassell 2002). Total use of water per person (hot and cold) continued 
to rise steadily during the early 1990s, reaching a peak of 154 litres per person per day in 1995. 
Between then and 2001 it stayed fairly stable at 150 1/person/day (National Statistics 2001). Hot 
water therefore currently accounts for around thirty per cent of total water usage (43 litres out of 
a total of 150 litres). Water use in England in 1997/98 was estimated to be in the following 
proportions: bath / shower / hand basin -  33%; toilet flushing -  25%; clothes washing -  14%; 
dish washing -  8%; garden use and car washing -  7%, other (including kitchen taps) -  13% 
(National Statistics 2001). As this includes both hot and cold water, it does not give an accurate 
picture of how hot water demand is made up -  but it indicates that personal bathing /showering 
dominates demand.
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Demand for hot water
Reliable measured data on hot water usage are in very short supply. An EU study suggested that 
the average EU citizen used 36 litres of 60 °C water per day, with a measured range between 20 
litres and 63 litres (NOVEM 2001), however, this was based on very limited monitored data.
An individual’s demand for hot water does not arise in isolation. It is affected by the availability 
and cost of hot water, social conventions on washing, bathing and clothes laundering, water 
usage of washing machines, whether showers or baths are preferred and so on. Many of these 
factors are themselves inter-related. It can be argued that the increasing availability and falling 
cost of delivering hot water has allowed social conventions around bathing to change. So 
although hot water demand is discussed in relation to the individual this does not imply that 
individual preferences are solely (or even primarily) responsible for changes in demand.
Shove (2003) presents a complex social analysis of both bathing and clothes laundering. She 
considers the nature of bathing and how it fulfils many different functions simultaneously: 
pleasure, duty, as a means of positioning the self in society, and expressive of the relationship 
between the body and nature. Shove’s analysis demonstrates how ideas about the role of bathing 
and bathing practices have changed over time, and that more but also less resource-intensive 
conventions of normal practice may arise in the future. She suggests that bathing practices are 
not locked into an inevitable escalation of resource use. In general, Shove concludes that: 
“Looking ahead, what people take to be normal is immensely malleable. There are no fixed  
measures o f comfort and cleanliness and it is perfectly possible that future concepts will be less 
resource intensive than those o f today. ” (2003:199)
This suggests a wide range of possible future demands for hot water.
Technological systems for delivering hot water
At the moment there are two key trends in hot water installations which will affect the rate at 
which hot water can be delivered and thus have the potential to affect demand:
• increasing popularity of mains pressure cylinders - increasing the rate at which hot 
water is delivered;
• increasing installations of combi boilers - decreasing the rate at which hot water is 
delivered.
Brinkley (2002) estimates that one in six new hot water cylinders are mains pressure ones, as 
are as many as half of all cylinders going into new homes. This contrasts with traditional UK 
hot water systems where the hot water tank is fed from a cold water cylinder in the loft (and hot 
water consequently is not at mains pressure, unlike cold water). The main advantage of mains 
pressure hot water is that it enables householders to have higher flow-rate showers. The flow
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rate depends on local water pressure, but can be up to 35 litres per minute (Brinkley 2002), 
much greater than conventional non-mains pressure systems which deliver water at about 10 
litres per minute (Hassell 2002). Thus, all other things being equal, mains pressures showering 
could use several times the water and energy of its conventional equivalent.
Hot water systems without storage capability, powered by combi (combination) boilers, are 
becoming increasingly popular in the UK. In 2002, combis accounted for around 50% of all new 
boiler sales (Brinkley 2002). These boilers are popular because they do away with the need for 
hot water storage (in cylinders), and tanks and associated pipework in the loft, and cost saving 
offsets their higher price than conventional boilers. Combis are cheaper to install than a 
conventional system (Brinkley 2002). The disadvantage is the lower rate at which hot water can 
be delivered (compared with a storage system) - this means that combi boilers are generally 
considered most suitable for smaller properties and smaller households, where there will not be 
multiple simultaneous demands for hot water. Running a bath with a combi system could take 
two to three times as long as with a conventional system, and so use of showers could be 
favoured. However, at the same time, a combi system never runs out of hot water - potentially 
facilitating an increase in hot water use.
Hot water demand range for investigation
With technological trends pointing in opposing directions and the possibility of social norms on 
bathing and clothes washing moving in different ways, a wide range of per capita hot water 
demand is possible in the future. The values used in the model are 20 litres and 80 litres in 2050, 
respectively half and twice the values in Johnston’s BAU. The value of 20 litres is based on the 
lowest measured value in the EU study quoted earlier (NOVEM 2001). This would be 
consistent with greater use of combis with their lower flow rates, with short showers becoming 
preferable to power showers or frequent bathing. The figure of 80 litres is greater than that 
currently seen in the EU. However, given the capacity of new mains pressure water systems to 
increase shower water use by a factor of three, a higher maximum of 80 litres would be 
consistent with more frequent high pressure showers or a preference for bathing over showers. 
This rate of change of water use, a halving or doubling over fifty years, is similar to the 70% 
increase over forty years seen since the 1960s (Hassell 2002).
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By 2050, a water demand of 20 litres per person per day results in a total energy reduction of 
5%, whereas an increase to 80 litres would lead to an increase of 11% (Table 4.9).
Table 4.9: Effects of hot water demand scenarios on UK household annual energy 
consumption
Difference from DJ-BAU (%)
20 litres by 2050 80 litres by 2050
2010 -1.2 2.4
2030 -3.0 6.1
2050 -5.4 10.8
4.8.4 Lights, appliances and cooking energy demand
In the DJ-BAU scenario, energy consumption per household from lights, appliances and 
cooking is 10.5% lower in 2050 than it was in 1996. The decreases in energy consumption come 
primarily from the cold appliances (fridges and freezers), wet appliances (washing machines, 
dishwashers and tumble driers) and cooking, with energy use by consumer electronics and 
lighting increasing. In the DJ-DS scenario it is assumed that electricity use by lights and 
appliances halves by 2020 and that energy use in cooking fall by around a quarter by the same 
date.
It is difficult to separate issues of usage and ownership of lights, appliances and cooking from 
new technologies which might tend to increase or decrease consumption. This is particularly the 
case for higher energy usage where new technologies tend to drive new patterns of demand for 
additional energy services. There is no comparable key behavioural or social variable for these 
end uses which parallels indoor temperatures or hot water consumption in determining space 
and water heating energy use.
Norgard & Christensen (1994) have suggested that it would be possible to live a high quality 
life using just 250 kWh electricity per person per year, with three people sharing a household, 
making household consumption of 750kWh. This level of consumption would rely on lower 
usage and ownership of some technologies as well as technological improvements. This is less 
than a quarter of current UK household electricity annual consumption (for lights, cooking and 
appliances). However, experience in a small number of monitored UK low energy houses has 
not shown particularly low electricity use, with the range of electricity used per household for 
lights, appliances and ventilation being 2,290 -  4,050 kWh/ year (analysis based on Best 
Practice Programme 1997). A number of the case study households which will be presented in 
Chapter 6 had lower electricity use than this. Historic evidence shows that energy use for lights,
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appliances and cooking has increased by 53% per household between 1970 and 2001 (Shorrock 
& Utley 2003).
The low value assumption is that energy use in these sectors could reduce to around half of the 
DJ-BAU value in 2050, a similar assumption to that made in DJ-DS (but in this case not making 
any assumption of technological improvement beyond that embedded in DJ-BAU). In a high 
consumption future, there would be higher ownership of appliances, higher usage and adoption 
of appliances which have not yet been invented. The assumption here is that energy 
consumption for these end-uses could double by 2050, which is a slightly higher rate of increase 
than that since 1970, but certainly plausible if there are no major brakes on demand.
By 2050, a fall by half in energy use in lights and appliances results in a total energy reduction 
of 11%, whereas a doubling would result in an increase of 23% (Table 4.10).
Table 4.10: Effects of lights, appliances and cooking scenarios on UK household annual 
energy consumption
Difference from DJ-BAU (%)
2 * BAU 0.5* BAU
2010 2.3 -1.2
2030 9.0 -5.4
2050 23.0 -11.0
Because electricity is a higher carbon fuel than gas, this would lead to an even greater increase 
in carbon dioxide emissions. So under the double DJ-BAU scenario, carbon dioxide emissions 
would be 2.9% higher in 2010, 16.4% higher in 2030 and 32.7% higher in 2050 than in DJ- 
BAU if Johnston’s projections for the annual carbon intensity of electricity to 2050 are used. 
These projections are described in Section 4.9.
4.8.5 Household size
The influence of population projections on household numbers has already been discussed 
earlier in this chapter. The other key factor is the size of households, that is, how many people 
live in the average household3. The number of people per household has fallen over recent 
decades. In 1971, there were 2.9 people per household, whereas by 2003 it had reduced to 2.4 
(National Statistics 2004a). This pattern is common to the rest of Europe, with data showing that 
the average household size in the European Economic Area excluding Ireland fell from 2.82 in
3 The number of households is simply defined as the total population divided by average household size. 
Because only occupied homes are of interest for energy modelling, the number of second homes and 
empty homes does not have an influence on household numbers. Thus the number of dwellings will be 
higher than the number of households.
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1980 to 2.49 in 1995 (EU 2001). In 1995 some countries already had smaller household size 
than the UK does now, with Germany having the smallest households at 2.21 people, followed 
by Denmark at 2.26 and Sweden at 2.27 (EU 2001). The changing size of households is related 
to demographic and social change, with key factors including the ageing population, lower 
marriage rates, increased divorce rates and the falling number of children per woman. In 
particular, the proportion of one person households has increased significantly, in the UK rising 
from 18% in 1971 to 29% in 2003 (National Statistics 2004a). Household size tends to influence 
the supply of the physical housing stock rather than the other way round. The dwelling stock is 
expected to expand to meet the increased demand for housing generated by increasing 
household numbers.
Johnston’s projections (DJ-BAU and DJ-DS) assume that household size will continue to fall 
until it reaches 2 persons per household in 2040, after which size remains the same. However, a 
wider range of future household sizes will be investigated.
Maximum size of households
The physical nature of the housing stock is unlikely to be the primary barrier to increasing 
household size. In 2002/03 just 6% of new dwellings were built with one bedroom, whereas 
36% had four or more bedrooms (National Statistics 2004a) -  so houses are large enough to 
accommodate larger households. It will be social and demographic change which determines 
household size.
It is assumed (by the author) that current trends towards greater individualisation will reverse, 
and that the household size in 1971 of 2.9 could be achieved again by 2050. However, if 
household size did increase to 2.9 by 2050, because the UK population is not expected to 
increase very much, household numbers would actually decrease below those in 1996 by about 
two and half million. This would require around 50,000 demolitions per year and that no new 
dwellings were built.
Minimum size of households
Technically, the minimum household size is one person per household. However, a scenario 
where everyone lives alone (including children of all ages) is clearly unrealistic. Johnston used a 
minimum of two people. The minimum used here is 1.8 people per household (which could be 
made up of 40% one person households, 45% two person households, 10% three person 
households and 5% four person households).
1 1 2
Modelling the effect of household size
The way the model works is that the number of new houses per year is determined by the 
replacement of pre-1996 homes (lost through demolition) plus the demand for additional 
housing generated by increasing household numbers. So in all scenarios where household size 
varies (and demolition rates are the same) there is the same number of pre-1996 homes, which 
dominate energy consumption. Because differences in the number of houses under varying 
household size scenarios are for new homes only - the differences in energy consumption due to 
changing household size, and consequent household numbers, are perhaps lower than might be 
expected.
By 2050, a fall to 1.8 people per household would result in an increase in energy consumption 
of 6%, whereas an increase towards 2.9 people by 2050 would result in a decrease of 12% in 
energy by 2030 (Table 4.11).
Table 4.11: Effects of household size scenarios on UK household annual energy 
consumption
Difference from DJ-BAU (%)
1.8 people/hh 2.9 people/hh *
2010 0.4 -3.1
2030 1.7 -11.5
2050 6.2 n/a
* The 2.9 people/hh scenario makes little sense after 2030 because there are no new dwellings 
required due to contracting numbers and the model assumes negative numbers of new houses.
One of the weaknesses of the modelling is that it does not allow variation in energy use 
depending on the number of people in the household, with the exception of water heating. Other 
forms of energy use are also likely to increase as the number of occupants per household rises. 
Thus the model probably overestimates the savings available from assuming people live in 
larger households.
4.8.6 Rates of demolition
New build houses are expected to use considerably less energy and be responsible for lower 
carbon dioxide emissions than pre-1996 dwellings throughout their lifetime, even under the DJ- 
DS scenario. Thus an increased rate of demolition means that lower energy consuming 
dwellings are replacing higher energy dwellings - resulting in energy savings. The question is 
how significant the savings could be.
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In Johnston’s BAU scenario, demolition rates stay constant at 16,700 from 1996 to 2039. 
However the rate increases dramatically between 2040 and 2045 and then stays at a high level. 
This change in demolition rates was introduced by Johnston to ensure that as household 
numbers fell slightly between 2040 and 2050, construction of new houses would continue at a 
reasonable rate. If the demolition rate was not increased, no new houses would be constructed. 
The main grounds for his decision was that it was very unlikely that the house building industry 
would be largely wiped out by the lower demand for new housing.
To understand the boundaries of possibility for demolition rates it is useful to look at the history' 
of demolition over recent decades. This is carried out in detail in Appendix 5. In summary, 
demolition rates have been far higher in the past than at present, being around 90,000 per year in 
1939. Demolition rates reached a post-war peak around 1970 with 70,000 properties demolished 
per year. Since then demolition rates have decreased considerably, particularly for the privately 
owned housing stock. It is estimated (based on government sources, as explained in Appendix 
5) that 24,400 dwellings were demolished in England in 2000/01. This is equivalent to 
demolishing around 0.1% of the English housing stock per annum, i.e. houses having to last 
1000 years before replacement. In Scotland, from 1996 to 2001 the demolition rate has been 
higher, with around 0.2% of the stock demolished per year (Scottish Executive 2002). In 
Northern Ireland, 0.15% of the stock was demolished per year on average in 2002/03 and 
2003/04 (DSD 2004). In Wales, an average of 600 dwellings were demolished annually between 
1996/97 and 2003/04 (Statistics for Wales 2004). This equates to around 0.05% of the housing 
stock per annum. However, as this figure relates only to government-funded demolition activity 
it may be an underestimate of the Welsh total (see Appendix 5 for an explanation of different 
types of demolition). At current English rates of demolition, 94% of houses built by 2000 will 
still be standing in 2050. Rates of private housing demolition are much lower at 0.02%, 
implying these houses will have to last for 5000 years.
Range of future demolitions rates
The range of demolition rates to be explored in the model is between half of the current rate of 
demolition, 0.05 of the stock per year, up to a maximum of 0.5% of housing per year. The 
current demolition rate is already historically very low (at 0.1%), half the present rate seems a 
reasonable estimate of a long-term minimum. The reason for choosing 0.5% as a maximum is 
that when demolition rates were at a post-war high in the early 1970s, 0.4% of the housing stock 
was demolished per year. In addition, given the expected changes in UK climate described in 
Chapter 2, demolition rates could well increase over time as properties are lost to rising sea 
levels and increased flooding incidents, or are removed as they become uninsurable due to these 
and other climate risks. A demolition rate of 0.5% per annum would require the capability of 
replacing 157,000 dwellings per year in 2050 in addition to the new dwellings required by the
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change in household numbers, compared with a dwelling completion rate in 2002/03 of 
184,000 per year (National Statistics 2004), which should not prove impossible.
By 2050, a demolition rate of 0.05% per year leads to an increase in energy consumption of 2%, 
whereas an increase to 0.5% by 2050 would result in a decrease of 5% (Table 4.12).
Table 4.12: Effects of demolition rates on UK household energy consumption
Difference from Johnston BAU (%)
0.05% per year 0.5% per year
2010 0.0% -0.1%
2030 0.0% -2.1%
2050 1.7% -5.1%
These calculations are based on replacing the average pre-1996 dwelling, whereas if an 
accelerated demolition policy was put in place in real life, the least efficient dwellings would be 
targeted for replacement and savings are likely to be higher. The embodied energy involved in 
creating new dwellings would also have to be considered, but preliminary analysis has 
suggested this is not very significant compared with the lifetime energy in use in dwellings 
(Fawcett 2002) -  see Appendix 6 for details.
Proposing a considerably increased demolition rate does of course raise questions about 
practicality. There is every reason to believe that political and economic difficulties associated 
with mass demolition of privately-owned housing would be more severe than in the 1970s. 
Nevertheless, a very low rate of demolition is not without its problems. It is widely recognised 
that the current very low rate of housing demolition is leading to an unrealistically long 
expected lifetime for houses (Balchin & Rhoden 1998, Revell & Leather 2000, Chartered 
Institute for Environmental Health 2002). Within the EU, the UK has the second largest 
proportion of pre-1919 housing. It also has the lowest rate of demolition in the EU. Other 
countries with an ageing housing stock (such as Austria, France and Belgium) have higher 
levels of clearance (Revell and Leather 2000). However, this has not led to many direct calls for 
increased demolition rates. Unlikely as an increased demolition rate may seem at present, given 
the right political climate and suitable financial arrangements, it might be achieved in future.
There are a number of ways in which increased demolition rates could be encouraged. For 
example, if properties had to reach a minimum standard in terms of their carbon emissions 
before sale or rental, this would increase the attractiveness of demolishing a (less valuable) sub­
standard home and replacing it with a more valuable new one. Alternatively, increased density 
of development could be encouraged through the planning system. This would make it easier for
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developers to replace existing old homes with new higher density development (as happens to a 
limited extent already). However, a policy like this would also have impacts beyond housing 
policy, e.g. on local traffic patterns. Finally, the government could offer direct financial 
assistance to owner occupiers in sub-standard housing to cover some or all of the costs of 
demolition and re-building, with the government getting back its investment by benefiting from 
the increased value of the replacement dwelling.
4.8.7 Combination into high and low energy scenarios
The various factors above can be combined into high and low energy scenarios to see what the 
maximum effect of these values is in combination. In each of the scenarios the values listed 
below are those achieved in 2050, with linear interpolation from Johnston’s values for 2004.
High energy scenario (TF-HighE) -  values in 2050
• 80 litres hot water demand per person per day
• 23 °C internal temperature
• household size of 1.8 people
• demolition rate is 0.05% of the stock per annum
• energy consumption by cooking, lights and appliances is two times that in BAU 
scenario
Low energy scenario (TF-LowE) -  values in 2050
• 20 litres hot water demand per person per day
• 16°C internal temperature (variation with 18°C internal temperature)
• household size of 2.9 people
• demolition rate is 0.5% of the stock per annum
• energy consumption by cooking, lights and appliances is half that in BAU scenario
The general trends of increasing personal consumption and greater individualisation of society 
which are embodied within the High Energy scenario match those within the Foresight World 
Markets (WM) scenario (which has been identified as the scenario most like conventional 
development). By contrast, the values embodied within the Low Energy scenario are those of 
reduced personal consumption and stronger communities with people choosing to live together 
in larger households. These match the Foresight Local Sustainability values.
The low and high energy scenarios are shown in comparison with Johnston’s BAU projection 
(Figure 4.7). The low energy scenario is shown with a variation where the average internal 
temperature is 18°C rather than 16°C. Johnston’s Demand Side scenario is also shown for 
comparison, as is TF-BAU.
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Figure 4.7: Low and high energy scenarios, UK domestic sector, 1996-2050
These scenarios demonstrate the considerable variation in energy consumption which might 
occur, even with no additional technological improvements beyond those included in Johnston’s 
BAU scenario. In fact both TF-LowE and TF-LowE-18C save more energy than the 
technologically-improved DJ-DS scenario. Energy consumption is 58% higher in TF-HighE 
than DJ-BAU in 2050 and 60% lower in TF-LowE. TF-LowE achieves 69% energy savings by 
2050 compared with 1996, clearly demonstrating that social / lifestyle changes can, in theory, be 
very powerful forces for energy saving. However, TF-HighE also demonstrates how social and 
lifestyle influences could lead to considerably higher energy consumption than is currently 
expected.
Figure 4.8 shows the effect of combining TF-HighE and TF-LowE with DJ-DS. In other words, 
the figure shows the result of a combination of social change towards higher and lower 
consumption patterns with maximum technological improvements.
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Figure 4.8: Low and high energy scenarios combined with DJ-DS, UK domestic sector, 
1996-2050
The TF-HighE and DJ-DS scenarios in combination result in slightly higher energy use than in 
DJ-BAU by 2050, and energy consumption in 2050 is just 17% lower than in 1996. The 
scenario TF-LowE & DJ-DS results in saving 77% energy by 2050 compared with 1996.
The lifestyle and behavioural variations identified in the TF-HighE and TF-LowE scenarios are 
based largely on today’s ideas about what is an acceptable level of energy service. They do not 
designate upper or lower limits to socially-driven consumption, and are clearly just two of the 
very many different scenarios which could have been developed. For example, a linear 
projection of energy use 1970-2003 up to 2050 would give total energy consumption then of 
760 TWh, a higher total than in TF-HighE. (Remember that projections of past trends 
incorporate the effect of previous introductions of new technologies, which by definition are 
excluded from bottom-up modelling.) There are also some more radical views of how much 
lower energy consumption could be (e.g. Norgard & Christensen 1994).
In conclusion, a combination of social and lifestyle changes has been shown to be very powerful 
in moving future energy consumption either upwards or downwards. Under the TF-HighE 
scenario, the technological responses that Johnston has identified in his Demand Side scenario 
would not be any where near sufficient to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 60% by 2050, 
only 17% savings could be achieved. This demonstrates the need to have some type of cap on 
carbon dioxide emissions from energy use, because otherwise social and lifestyle change could 
easily increase demand for energy services beyond the point at which efficiency options could 
be effective in reducing energy use sufficiently.
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4.9 Supply side variations
4.9.1 Introduction
So far the analysis in this chapter has been based largely around energy use rather than the 
subsequent carbon dioxide emissions, which are of most concern. Carbon dioxide emissions 
depend on the fuels used to supply this energy demand, and, in the case of electricity, the fuels 
used to produce it and the efficiency of its production, transmission and distribution. The ratio 
of gas:electricity use stays almost constant in DJ-BAU - gas accounts for between 73 and 75% 
of total energy use over the whole period of modelling. The carbon intensity of electricity is 
expected to change over time. However, the carbon intensity of gas is not - because the 
chemical nature of natural gas (methane) will not change. So the carbon intensity of electricity 
is crucial to influencing changes in carbon dioxide emissions.
4.9.2 Carbon intensity of electricity
1990 to 2010
Carbon intensity figures are not published by the government on a regular basis. Indicators of 
carbon intensity since 1970 have been published (DTI 2004b), but actual values are not 
available from this report. The values in the graph below have been calculated by the author 
using a combination of data on carbon emissions from the power generation sector (DTI 2004b) 
and electricity ‘final consumption’ figures from Table 5.2 in the Digest of UK Energy statistics 
(DTI 2004a). So the carbon intensity is based on all electricity provided for final consumption in 
the UK, including net imports, and carbon emissions from the UK generation sector. No 
temperature corrections have been made to the data. These figures differ by up to 10% from 
those published by DEFRA for the years 1990-97 (DEFRA 2001a), but DEFRA do not explain 
their methodology in full, so it is not clear why this is the case. In 2003, the carbon intensity of 
UK electricity was 0.136 kgC/kWh (based on ‘provisional’ carbon emissions data).
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Figure 4.9: Carbon intensity of electricity, UK, 1990-2003 and projections to 2010
The carbon intensity of electricity has fallen considerably between 1990 and 1999 in the UK 
(Figure 4.9). However, from 2000 high prices of gas have increased the share of coal generation 
somewhat, leading to an increase in carbon intensity. The key factor in the overall fall of carbon 
intensity since 1990 has been the huge increase in the use of gas for generation and the 
consequent falling percentage of generation from coal and oil (Table 4.13). The figures in Table 
4.13 are presented on a fuel input basis, i.e. based on the volumes of fuels input to power 
stations. However, figures on this basis do not account for the different efficiencies with which 
fuels are used in power stations. The alternative way of presenting this data is by fuel on an 
electricity output basis, which would reduce the contribution of coal and nuclear fuels and 
increase the contribution of gas (by about five percentage points in 2003) compared with the 
fuel input basis, because of the higher conversion efficiency of gas (DTI 2004a).
The percentage gas contributes to electricity generation has risen from less than 1% in 1990 to 
32% in 2003. During the same period, there has been a small percentage increase in the 
contribution of carbon-free nuclear power and renewable electricity and lower carbon combined 
heat and power (CHP).
120
Table 4.13: Fuels used to generate electricity, UK, 1990 and 2003 (fuel input basis)
Fuel 1990 (% share) 2003 (% share)
Coal 65.3 38.0
Oil 11 1.5
Gas 0.7 32.2
Nuclear 21.3 23.1
Renewables4 0.8 3.3
Other fuels (mostly coal 
derivatives) + net imports 1.0
1.9
Source: DTI 2004a with non-hydro renewables data for 1990 from DoE 1991a
The carbon intensity of electricity is expected to continue to change in future. The current 
opinion of DTI is that it will fall by another 17% by 2010 from 2002 values, to reach
0.1 lkgC/kWh (DTI 2003c). Johnston made a very similar projection for 2010 to that by the 
DTI, as Figure 4.9 demonstrates. However, Shorrock (2003) suggests that the strong reductions 
in emissions due to electricity supply industry changes that occurred in 1990s are probably 
coming to an end.
After 2010
The future carbon intensity of electricity depends on the generation mix, which is itself 
influenced by changes in prices, availability of fuels and generation technologies. The uncertain 
future of all of these factors makes it is increasingly difficult to make estimates of the carbon 
intensity of electricity beyond 2010.
Beyond 2010, Johnston assumes that the carbon intensity of electricity will fall in all scenarios, 
from 0.135 kgC/kWh in 1996 to 0.090 kgC/kWh by 2050 in the BAU and Demand Side 
scenarios (a fall of 33% from 1996) and to 0.050 kgC/kWh in 2050 in the Integrated scenario. In 
the BAU and Demand Side scenarios he uses Environmental Change Institute projections to 
2020 (Fawcett, Lane, & Boardman 2000) and assumes a gradual reduction in carbon intensity 
thereafter. The decrease in energy intensity of electricity in the Integrated Scenario is based on a 
number of developments in the supply side: increasing the efficiency of energy conversion, by 
technologies like advanced combined cycle gas turbines; displacing electricity production from 
more carbon intensive fuels; increased use of renewable energy; development of advanced fuel 
cells; more nuclear generation; capture and storage of carbon dioxide emissions. Some of these 
assumptions are very speculative. For example, the use of capture and storage of carbon dioxide
4 The UK government presents data on renewable electricity on three different bases. The ‘international’ 
definition o f  renewable energy would lead to a lower percentage contribution o f  2.67% in 2003, because 
imported renewable electricity and that from non-biodegradable waste are excluded (DTI 2004a).
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emissions, known as carbon sequestration, is currently in the very early stages of research and 
there remain many questions yet to be answered which are critical to its wide application 
(Gough, Shackley, & Cannell 2002). The government has recently confirmed that it does not 
expect projects to capture and store C 02 to be viable before 2020 (ENDS 2004a).
In terms of mainstream options, gas is expected to be the most important fossil fuel in the 
generation mix to 2050 (DTI 2003b, PIU 2002). The other key factors which will determine 
future carbon intensity of electricity are the contributions to be made by nuclear energy and 
renewables. The future contribution of nuclear power is particularly uncertain. The last nuclear 
reactor to be built in the UK was Sizewell B, which came into full operation in 1996 (Hillman & 
Fawcett 2004). At present, no new ones are planned and, if none are built and the life of existing 
stations is not extended, there would be only one plant still operating by 2025 (DTI 2003b). As 
its contribution declines, carbon dioxide emissions from electricity will increase unless all 
current nuclear capacity is replaced by renewable sources. Recent government statements have 
not given a lead on the future of nuclear power. The Energy White Paper stated: “We do n o t... 
propose to support new nuclear build now. But we will keep the option open. ” (DTI 2003b:44). 
As stated earlier, there is widely expected to be a gap between the government’s ambitions for 
renewables and their contribution over the next few years. Presently, it does not seem likely that 
renewable energy will make up the deficit of non-fossil fuel electricity that will emerge as 
nuclear stations close down.
There are many possible scenarios under which the carbon intensity of electricity could rise. For 
example, if new nuclear capacity is not brought on line, or if a very significant increase in 
renewable electricity proves not to be achievable, or if there is a return to greater use of coal or 
oil, then carbon intensities would rise. It can be argued that Johnston’s projections of carbon 
intensities in the BAU and DS scenarios, as well as the Integrated Scenarios, are optimistic.
Two possible alternative scenarios, that the carbon intensity is the same in 2050 as it was in 
2003, or that it increases back to the 1990 value by 2050, and the effect this would have on 
carbon emissions under the DJ-DS scenario are shown in Table 4.14. Carbon intensities at 2003 
values in 2050 would lead to an 18% increase in carbon emissions compared with DJ-DS, and a 
return to 1990 values then would lead to an increase of 43%. As a result of a return to 1990 
values, carbon emissions would only fall by 44% from 1996 values, rather than the 58% in DJ- 
DS.
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Table 4.14: Variations in carbon intensity of electricity, and their effect on carbon savings 
under DJ-DS
Carbon intensity Domestic sector annual carbon 
emissions 2050 (MtC)
Change from DJ- 
DS (%)
DJ-DS 16.1
Stays constant at 2003 value 
until 2050
18.9 +18
Increases to 1990 value 
linearly by 2050
23.0 +43
This analysis demonstrates both the importance of the carbon intensity of electricity and 
suggests that its continued reduction is far from assured.
4.9.3 Gas as a heating fuel
In terms of current mainstream energy sources for water and space heating, gas is the lowest 
carbon option there is. It has lower carbon emissions per kWh than solid fuels, oil and 
electricity. Therefore projections which assume gas will retain its current dominance are a kind 
of ‘best case’ for heating fuels. Is it plausible that gas will be the major fuel over the whole 
period to 2050? If not, how might this affect the carbon intensity of energy use?
There are good reasons to believe that gas could remain a very important fuel. The gas deliver}' 
infrastructure is already in place in most areas of the UK and over 80% of households are 
connected to the gas network (Fawcett, Lane, & Boardman 2000). Gas supplies are expected to 
still be available in 2050 on the world market, subject to geopolitical concerns. Supplies of oil, 
probably the key competitor fuel, are thought less certain to be available at low cost in 2050 
(PIU 2002). Solid fuel use has been falling over recent years for many reasons, including 
restrictions on use due to local air quality concerns, and the greater difficulties attached to 
handling, usage and storage compared with oil and gas. In the PIU (2002) study on the future of 
energy, gas was expected to remain an important fuel under all the different Foresight Scenarios 
to 2050. Thus, gas is widely expected to retain its position as the key heating fuel.
However, although gas appears to have many inherent advantages as a fuel, changes in 
availability and relative prices could be sufficient to change choices about home heating fuels. 
This might be particularly likely under a future like the Provincial Enterprise Foresight scenario 
mentioned in Chapter 3, where there is more focus on the national economy rather than 
international trading. If 20% of current gas users switched to using (British) coal, carbon 
emissions would increase in DJ-DS by 8% at 2050. In this example, the increase in emissions is 
not hugely dramatic, but it could be important should people switch away from gas to other 
fossil fuels in significant numbers.
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There are two main options for a lower carbon space and water heating fuel than gas. These are 
biofuels and renewable or nuclear electricity. Supplying large amounts of electricity at lower 
carbon intensity than gas would imply a vast expansion of the nuclear industry, which currently 
seems unlikely. Johnston mentions the possibility of biomass based heating fuels but concludes 
there is little immediate prospect of this making a significant contribution. At present, over three 
quarters of renewable energy is used to create electricity rather than heat (DTI 2004a). Biomass 
could be either burned in homes or at central CHP plants as a substitute for gas. A new report 
from the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution has suggested that the government 
should create ‘renewable heat’ targets, aiming to perhaps supply 5% of heat by 2020 from 
renewable sources such as biomass and solar thermal (RCEP 2004).
4.10 Summary and conclusions
This chapter has been concerned with a detailed challenge to the claim that 60% carbon savings 
by 2050 through technology improvement and renewable energy can be achieved. Although 
Chapter 3 had already established general arguments for doubting claims of potential future 
savings, this chapter looks at one particular bottom-up model (Johnston 2003a) and 
demonstrates clearly that there are many grounds for concern that the projected savings will not 
be achieved. Johnston’s model is just one of many which suggests significant savings can be 
achieved through technological change, as illustrated in Chapter 3, so the analysis presented 
would have been similar had a different model been chosen.
Business as usual and reference case projections from Johnston (2003a) and BRE (Shorrock et 
al. 2001) both suggest a levelling off in and then reduction in energy demand between now and 
2020 (BRE) or 2050 (Johnston). However, these projections, when compared with the historical 
evidence, look optimistic in terms of the expected reduction in energy demand.
Johnston’s model has been replicated for use in this thesis. The DJ-DS scenario showed that 
50% energy and 60% carbon savings could be made by 2050 by a combination o f demand-side 
renewables, energy efficiency and a reduction in the carbon intensity of electricity. Although 
DJ-DS is generally technologically conservative, relying on technologies that have a proven 
track record, there are many non-technical barriers which could jeopardise the envisaged 
technology improvements. Three of the technologies were chosen for further investigation. It 
was shown that there could be considerable non-technical problems with achieving the uptake 
rates assumed in DJ-DS.
Having considered the technical aspects of Johnston’s energy saving scenario, social and 
lifestyle changes which could affect future energy demand were identified. Key factors which
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could vary were identified, with the most critical factor being the internal temperature of homes. 
Because of its importance, considerable attention has been paid to temperature, including a 
comprehensive review of data on internal temperature in UK houses which combines modelled 
and monitored values from a number of different studies. Consideration of a number of different 
types of evidence, including current trends, past experience, and data from other countries, led 
to identification of possible minimum and maximum values for these factors by 2050. These 
were combined in a High and Low Energy scenario. TF-HighE suggested that energy 
consumption could be 58% greater in 2050 than DJ-BAU. Like all bottom-up scenarios, TF- 
HighE does not include as yet unknown energy uses and so is an underestimate of potential 
future energy use. TF-LowE suggested that energy consumption could be 60% lower in 2050 
than DJ-BAU.
Developing these scenarios has clearly demonstrated that a combination of escalating demand in 
several areas of consumption, and social change, could lead to energy consumption considerably 
higher than that projected by Johnston for 2050. This increase in energy demand would outstrip 
the capability of currently known technology to reduce carbon emissions by 60%. Such analysis 
demonstrates that current modelling of future energy use and potential savings is not based on 
anything like a ‘worst case’ scenario. Conversely, social and lifestyle changes could 
alternatively lead to much lower energy demand than Johnston envisaged.
Future carbon dioxide emissions will be determined by the fuels used as well as household 
energy demand. The analysis here has demonstrated both the importance of the carbon intensity' 
of electricity, and suggested that its continued reduction is far from assured. In addition, 
although gas is likely to remain as the most important water and space heating fuel, there is a 
possibility that higher carbon fuels could increase their market share. The potential for 
additional carbon emissions is clear.
The analysis in this chapter has highlighted a number of issues about the use of bottom-up 
models and has identified missing data. For example, it has highlighted how little is known 
about the new methods of delivering hot water and how this might affect usage. In this example, 
and others, the linkages between behaviour and technology have been stressed.
Finally, a carbon saving strategy which relies solely on energy efficiency and renewable energy 
does not provide any mechanisms to restrain demand, without which expected savings may not 
be achieved in reality, and certainly cannot be guaranteed. The analysis in this chapter points to 
the need for an over-arching carbon reduction framework, which can incorporate and encourage 
savings from energy efficiency, renewable energy, social change and lifestyle alterations. The
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following chapter proposes that personal carbon allowances could provide just such a 
framework.
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Chapter 5: Introducing a new policy: personal carbon 
rations
5.1 Chapter overview
In earlier chapters, several key arguments have been presented, which are necessary precursors 
to the ideas pursued in this chapter. To re-cap, the critical propositions are:
1. Evidence from Chapter 1 demonstrated that climate change is an extremely serious 
global environmental problem and urgent action is required to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.
2. However, current action is far from sufficient. Chapter 2 showed there is little evidence 
that the UK is moving towards a lower carbon economy. The government is not 
expected to meet its 20% carbon reduction target by 2010.
3. The government’s radical target for 60% reduction in emissions by 2050 has not been 
matched by the equally necessary radical thinking about policies to achieve the target. 
There is a large policy gap.
4. Historical analysis in Chapter 3 and bottom-up modelling undertaken in Chapter 4 
suggest that energy efficiency improvements alone cannot guarantee a reduction in 
carbon emissions from the domestic sector. In the past, potential savings from 
efficiency have been overwhelmed by increases in demand for energy services, and this 
is likely be the case in future too.
This chapter introduces a new policy which responds to the seriousness of climate change and 
provides a fair and effective way of making the necessary carbon savings in the domestic sector. 
The policy is personal carbon rations for all UK citizens. Carbon rationing would provide an 
overall mechanism for making savings from a combination of energy efficiency, renewable 
energy and social and behavioural changes. In addition, it will be argued, this policy opens up 
the possibility of increasing carbon savings beyond 60% by 2050.
Firstly personal carbon rationing, as investigated in this thesis, is described in some detail.
Future rations up to 2050 will be defined under different carbon emissions scenarios. The
underling principles which support carbon rationing will be elaborated. Then the existing
literature on carbon rationing and similar policies will be summarised to show how the
definition in this thesis emerges from earlier work. In the following section, the principles
underlying rationing and how it fits with global carbon emissions reduction are considered.
‘Contraction and convergence’, the most promising basis for a global agreement on carbon
reductions, is described and the connection with UK carbon rationing is explained. Next,
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practical aspects of introducing rationing are discussed. Firstly, Britain’s most important 
example of mass rationing, food rationing during the second world war, is described and lessons 
are drawn from that experience for carbon rationing. Then other practical issues of 
administration are considered. Finally, the wider social and economic implications of carbon 
rationing are briefly considered.
5.2 Methodology
The key aim of this chapter is to describe what carbon rationing is and how it could operate in 
practice, and arguments and descriptions have been developed to that end. These cover the 
principles on which carbon rationing would be based and practical operational details for the 
scheme. The prospects for carbon rationing are investigated by considering how existing 
policies could be adapted to support rationing.
This description of carbon rationing is situated within the existing literature by means of a 
literature review. The characteristics of other suggestions for rationing-type scheme are 
compared with the one described here. However, little has been developed on this topic 
previously, so there is limited material.
Existing data is used to perform original calculations. Secondary data is used to estimate how 
much of the UK’s carbon emissions including air travel are the direct responsibility of 
individuals (rather than being emitted by the commercial and industrial sectors). Then, data on 
current emissions of carbon in the UK and future targets are used to calculate what future 
rations would need to be. Variations on rations, depending on carbon reduction targets and on 
the way in which rationing is introduced and progressively tightened over time, are also 
calculated.
Historical evidence has been used to describe the policy responses to two different crises, from 
which lessons may be drawn for responding to climate change. Firstly, a national policy, that of 
food rationing during the second world war is described. The characteristics this shares with 
carbon rationing are identified, as are the many differences between the two forms of rationing. 
Secondly, the international response to damage to the ozone layer is described. Again, the 
lessons this may offer for responses to climate change are identified.
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5.3 Description of personal carbon rations
5.3.1 Introduction
Before reviewing the existing literature, the concept of personal carbon rationing developed in 
this thesis is described in some detail. Carbon rationing as presented here is not an original idea. 
As explained in the literature review (in section 5.4), there has been earlier work on carbon 
rationing and allied policy concepts. However, what is novel in this chapter is the detail in 
which carbon rationing is described and worked out, and how past experience and present data 
are used to investigate the implications of the policy in this and the following chapter.
Personal carbon rationing, as presented in this thesis, would be a UK-wide allowance system 
covering carbon emissions generated from fossil fuel energy used by individuals for personal 
transport, including air travel, and within the home. It would account for around half of current 
UK carbon equivalent emissions from energy, including international air travel (see section 
5.3.4). The primary aim of the scheme would be to deliver guaranteed levels of carbon savings 
in successive years, reaching the government’s current target of 60% reduction by 2050 and 
interim targets, or whatever alternative targets are deemed necessary as time progresses. It 
would not cover the energy used by the government and business sector; possible methods of 
reducing carbon emissions in parallel from these sectors are outlined briefly later.
Personal carbon rationing as a UK solution emerges from the key proposed global solution to 
climate change: “contraction and convergence”, which is described in more detail in section 5.5. 
Contraction and convergence aims to deliver global carbon savings fairly and with certainty. 
Personal carbon rationing is based on the same approach to achieving savings, and aims to 
deliver these benefits of equity and certainty on a UK scale. Carbon rationing is designed as a 
policy which will enable the UK to make national savings as its contribution within a global 
agreement on limiting greenhouse gas emissions. It could well be a suitable national response in 
other countries as well, but it is only applied to the UK in this thesis.
The main features of carbon rationing would be:
• Equal rations for all individuals
• Tradable rations
• Year-on-year reduction of the annual ration, signalled well in advance
• Personal transport and household energy use included
• A mandatory, not voluntary arrangement.
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In the following sections the reasons for each of these features of the policy are presented.
There is also discussion about each feature and alternative approaches are identified and 
debated.
Carbon rations could equally well be described as ‘allowances’, ‘entitlements’ or ‘quotas’, but 
the word ‘ration’ is used within this thesis for clarity and consistency.
5.3.2 Equal rations
Carbon rationing will be based on equal carbon rations for all adults. Children would probably 
receive somewhat less than the adult ration; the rationing scheme would have to be fair to 
children, but not unfairly advantage people with larger families. Equal rations are based on the 
principle of equity, where equity is defined in an egalitarian way as giving people equal rights 
to a share of atmospheric space. This is the same principle as that which underlies contraction 
and convergence. Alternative definitions and interpretations of equity do exist, and these are 
discussed below and in section 5.5.3, but an equal right to emit is considered here to be the most 
defensible and manifestly fair way of sharing out the UK’s emissions total between individuals. 
This suggestion of equal rations is probably the most challenging part of the rationing scheme -  
it varies considerably from a more familiar alternative such as carbon taxation.
There are a number of other possible ways of sharing out the UK’s carbon emissions. One 
alternative would be a ‘grandfathering’ scheme, where those who emit most now are permitted 
to continue to do so into the future. While protecting the interests of current high emitters, it 
would reward high consumption and penalise low consumption. Another possibility would be a 
scheme based on allocating rations according to differentiated energy ‘needs’. This could 
include making allowances for climate (more emissions rights for those in cold Northern 
Scotland), geographical location (more emissions rights for rural dwellers who have less access 
to public transport and are more distant from facilities), efficiency of housing, availability of 
alternatives to car transport and many other factors. The difficulty of defining needs as opposed 
to wants will be discussed in Chapter 6. This could be a very complex scheme, with no limits on 
the number of special cases which could be established. In addition to the disadvantage of its 
complexity, it also privileges higher carbon lifestyles above those of people who live more 
carbon thrifty lives. Finally, carbon taxation would provide a completely different approach to 
sharing out carbon emissions, allowing the rich far more access to fossil fuel energy than the 
poor. The case for and against carbon taxation is discussed further in Chapter 6.
A scheme based on equal rations can make special allowances for classes of people with special 
needs, as occurred with food rationing in the second world war (described in Section 5.6.2). 
However, in the longer term it would be better for the government to subsidise efficiency /
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renewable energy measures for certain groups of people rather than grant them extra 
allowances. The more exceptions that are made, the lower the available ration will be for 
everyone else. Chapter 6 analyses in detail the effect of equal carbon rations on different income 
groups, on people in single person households and the effect of living in an older or newer home 
- to see if any of these groups might be disadvantaged.
A concern for equity is one of the key motives around introducing national carbon rationing 
based on equal shares. But rationing is not being introduced in order to resolve existing 
inequities in access to energy services within society. Analysis in Chapter 6 will show it is 
likely to disadvantage far fewer of the poorest people in society than carbon taxation, but it is 
not this outcome which is the key argument in its favour.
5.3.3 Tradable rations
Because of differences between individual carbon emissions, the carbon ration necessary to 
cover current consumption will vary considerably between individuals. Those who invest in 
household efficiency and renewables, travel less, and who lead lives with a lower energy input, 
will not need all of their ration and will therefore have a surplus to sell. Those who travel a lot, 
or who live in large or inefficient homes will need to buy this surplus to permit them to continue 
with something like their accustomed lifestyle. Thus people will want to trade carbon and 
trading would be an integral part of a carbon rationing scheme. By incorporating trading within 
the rationing scheme, economic theory says that savings should be made at least overall cost. 
The price of ration units would be determined by the availability of the surplus set against the 
demand for it.
The question arises, does having trading as part of the system undermine its egalitarian 
credentials? Certainly, in the early years of its introduction, well-off people will be able to buy 
the surplus from those who lead energy-thrifty lifestyles. But the cost of doing so will rise 
steadily as the ration is progressively reduced. Nobody would be forced to sell their ration, and 
if people do choose to sell some of their rations, they will gain financially. So, while it is true 
that trading allows wealthier people to lead a higher carbon lifestyle if they choose, this does 
not undermine the basic equality of the rationing system.
5.3.4 The boundaries of personal carbon rations
Personal carbon rations in this thesis cover all household energy use and personal transport 
energy use including air travel, that is, all direct use of energy by individuals. Personal transport 
energy use includes all travel undertaken in a personal capacity, including travel between home 
and work, but not travel undertaken on behalf of an employer or as a necessary part of an 
individual’s occupation.
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Figures 5.1 and 5.2 sh ow  total carbon em ission s including carbon equivalent em iss ion s from  
international air travel (Chapter 2 explained h ow  these w ere calculated) for 2001 . The year 2001  
is the latest for w hich  total U K  carbon em ission s figures have been published, sp lit into the 
industrial, dom estic, transport and other sectors (D E FR A  2004a).
domestic
23%
industry
32%
transport (exc. 
international air) 
23%
other
6%
international air transport 
16%
Figure 5.1: Percentage of UK annual carbon equivalent emissions (including international 
air travel) by sector, 2001
In Figure 5.2 all equivalent em iss ion s from transport have been split into personal and non­
personal transport (w here ‘n on-person al’ en com p asses freight transport and all other business  
and com m ercial transport). O ffic ia l statistics are not split by personal and non-personal travel, 
how ever, it has been p ossib le to m ake estim ates o f  this split, as explained  below .
DTI report Departm ent o f  Transport estim ates o f  the percentages o f  road fuels (sp lit into m otor 
spirit and derv, i.e. petrol and d iese l) w hich  are used by cars and taxis, as opposed  to goods  
veh ic les (including light vans) and buses and coaches (DTI 2004a). C om bining the energy use 
by cars with the carbon intensities o f  petrol and d iesel (DE FRA  2001a), sh ow s that 61% o f  
carbon em issions from road travel com e from  cars. O ver 90%  o f  total U K  transport energy, 
excluding that for international air travel, is used in road transport (DTI 2004a). Therefore the 
sim plified  assum ption is m ade here that carbon em issions from travel by car are personal 
transport em ission s, and that 61%  o f  all transport em issions, excluding international air travel, 
are from personal transport. In reality, personal travel also includes travel by bus, coaches and 
trains and does not include all travel by car, som e o f  w hich  is carried out for b usin ess purposes. 
H ow ever, data to carry out a m ore precise analysis w hich  w ould, for exam ple, look  in m ore 
detail at the split o f  personal and non-personal transport in the non-road m odes, as w ell as the
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percentage o f  car m iles w hich are driven for non-personal purposes, are not readily availab le  
(Brand 2004). B oth because cars are used for the vast m ajority o f  personal d istance travelled  
(85%  o f  passenger kilom etres in 2003 (D fT  2004b )) and because m ore detailed  analysis is 
d ifficult due to lack o f  data, it is reasonable to make the assum ption that personal transport 
energy use is equal to energy use by cars.
For international air transport from the UK  in 2002 , only 14% o f  journeys w ere undertaken for 
business purposes, with the rem aining 86% o f  journey trips being personal travel, prim arily for 
holidays and v isitin g  friends or relatives (D fT  2003c). Therefore 86% o f  carbon equivalent  
international air em issions have been allocated as personal transport.
U sin g these assum ptions, carbon equivalent em issions from  personal and non-personal 
transport, including international air travel, have been separated and are show n in Figure 5.2. 
C om bining dom estic and personal travel em issions, g ives a total o f  51%  o f  U K  carbon  
equivalent em issions b ein g  generated by individuals on their ow n behalf. ( I f  international air 
travel em issions w ere not included, personal em issions w ould  am ount to 44%  o f  the total.)
domestic
23%
industry
32%
other
6% personal transport 
28%
non-personal transport
11%
Figure 5.2: Percentage of UK carbon equivalent emissions (including international air 
travel) by sector -  with transport split into personal and non-personal, 2001
The average in d ividual’s personal carbon and carbon equivalent em issions are m ade up o f  45%  
from household energy use, 27%  from international air travel, and 28% from  all other m odes o f  
transport.
There are a num ber o f  good  reasons for including both personal transport and household  carbon 
em issions in the personal ration. Firstly, as has been dem onstrated, by including both, h a lf o f
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the energy-related carbon and carbon equivalent emissions in the UK economy would be 
covered. Secondly, reducing emissions in the transport sector is unlikely to be any easier than in 
the residential sector and a mechanism to cap and reduce emissions in this sector will be 
certainly be required: rationing is just as relevant as for household energy (Hillman & Fawcett 
2004). Thirdly, combining personal transport and household energy use in a single scheme 
would also give people more flexibility in responding to carbon restrictions. In addition, as will 
be demonstrated in Chapter 6, a household energy emissions only ration would impact most 
heavily on the least well-off individuals, in a way that a combined ration would not. Finally, 
dealing with household energy use and personal transport separately would add to complexity 
for no obvious gain, and so the personal ration should cover both.
The personal carbon ration does not cover the carbon embodied in goods and services, so 
purchasing, say, mange tout air-freighted from Kenya, which have high associated air miles and 
carbon emissions, would not involve the purchaser giving up any of their ration. In theory, it 
might be possible to calculate the ‘embodied’ carbon in each product or activity (i.e. the carbon 
used to produce an apple, stereo equipment or car) and give consumers a further allowance to be 
used when buying products. However, as argued in Fawcett, Hurst, & Boardman (2002) this 
would be both extremely complex and data-intensive for goods. Embodied carbon rating would 
require a life-cycle analysis approach, to assess the carbon impact from cradle to grave. It would 
be even more difficult, if not impossible, to apply to services - would it be possible to carbon 
rate a haircut or a hospital stay? It would be much simpler to make the non-domestic sector 
directly responsible for reducing their share of carbon emissions, as suggested by Starkey & 
Fleming (1999). This is the approach also taken here, that consumers should only be directly 
responsible for their direct energy use. As carbon emissions in the other sectors would also be 
controlled, the price structure should alter in favour of low embodied carbon goods and 
services.
5.3.5 Reducing rations
UK carbon rations will have to decrease over time, in response both to the need to reduce global 
emissions and to allow for the expected rise in national population. The level of future rations 
depends on what cuts need to be made to ensure that the agreed level of carbon dioxide 
emissions in the atmosphere is not exceeded. It also depends to a lesser extent on the date 
chosen for global convergence on equal emission rights. Rations have been calculated both on 
the basis of the government’s 60% reduction target for 2050 (designed to stabilise 
concentrations at 550ppmv), and on the basis of the reductions that would be needed to stabilise 
at 450ppmv by 2030 -  which gives a reduction in UK emissions of approximately 80% by 2050 
(GCI2004).
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Table 5.1 shows actual values for annual carbon emissions and population for 2000 and 2002 
with projections to 2050. Projected emissions are based on a combination of national emissions 
projections by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI 2000) and the government’s estimate 
that carbon emissions from aircraft can be expected to double by 2020 (DTI 2003b) and using a 
factor of 3 for transforming carbon emissions into carbon equivalent (as explained in Chapter 
2). Carbon emissions projections are only available to 2020. Chapter 3 has already discussed the 
weaknesses of the DTI projections. However, this gives some idea of how personal carbon 
emissions might change up to 2020 in the absence of carbon rations.
In order to calculate future personal carbon emissions and rations, personal emissions are 
estimated to remain at 50% of the total UK carbon equivalent emissions up to 2050 (based on 
the 51% figure calculated earlier). Population projections used to calculate the per capita figures 
come from 2002-based figures (Shaw 2004). The targets for 60% or 80% reduction are based 
on 60% or 80% of UK carbon equivalent emissions in 2000 for personal energy use.
Table 5.1: Estimated UK carbon rations for personal energy use per capita to 2050 under 
different reduction scenarios
Year
Carbon
emissions
MtC/yr
International air 
carbon equivalent 
emissions MtCe
Population
(million)
Future personal carbon emissions / rations 
per person (tCe/year)
Business as 
usual
60% reduction 
by 2050
80% reduction 
by 2050
2000 152.6 32.1
2002 150.4 28.8 59.229 1.51
2005 145^8 34.7 59.802 1.51
2010 148.1 44.5 60.808 1.58 1.58 1.58
2020 156.3 64.2 63.026 1.75 1.33 1.26
2030
No C02 projections are 
available after 2020
64.835 1.07 0.93
2040 65.402 0.82 0.61
2050 65.440 0.56 0.28
Sources: Shaw 2004, DTI 2000, RCEP 2000
Figures in bold are actual values, all the remainder are projections
As with global carbon reductions based on contraction and convergence, rationing would be 
introduced in a phased way, so that average per capita emissions fall gradually. Future 
projections for carbon rations are based on linear projections of reduction between 2010 and 
2050 (see section 5.7.2 for explanation of start date of 2010). The figures in Table 5.1 also 
assume that adults and children get equal personal carbon rations, although in operation children 
would probably be allocated a lower ration. However, as children under 16 comprise only 20% 
of the population (Rickards et al. 2004), giving them a lower ration would not enable the adult 
ration to be increased by very much. All these assumptions are simplifications, and many 
variations can be imagined. For example, in reality annual reductions in carbon rations might be
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lower at first as people got used to the scheme, and increase over time as society became better 
oriented towards low carbon living.
These proposed carbon reductions will have real consequences, particularly for international air 
travel. Under the 60% reduction scenario, just one return flight from London to New York 
(using current technology) would exceed the whole personal carbon ration for the year by 2040, 
and in the 80% scenario by 2030. As noted in Chapter 1, stabilising carbon dioxide 
concentrations — at any level — requires the eventual reduction of global carbon dioxide 
emissions to a fraction of their current levels. So, under both scenarios, carbon rations will have 
to continue to fall from 2050 into the future.
5.3.6 Mandatory
In order to be effective, carbon rationing would have to be mandatory. A voluntary approach 
would not succeed: the ‘free-rider’ would have far too much to gain. As environmental thinker 
Michael Jacobs has written:
"...environmentally sustainable consumption will not come about through individual choices, 
but through regulatory policies collectively decided and imposed through the state. ... 
Admirable as voluntary reductions in consumption are, they are not the route to environmental 
improvement. ”(1997:52)
When the wider public interest is at risk and the issue one of critical importance to the welfare 
of the community, government intervention is necessary (Hillman & Fawcett 2004).
5.3.7 The key benefits of personal carbon rations
One of the key benefits of carbon rationing is that it provides a framework for assured carbon 
reductions. No longer might it be necessary to have separate government policies and 
programmes to promote everything from cycling strategies to efficient refrigerators. Under 
carbon rationing, the carbon ‘market’ should recognise the benefits of renewable energy, 
household insulation and low carbon methods of transport. Many people may choose to meet 
all their carbon reductions through technical improvements as in Johnston’s DJ-DS scenario. 
But without carbon rationing there would be no mechanism for ensuring that they did so. The 
great advantage of carbon rationing is that it allows people to reduce their emissions in the way 
that suits them best, whether through technical efficiency improvements and using more 
renewable energy or through demanding fewer energy services, or any combination of these 
strategies.
The government might still wish to have some long-term research programmes and other 
policies to provide solutions which cannot emerge from market forces (whether conventional 
money-based market, or the new carbon market). However, since the environmental damage
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caused by energy related decisions will finally be fully recognised, there should be less need for 
intervention to try and correct for the market imperfections that currently exist.
5.4 Literature review
Relatively little has been written on the subject of carbon rationing or personal carbon 
allowances. These are fairly new ideas which have not yet been widely or fully explored. This 
section brings together the limited literature on carbon rations and similar schemes which go by 
various names such as ‘domestic tradable quotas’ and ‘permit trading’.
5.4.1 Carbon rationing
The most prominent UK proponent of carbon rationing is Mayer Hillman. He has been 
developing and promoting the idea of personal carbon rations for many years (e.g Carley, 
Christie, & Hillman 1991). Hillman’s arguments in favour of carbon rationing arise from a 
concern about the urgency of climate change and a belief in equity as the only feasible principle 
on which to base a society-wide agreement on carbon reductions (Hillman 1998). A full 
description of his arguments for carbon rationing and details of the proposed scheme are given 
in Hillman & Fawcett (2004). This is the same in all important respects as the scheme described 
in this thesis, and is very similar to a description of carbon rationing developed by the author 
independently of Hillman (Fawcett 2003).
5.4.2 Domestic tradable quotas
A detailed approach to carbon saving across the whole economy has been developed by Starkey 
& Fleming (1999). Their proposal is called ‘Domestic Tradable Quotas’ (DTQs) -  where 
domestic indicates a national as opposed to an international scheme. The basis of the policy is 
that the national government sets an overall carbon budget that is reduced over time. The 
'carbon units' making up this budget are issued to adults and organisations. All adults receive an 
equal and unconditional entitlement of carbon units; organisations acquire the units they need 
from a tender, a form of auction modelled on the issue of government debt. There is a national 
market in carbon units in which low users can sell their surplus and higher users can buy more. 
Virtually all transactions could be carried out electronically, using the technologies and systems 
already in place for direct debit systems and credit cards. Starkey and Fleming claim that the 
scheme would be effective, equitable and efficient.
DTQs have been designed to meet the twin objectives of a reduction in carbon emissions and 
economic efficiency. The policy would allow government to take control over the rate at which 
fossil fuel consumption is reduced, while allocating the available resource fairly and 
maintaining price flexibility so that the economy can distribute it efficiently. In addition, the
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system would provide the framework for establishing carbon reduction as a proper objective of 
public policy, playing a central part in aligning social norms and values with individual 
responsibility for reducing carbon emissions. It would complement at national level the 
international contraction and convergence model for sharing carbon emission rights.
This work is being developed further under the Tyndall Centre ‘Decarbonising modem 
societies’ programme by Anderson and Starkey (2004). Future work in the research programme 
includes: assessing the equity of allocating emissions rights under DTQs and alternatives; 
assessing the technological feasibility of introducing DTQs; assessing the likely efficiency of 
DTQs and other instruments in reducing greenhouse gas emissions from energy use, and; 
assessing the public acceptability of DTQs via focus groups. Anderson and Starkey’s work 
appears to be the only research currently being funded in the UK which looks at carbon 
rationing type schemes.
This work has attracted some political attention, with Colin Challen MP hosting a meeting to 
discuss DTQs at the House of Commons in Spring 2004. Following this, on 6th July 2004 he 
introduced a private member’s bill on “Domestic tradable quotas (carbon emissions)”. The aim 
of the bill was to introduce a national trading scheme for carbon emissions and to set a national 
ceiling for carbon emissions (Hansard 2004). The bill was scheduled for a second reading in 
October 2004, however it has subsequently been dropped.
5.4.3 National permit-trading
Dutch researchers Woerdman, Boom, & Nentjes (2002) have also discussed the idea of a 
national permit-trading scheme which could include householders and motorists. Woerdman 
also explored similar ideas briefly in an earlier paper (Woerdman 2000). The authors distinguish 
between downstream and upstream trading systems. In a downstream trading system both large 
and small energy end-users, including households and motorists, receive tradable permits. In an 
upstream trading system, permits are allocated to producers and importers of fossil fuels, who 
pass on their permit costs in a mark-up on the fuel price to their customers. They suggest that 
‘permit trading’ could be both effective and efficient because it places a ceiling on total 
emissions and attaches a price to the entitlement to emit, providing a strong incentive to switch 
to sustainable energy. Woerdman et al argue argue that a downstream system which directly 
incorporates firms as well as households and motorists can be administratively feasible and 
cheap, contrary to the commonly held opposite view, thereby enhancing its potential 
acceptability. Woerdman et al appear to see permit trading as primarily an economic instrument, 
rather than a means of fairly sharing the available carbon emissions.
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5.4.4 Average utility carbon per household
A scheme which could be characterised as offering collective responsibility based on personal 
carbon rations was suggested by Fawcett, Lane, & Boardman (2000). This scheme was called 
Average Utility Carbon per Household, or AUCH. The national government would set sector 
targets for carbon reductions and, based on this, would give energy utilities a reducing cap for 
emissions. Initial allocation of emissions permits to the utilities would be based on the number 
of customers, with separate allocation for gas and electricity use. The idea was that utilities 
could achieve lower average household emissions through investment in both lower carbon 
technologies (including renewable energy) and in reducing demand per household. Energy 
utilities were seen as a key actor, who already have some responsibility to save energy via 
existing UK legislation (via the EEC scheme, as explained in Chapter 2), and who have the 
technical knowledge and capability of investing to achieve carbon savings.
AUCH is based on the same principle as DTQs and carbon rationing -  that of equal emission 
allowances for individuals which reduce over time -  but the location of responsibility for 
meeting the rationing targets is allocated to a different actor. The thinking behind AUCH 
emerged from research which demonstrated the limits individuals face in trying to reduce their 
emissions:
‘7« reality, consumers have restricted incomes and fuel choices, imperfect information, face 
limited choices in the retail environment, have to rely on the advice o f professionals and, not 
unreasonably, have priorities other than energy and carbon efficiency. Consumers are people -  
bound into complex webs o f social and cultural expectations that influence what is considered 
desirable, acceptable and normal” (Fawcett, Lane, & Boardman 2000:53).
In their Carbon UK report, Fawcett, Hurst, & Boardman (2002) discuss carbon management 
throughout the economy at different levels by different actors. For household energy, the 
AUCH concept introduced in ECI’s earlier work is recommended. However, for transport there 
is discussion of personal carbon allowances for motorists. For airline emissions two possibilities 
are discussed: caps on emissions for airline companies or individual carbon emissions -  carbon 
air miles. However, a comprehensive carbon rationing scheme was not considered.
5.4.5 Other similar ideas
Household carbon rations, allowances or tradable permits are far from being mainstream ideas, 
however, there have been references to similar ideas. In an article for an Environment Agency 
magazine about a fictional family in 2020, Boyle (2003) mentions ‘a domestic greenhouse gas 
allowance’. The ideas are also beginning to be taken up in other research. For example, the 
applicability of DTQs has been considered in a study of environmental taxes and their effects on
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lower income households (Ekins & Dresner 2004). The results of this study are discussed in 
Chapter 6.
5.4.6 Summary and comparison
The differences between the proposals examined are chiefly in terms of their scale, i.e. how 
many sectors of the economy they cover, and where responsibility for making carbon reductions 
lies -  as summarised in Table 5.2. They are all based around the idea of equal allowances for 
individuals and, apart from AUCH, include notions of trading of allowances.
Table 5.2: Comparison of carbon rationing-like proposals
Version of idea Energy covered Responsibility
Carbon rations Personal transport and 
household energy
Individual
DTQs, Permit 
trading
All energy - with personal 
allowances for household and 
transport energy. DTQs would 
not include air travel in personal 
allowances.
Individual for personal 
consumption.
AUCH Household energy Energy company
The remainder of this chapter builds on the existing literature and develops the idea of carbon 
rationing.
5.5 The international context for carbon saving
5.5.1 Introduction
The arguments for carbon rationing at a national level follow directly from consideration about 
how carbon reductions should be achieved internationally. As explained in Chapter 1, the Kyoto 
agreement was only intended to be the first of successive global agreements on reducing the 
threat of additional climate change. Kyoto itself has turned out to be something of a 
disappointment, with very modest savings targets and the USA remaining outside the 
agreement. If greenhouse gas emissions are to be controlled world-wide, an effective successor 
to the Kyoto agreement is vital. This section looks at ‘contraction and convergence’ and 
alternative approaches to post-Kyoto carbon reductions. There is also a discussion of the 
meaning of equity in global carbon negotiations, as agreeing a common definition of equity will 
be key.
5.5.2 The current position
Before discussing the future of international carbon emissions, it is important to understand in a 
little more detail the current international picture on emissions. As mentioned briefly in Chapter
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2, current global per capita carbon emissions are highly unequal. Table 5.3 shows per capita 
carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel burning, cement manufacture and gas flaring for a 
selection of countries. Each Briton emits about two and a half times the global average carbon 
emissions from fossil fuels, and the average American emits 500 times as much the average 
person in Afghanistan. Note that these statistics do not include carbon emissions from land use 
change, including those from unsustainable use of forests, which also vary considerably by 
country. Neither are they adjusted to include the full global warming effect o f carbon emissions 
from air travel.
Table 5.3: Per capita carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuels, various countries, 2000
Country Emissions per capita, tC
USA 5.40
Australia 4.91
UK 2.59
France 1.68
Mexico 1.19
China 0.60
India 0.29
Bangladesh 0.06
Afghanistan 0.01
Global average 1.09
Source: Marland, Boden, & Andres 2003
This data also indicates that there is considerable potential for the UK individuals to increase 
per capita emissions. The UK is by no means at the top of the international league.
5.5.3 Equity
Equity issues are central to the international climate change debate. This is for both principled 
and practical reasons. Inter-generational equity is at the heart of policy on reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions because, as the emissions accumulate in the atmosphere for hundreds of years, 
today’s emissions place a burden on future generations. Equity is explicitly acknowledged as an 
important consideration in the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). Article 3.1 
of the FCCC states that parties to the convention should ‘protect the climate system for the 
benefit of present and future generation of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (United 
Nations 1992). Equity is key for practical reasons as well. It is widely agreed that without 
equity, transparent in its application, there can be no realistic prospect of public acceptance or 
political agreement to introduce the measures needed (IEA 2002a).
However, there is more than one definition of equity. More than a dozen different equity rules
are defined and have been extensively discussed in the literature (IPCC 2001c). These range
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from egalitarian rules (where equal rights are assigned on a per capita basis), to sovereignty 
rules (where allocation is to governments), to ability to pay rules (varying according to national 
well-being), to polluter pays (where abatement costs are distributed in proportion to emission 
levels), to utilitarian rules (where the goal is the greatest happiness for the greatest number), to 
procedural equity (related to how a decision is made) (IEA 2002a).
Deciding which definition of equity to adopt is crucial to answering practical questions such as 
who is allowed to suffer how much climate change damage, and who gets to emit how much 
carbon. Three different interpretations of equity - equal rights, ability to pay and polluter pays - 
would result in different allocations of responsibility for achieving carbon reductions. Indeed, 
‘ability to pay’ and ‘polluter pays’ would require a regular re-allocation of responsibility over 
time as countries’ wealth and emissions changed. ‘Polluter pays’ could encompass either 
current or cumulative historic emissions - the choice of which would make a huge difference to 
the UK which has been responsible for 15% of cumulative global emissions since 1750, but is 
responsible for just over 2% of current emissions (Marland, Boden, & Andres 2003). This thesis 
concurs with the argument of the Global Commons Institute (Meyer 2000) that the equal rights 
interpretation of equity is the most morally defensible option and the only one likely to lead a 
successful global carbon control agreement. Therefore, the definition of equity which is used 
here is that of equal rights to use the atmosphere.
5.5.4 Contraction and convergence
Contraction and convergence (C&C) principles were first proposed by the Global Commons 
Institute in 1990 (Meyer 2000) as a means of reaching a just global agreement on emission 
reductions. C&C is founded on two fundamental principles: first, that the global emission of 
greenhouse gases must be progressively reduced; secondly, that global governance must be 
based on justice and fairness.
C&C consists of:
Contraction: An international agreement is reached on how much further the concentration of 
C 02 in the atmosphere can be allowed to rise before the changes in the climate it produces will 
become totally unacceptable. Once this limit has been agreed, it is possible to work out how 
quickly current global emissions must be cut back to reach this target. This cutting back is the 
contraction part of contraction and convergence.
Convergence: Global convergence to equal per capita shares of this contraction, by an agreed 
year.
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C&C does not entail a particular concentration of greenhouse gases as being the safe limit, nor a 
time scale for reductions -  this would be a matter for scientific judgement and political 
negotiation. Global emissions trading would be included within C&C to ease transition costs 
towards lower emissions lifestyles and techniques. Those countries which were unable to live 
within their allocation would be able to buy more permits from countries which ran their 
economies in a more energy-frugal way. This feature would lead to a steady flow of purchasing 
power from countries that have used fossil energy to become rich to those still struggling to 
break out of poverty.
The lower C&C graph (Figure 5.3) shows how fossil fuel-related carbon emissions have 
evolved over time for six blocks of countries: the USA; the former Soviet Union (FSU); OECD 
countries excluding the USA (which includes all the EU and other European nations, Australia, 
New Zealand, Japan and Canada); India; China; and the rest of the world. Not surprisingly, 
most of the historic carbon emissions, prior to 2000, are the responsibility of the developed 
world.
The graphs show the effect from 2000 onward of introducing a maximum concentration target 
of 450ppm with convergence by 2030. The lower graph shows the effects on country blocks, the 
upper one on individuals within those blocks. The highest carbon emitting countries have to 
make the largest contributions to the overall reduction in emissions, so the change per capita 
required is greatest for the United States, followed by other OECD countries including the UK. 
Emissions from developing countries would be permitted to increase to 2030 under this 
particular scenario. Thereafter, as for the developed countries, their emission allowances would 
gradually reduce over time to ensure that the 450ppmv target was not breached. The graphs 
assume that there is no trading between countries; in reality, the pattern of emissions might be 
rather different from this, with rich countries emitting more, having paid the poorer countries 
for the privilege of doing so.
This is just one illustration of the contraction target and convergence dates which might be 
chosen. An earlier convergence date would disadvantage developed countries who would have 
to bring their emissions down more quickly to the agreed target, and conversely would benefit 
developing countries who would get emissions allowances in excess of their actual emissions. A 
later convergence date would benefit developed countries - allowing them to continue their 
higher emissions for longer. However, it would also mean that the per capita convergence target 
would have to be lower for everyone, because more carbon will have been emitted prior to 
convergence. The national interests of developed and developing countries will tend to lead to 
different views about the ideal date for convergence.
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Figure 5.3: Historical and future carbon emissions under C&C (shown gross and per 
capita) for a maximum of 450ppmv atmospheric concentration achieved by 2100, with per 
capita emissions converging to equality achieved by 2030
Source: G CI2004
C&C is considered by many to be the scheme which should succeed the current Kyoto 
agreement. It has many influential supporters, including the UN Environment Programme and 
the European Parliament (Pearce 2002) and is being seen by many as the only realistic basis for 
a future agreement (Anon 2003). Houghton (2004) has said that: “Its simple and appealing 
logic means that it is a strong candidate for providing a long-term solution The Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution has recommended that the UK should adopt a target 
for carbon dioxide emissions reduction of 60% from 1997 levels by 2050. This is based C&C 
principles with the aim of ensuring that an upper limit of 550ppm carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere is not exceeded (RCEP 2000). However, C&C has not yet been adopted as the post- 
Kyoto negotiating position of any of the Annex 1 countries. This includes the UK, despite the 
government having accepted the RCEP’s C&C-based argument about targets for 2050.
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5.5.5 Other post-Kyoto frameworks
The UK government, while it has so far refused to endorse C&C, has not identified its preferred 
post-Kyoto framework. Neither is there a leading alternative which other countries are joining 
in supporting. A review of proposals for tackling climate change published by the New 
Economics Foundation identified two main alternatives to C&C: the ‘Brazilian’ and the ‘Kyoto 
plus’ proposals (Evans 2002).
The Brazilian proposal emphasises responsibility for the historic emissions that have caused the 
rise of atmospheric concentrations, temperature and damage. In this, countries with a longer 
history of industrial development would bear a greater share of responsibility than those with 
shorter histories. Thus, with this greater share, the UK would face a huge 63% reduction by 
2010 against 1990 levels whilst Japan’s reduction would be less than 10%. The very large 
reduction required of the UK reflects its historic responsibility for 17.5 % of global emissions 
from fossil fuels (since 1750), compared with Japan’s responsibility for just 3.9% over the same 
period. This puts all the responsibility for emissions reduction on the older developed countries, 
excludes developing countries from quantified commitments and has no formal concentration 
target. The fact that some countries would have no commitments would make it unacceptable to 
the USA, in particular, because it is not prepared to be the signatory of any international 
agreement on climate change which does not involve a commitment from these other countries 
(Meyer 2000).
By contrast, as its name implies, the ‘Kyoto plus’ proposals are variations on the theme of 
continuing the existing approach. However, they lack a target for carbon concentrations in the 
atmosphere and a clear idea of where the process ought to be going. There is no leading 
variation on the ‘Kyoto plus’ theme.
There are a number of other complex allocation systems which have been proposed with a mix 
of concerns about equity, economic efficiency and transitional arrangements for developed and 
developing countries (IEA 2002a). The more complex the system the less likely it is that global 
negotiations could ever be concluded on such a basis, where negotiations around different 
elements of the allocation system could continue ad infinitum.
Evans (2002) concluded that the GCI’s C&C strategy is the only framework which offers 
assurance of first, arriving at a defined atmospheric concentration, second, the equitable 
allocations that developing countries have very rightly stated to be an essential part of any 
agreement, and, third, the potential for immediate implementation. None of the alternatives, 
including the two above, can offer all of these vital features. In summary, C&C is the only
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framework for future negotiations which includes all the countries of the world on an equitable 
basis and offers a mechanism for guaranteeing reductions in carbon emissions.
5.5.6 Previous international environmental agreements
There has been no previous environmental problem on the scale of climate change. However, 
amongst other global environmental issues, such as deforestation, soil erosion and acid rain, the 
most similar problem is the hole in the ozone layer. Like climate change, most nations were 
contributing to varying degrees to the problem of depletion of the ozone layer, and widespread 
agreement was needed to reduce the production of ozone depleting chemicals. Ozone depletion 
was causing a current problem, but the more serious threat was that emissions would 
accumulate into the future and cause greater damage, as is the case for greenhouse gas 
emissions. The problem of ozone depletion and the solution which was devised are described 
briefly here, and this is followed by consideration of the lessons that can be learned for climate 
negotiations.
In the mid-1970s atmospheric chemists discovered that chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs), although 
inert in the lower atmosphere, are highly destructive of ozone once they make their way into the 
upper atmosphere layer known as the stratosphere. This was of concern because damage to the 
ozone layer allows additional high energy radiation to reach the earth’s surface, which can harm 
human health and the wider ecosystem. Although some governments took immediate action in 
the late 1970s to limit CFC use as propellants in spray cans, others contended that there was no 
scientific proof about the destructive nature of CFCs (Glantz 2003).
A sharp thinning, or ‘hole’, in the ozone layer over the Antarctic was brought to wide attention 
by scientists from the British Antarctic Survey in 1985 (Houghton 1997). The extent of 
destruction of ozone and the fact that it was occurring over polar regions was unexpected, given 
the incomplete state of scientific understanding of stratospheric chemistry (Christie 2001). 
Subsequently, scientists showed that the hole was caused by man-made ozone depleting 
chemicals (ODCs) including CFCs which catalyse the destruction of ozone during the spring 
over Antarctica and to a lesser extent over the Arctic. Following this, political action to reduce 
CFC manufacture, use and trading was reinforced if not accelerated (Glantz 2003).
In 1987 the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer was agreed and 
signed by 24 industrialised countries and the EU. The protocol set out the time schedule to 
freeze and reduce consumption of ODCs and required all parties (i.e. signatories) to ban exports 
and imports of controlled substances to and from non-parties. At subsequent meetings, 
timetables to freeze and phase out ODCs were brought forward as scientific knowledge of the 
problem increased. Developing nations have subsequently signed up to the protocol, which has
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now been ratified by 183 countries. Use of CFCs was phased out in the developed countries by 
the end of 1995 and will be phased out in developing countries by 2010 (UNDP 2004). 
According to the Environment Agency (2004), the ozone layer may recover by around 2050, but 
alteration of the atmosphere by greenhouse gases and changing global temperatures make the 
nature of recovery uncertain.
The most positive lesson from the ozone experience is that it proved possible to have an 
international environmental agreement which largely succeeded in limiting further damage. As 
Houghton (2004:323) suggests, the response to the hole in the ozone layer means “A way 
forward for addressing global environmental problems has .. been charted. ” There are a 
number of interesting precedents set by the Montreal Protocol and its successor agreements:
• different timetables for freezing and phasing out production and use of ODCs were agreed 
for developed and developing countries, with developed countries taking the lead. The 
differential timetables were agreed in recognition of the need of developing countries for 
industrial development and their relatively small production and use of ODCs (UNDP 
2004);
• there were sanctions for non-compliance. Without the trade sanctions, there would have 
been economic incentives for non-signatories to increase production, damaging the 
competitiveness of the industries in the signatory nations as well as decreasing the search 
for less damaging CFC alternatives;
• reductions in ODC production and use increased over time as scientific evidence showed 
more action was needed;
• action was taken in the absence of statistical evidence of impacts on human health (Glantz
2003).
The different responsibilities of developed and developing countries in the ODC case are 
similar in effect to what would happen under a contraction and convergence framework. 
Although all countries would be working towards the same convergence date, in terms of 
absolute emissions, developed countries would make bigger reductions than developing ones. 
Trade sanctions would be equally required in a C&C framework, as ‘free riders’ and cheats 
would have a lot to gain.
It is encouraging that action was stepped up as the seriousness of the problem was increasingly 
understood -  something that is badly needed in response to the increasingly serious news about 
climate change outlined in Chapter 1. Equally striking is the fact that action was taken well in 
advance of proof of actual, rather than potential, damage to human health. By contrast, it is 
already clear that extreme events, which are almost certainly a result of climate change, are 
damaging human health, e.g. the heat wave in Europe in 2003.
147
This comparison between the ozone hole problem and climate change is not to deny that the 
causes of climate change are much more complex and fundamental to the world’s economy than 
the use of the niche market chemicals which caused ozone destruction. For example, since 1991 
the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol has spent $1.6 billion on 
aiding phase out of consumption and production of ozone-depleting substances in developing 
countries (Multilateral Fund 2004). Although the cost of reducing greenhouse gas emissions is 
disputed, and estimates produced by different models differ for many reasons (IPCC 2001b), it 
is clear that far greater investment than this will be required. Technical responses and finding 
alternatives to ODCs were key to their being phased out. There is no simple technical fix 
available to make the reduction of fossil fuel usage similarly straightforward.
5.6 Experience of rationing in the UK
5.6.1 Introduction
There has been no UK experience of widespread fuel rationing in the domestic sector. The most 
important example of a mass rationing scheme is food rationing during and after the second 
world war. Food rationing was a radical policy introduced for reasons of equity in the face of a 
national emergency, and thus it has some characteristics in common with carbon rationing. The 
considerations and debates about this policy should be able to tell us something about the issues 
that carbon rationing would raise. In addition, policies currently in place for energy use and 
carbon rationing in the non-domestic sector have some similarities to a rationing scheme. Both 
of these experiences are described, and the similarities between these schemes and carbon 
rationing are analysed.
During the second world war in the UK access to both coal and petrol was restricted for 
householders, but neither of these schemes had a great effect on the population. Coal was the 
main heating fuel for households of the period. Restrictions were introduced on coal deliveries 
in 1941, but a full rationing scheme was never introduced. This was for several reasons 
including public resistance to fuel rationing and controversy about the fairness o f the proposed 
scheme, government concern that it might not be possible to deliver a guaranteed coal ration if 
problems of production and transport arose, and the administrative complexity which would 
have been involved in a system of fuel rationing. The restrictions on coal delivery do not appear 
to have been very onerous; following their introduction consumption of household coal actually 
increased (Hancock & Gowing 1949). No restrictions were introduced on the use of gas (at that 
time town gas) and electricity, instead people were encouraged to be economical with energy. 
Petrol for private motorists was rationed from 1939 and withdrawn altogether from 1942 (The
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second world war experience centre 2004). Because there were very few motorists at the time, it 
was not a restriction which had wide effect.
5.6.2 Food rationing during the second world war
During the second world war years, some degree of food control and rationing operated in 
almost every country in the world, from the richest agricultural countries like the USA and 
Australia to the poorest such as India and China (Burnett 1989). In this section the British 
experience of food rationing is briefly described.
In the course of the war, civilian consumption of food, clothing and miscellaneous goods was 
reduced drastically as economic resources were directed towards the war effort. The food 
rationing schemes were concerned mainly with protein foods, milk and fats, the need for which 
varies less between different sections of the population than it does for other nutritive elements. 
The British scheme rationed meat, bacon, cheese, fats, sugar and preserves in fixed quantities 
per head. The principle of a flat-rate ration for all, which ignored the diverse needs of heavy 
workers at one extreme and small children at the other, was justifiable since only a fraction of 
all foodstuffs was rationed. In addition, it was recognised that certain categories of the 
population had special nutritional requirements, and therefore other schemes were super­
imposed on this common basis. For example, there were schemes which provided additional 
proteins, vitamins and minerals to children of pre-school age, nursing and pregnant mothers 
(Burnett 1989).
Rationing, coupled with subsidies and price controls, promoted greater social equality, and 
consumption became more equal in contrast with the intense inequalities that existed 
previously. The fair shares policy was critical in maintaining morale at a time when the share of 
personal consumption in national expenditure fell from about four-fifths in 1938 to about half in 
1944 while resources devoted to the war effort increased from 7 per cent to half the total 
(Zweiniger-Bargielowska 2000). Despite difficulties, contemporary opinion polls showed that 
rationing and food control were on the whole popular and discontent was eclipsed by general 
satisfaction. Ultimately food morale was maintained during the war because people accepted the 
necessity of sacrifice for the duration, even though two-thirds thought that food quality was 
worse in 1944 than before the war (Zweiniger-Bargielowska 2000).
The British experience with food rationing is that the chosen scheme was seen as fair and 
retained public support up to and beyond the end of the war. It was effective: overall nutrition 
was improved from the period before the scheme started. Rationing operated alongside policies 
on price control, which ensured that people could afford to buy their ration of food. There were
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also large-scale governmental persuasion and information campaigns explaining the reason for 
rationing and advising people on how to cope on their rations.
5.6.3 Non-domestic energy use
The UK has introduced a voluntary carbon trading scheme for business, and a mandatory 
scheme which will supersede it is being introduced EU-wide from 2005. There has been 
criticism that the voluntary UK scheme was unlikely to result in real carbon savings 
(Environment Daily 2003). The EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) will establish the 
world’s largest ever market in emissions. Up to 2000 UK installations that collectively emit 
about half of the economy’s carbon dioxide emissions are set to participate in this market. The 
EU ETS is supposed to provide clear incentives for investment in energy efficiency and cleaner 
technologies at lowest cost (DTI 2004d). Emissions allowances have been allocated in two 
stages - first to each of the industry sectors covered by the scheme, then to each installation in 
that sector on the basis of its previous historical record of emissions. A cap on C 0 2 emissions 
has been set for each installation and allowances issued which are equal to that cap. The 
allocation of allowances to existing operators who register is free. Companies will be able to 
trade emissions. The price of carbon allowances will depend on the Europe wide carbon trading 
market, which will be created by the scheme. Whether the EU ETS results in significant savings 
depends on details of the scheme. There are concerns that EU ETS will not result in significant 
savings within the UK (Mitchell & Woodman 2004) or within EU as a whole (ENDS 2004d). It 
is not yet clear how much EU ETS will deliver in practice.
5.6.4 Comparisons with carbon rationing
Food rationing
Food and carbon rationing are similar in some ways, but also differ in important aspects. The 
most obvious similarity is the centrality of access to food and energy (resulting in carbon 
emissions) to British life. Both are vital resources required by everyone and ensuring adequate 
access to them is important to government and society. Concern for adequate access to energy 
and reduction of fuel poverty has become an important aspect of government energy policy 
(DTI 2003b).
However, there are very important differences between carbon rationing and food rationing. 
Firstly, there is a vast difference in the visibility and urgency of the problems which would be 
caused in their absence. The reason for introducing food rationing was to ensure the population 
remained well-fed at a time of national crisis and restricted food supplies. If society had not 
accepted rationing, and associated price controls, the effect would probably have been very 
many people going hungry -  an unacceptable outcome, and one which would have been
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immediately experienced by the population. In the case of climate change, no such immediate 
and personal effects of increasing carbon emissions would be felt. So the motivation for the UK 
undertaking carbon rationing as a whole is different, and the personal connection with the 
benefits of carbon rationing would be less immediate.
Another contrast is that food rationing was limited in time, although people did not know how 
long that time would be. Restrictions on carbon emissions to the atmosphere need to be 
permanent.
There is a simpler relation between rations and needs for food than there is for carbon rationing. 
Food rationing is in theory equitable in that each person (of a particular age / gender / activity 
level) needs about the same amount of food to stay healthy. This is not the case for carbon 
emissions from household energy: depending on the number of people living together and the 
efficiency of their home and equipment, similar people can require very varied amounts of 
energy. Having said that, inequities were recognised as existing in the food rationing system, 
even after the additional allowances given to special groups:
“To some extent 'rationing bore most heavily on those living alone [and] least upon those 
families whose capacity fo r mutual adjustment was greatest'. However, the situation was 
complicated by the fact that single people frequently had more money to spend on unrationed 
foods and, whereas the system advantaged families with young children, flat-rate rations were 
not generous with regard to adolescent needs ” (Zweiniger-Bargielowska 2000:79)
Despite these problems, as already stated, the system was generally regarded as fair.
Practically, administration of carbon rationing should be simpler than for food rationing as there 
are few sellers of gas and electricity and other fuels compared with the tens of thousands of 
food retailers there were in the 1940s (see following sections). There should be little room for a 
black market to develop given that flows of fossil fuels are already very well recorded and 
tightly regulated in our economy. As with the food ration, some sources of energy would be ‘off 
ration’. For example, green electricity, household level photo-voltaics (PV), solar water heating 
and wood burning stoves would be carbon emissions-free energy.
Finally, carbon would be rationed to prevent further climate change, not because fossil fuel 
sources of carbon are in any danger of running out. Total carbon dioxide emissions from fossil 
fuel use since 1750 are estimated at 280 GtC (Marland, Boden, & Andres 2003). Total reserves 
on earth of coal, oil and gas (including those not yet discovered) are estimated to amount to 
5000 GtC (Kasting 2001). Therefore stocks of fossil fuel have the potential to emit about 
eighteen times more carbon dioxide than has been emitted over the past 250 years. This is
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completely different from food rationing, which was introduced because of reduced access to 
food in the UK.
There are many differences between food and carbon rationing, some of which will make it 
harder to make the case for carbon rationing than it was for food rationing. The key difference is 
the lack of connection between individual action and the long-term effects on the climate in the 
case of carbon rationing. A sense of urgency is clearly not present with regard to climate 
change, despite the evidence that people should be deeply alarmed (as summarised in Chapter 
1). In some ways, carbon rationing would be less prescriptive and intrusive in everyday life than 
food rationing, as people could select from many lifestyle and technical adjustments in order to 
reduce their personal carbon emissions (as discussed in Chapter 4). Having said that, fossil fuel 
energy use underpins most aspects of modem life, including growing and importing food, 
making the transition to a lower carbon society an immense task - but one which must be 
undertaken whether or not carbon rationing is introduced.
EU ETS
Because EU ETS applies to businesses rather individuals, a lot of the focus to date has been on 
different businesses and sectors receiving ‘fair’ emissions allocations. This rather fraught 
process would not be required when introducing personal carbon rations. EU ETS is a multi­
country scheme, which greatly increases complexity. Personal carbon rations would operate 
within one country, and it is hard to imagine any net benefit from doing otherwise. So, in two 
important respects, personal carbon rations should be simpler to agree and implement than EU 
ETS. Maybe the fact that an EU-wide trading scheme has been introduced should offer hope 
that the challenges of administration and management of a personal carbon rations scheme 
could be met.
5.7 Carbon rationing as a practical policy
Here some of the practical aspects of introducing carbon rationing are discussed. Many social, 
technical and policy innovations would be needed to make it easier for people to live within 
their carbon rations - some ideas about what these might be are outlined. The purpose of this 
section is to demonstrate how carbon rationing could work within a supportive policy context.
5.7.1 Administration
Administration of carbon rationing should be straightforward. Each person would get an 
electronic card containing that year’s carbon credits -  illustrated in Figure 5.4. The card would 
have to be presented on purchase of energy or travel services, and the correct amount of carbon 
would be deducted. The technologies and systems already in place for direct debit systems and
152
credit cards could be used. The technical feasibility of managing carbon allowances 
electronically is discussed in greater detail for DTQs , and is being researched further by 
Anderson and Starkey (2004).
r a
Carbon Allowance Card 2010
1234 5678 9101 1121'
Valid from 1/10 Expires end 12/10
Ms A N Other
Figure 5.4: Illustration of a possible future carbon allowance card
There are relatively few sellers of gas, electricity, petrol, diesel and other fuels, and flows of 
fossil fuels are already very well recorded and tightly regulated in the economy. For example, 
three large suppliers accounted for 82% of gas sales to the domestic sector in 2003, and there 
are just fifteen public electricity suppliers in the UK (DTI 2004a). However, there are 
considerably more suppliers of coal and heating oil. Introduction of such an allowance scheme 
therefore would affect relatively few businesses, and mpst of those involved would be large 
businesses with the capability to adapt.
5.7.2 Easing the introduction of rationing
The nature of carbon rationing is such that it could not be introduced on either a regional or a 
voluntary basis to test its efficacy. It would need to be introduced nationally and in a mandatory 
way. However, there would be ways of simplifying the introduction of carbon rationing to 
reduce initial complexity and confusion. For example, initially public transport journeys could 
be excluded from carbon rationing as these account for only a small amount of personal 
motorised travel. In addition, carbon rationing could be introduced with no annual reductions 
initially to give people time to understand and start adjusting to the new system.
Starting carbon rationing in the UK prior to the next post-Kyoto international agreement would 
help get the framework in place before really serious reductions need to be made. A possible 
timetable would be:
2005-2007: making the public case for carbon rationing, and consulting about how it could be 
introduced
2008: begin introduction of rationing and supporting administrative systems
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2009: trial year, where carbon ration cards can be used voluntarily by people to give them 
experience of where their carbon emissions arise
2010: second trial year, where people are given equal carbon rations, compulsory use of carbon 
allowance cards, and full annual statement of where their emissions arose and how much over 
or under their ration they were -  but no financial penalties at the end of this year 
2011 -  onwards: rationing fully introduced, with falling annual allowances and strict use of 
carbon allowance cards for all transactions involving carbon-based energy use.
This timetable is far slower than for the introduction of food rationing in the second world war, 
which happened within weeks of the declaration of war. In terms of administration, rationing 
could be introduced much more quickly than in the timetable above. The limiting time factor 
would be getting political and public support for carbon rationing.
5.7.3 Making awareness of carbon emissions part of everyday life
There is currently little information available to consumers, householders and travellers about 
the carbon impacts of their decisions. One exception is that carbon emission figures (in terms of 
grams of carbon dioxide per kilometre — gC0 2 /km) are published in advertising material for 
new cars. In addition, there are plans at an EU level to include carbon emission figures on 
energy bills (Boardman & Palmer 2003). However, with carbon rationing, carbon becomes a 
parallel currency and the level of information and education on carbon issues will have to 
increase considerably.
The scale of education and information provided on food rationing in the second world war 
shows the effort required. There was a comprehensive information campaign using radio, 
magazines, leaflets, posters and so on giving recipes for the new types of food (such as 
powdered egg), suggesting how to economise with food while still providing healthy meals and 
persuading people to grow their own vegetables (Zweiniger-Bargielowska 2000). Enabling 
people to live well on food rations was a key government aim and taking pride in doing so 
became part of the national culture. This is the scale of the transformation which would also be 
needed in information about and attitudes to carbon rations.
The following suggestions are some of the ways in which the carbon impacts of decisions could 
be made more transparent:
• smart bills: including carbon emissions on gas, electricity, fuel oil and other fuel bills;
• smart meters: gas and electricity meters to be upgraded over time to include a running 
total of carbon emissions, and provide comparisons with previous periods;
• smart receipts: including carbon emissions on petrol and diesel receipts;
• enhanced petrol pumps: displaying carbon emissions as well as price and quantity ;
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• ‘carbon-ometers’: adding a carbon counter to standard car, motorcycle and moped 
displays, allowing the driver to have a record of total carbon emissions, plus a trip 
carbon calculator (as is equivalently available on the mileometer);
• carbon responsibility in advertising: all flight tickets and travel promotional material 
(such as adverts in the media, outdoors and on the web) to include equivalent carbon 
emissions;
• carbon labels: energy labels on appliances and light bulbs to include average annual 
carbon emissions;
• carbon promises: insulation materials (such as loft insulation) and home improvements 
such as double or triple glazing to be promoted in terms of the carbon as well as energy 
savings they can provide;
• carbon-rated homes: all houses, new and second-hand, to be sold with an energy survey 
and an estimate of average annual carbon emissions in use, plus tailored advice on how 
to reduce the emissions. Tenants would also need carbon information from their 
landlords.
Some of these ideas could be introduced by extending existing information provision methods, 
as examples in Table 5.4 indicate.
Table 5.4: Opportunities for adapting existing energy policies under a carbon rationing 
framework
Policy Existing characteristics Changing to a carbon emissions basis
EU energy labels, 
Energy Saving 
Trust ‘energy 
efficiency 
recommended’ 
labels
Based on the relative 
efficiency of appliances
Would need to change current basis first 
from relative efficiency to total 
consumption. For EU labels there would 
be issues around different EU electricity 
carbon intensity, and between UK 
energy companies to be resolved.
Building
regulations for new 
homes
Based on meeting thermal 
performance standards, or a 
Carbon Index (carbon 
emissions for space and water 
heating per square metre). 
(ODPM 2001)
Base standards on household carbon 
emissions, independent of fuel used. 
This has already been considered as a 
possibility (ODPM 2004). However the 
proposed standard for 2005, although 
based on a carbon target per square 
metre, allows electrically and oil heated 
houses more emissions than properties 
heated with gas.
Energy Saving 
Trust ‘energy 
efficiency’ 
campaign
Focus is on individual actions 
and technologies which can 
save money and energy.
Would have to include carbon 
emissions and overall limits as well as 
energy and money savings. Much of the 
detailed advice about how to make 
savings would remain the same.
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Industry 
agreements on 
efficiency
For example, for TVs and 
VCRs industry average 
standards and improvements 
agreed (Fawcett, Lane, & 
Boardman 2000).
People would need individual labels to 
tell them how much carbon the piece of 
equipment they were purchasing would 
emit.
Energy bills No present requirement to 
provide any information about 
carbon emissions. However 
there are EU plans to include 
environmental information on 
energy bills (EU 2003) and 
research has been carried out 
on how best to do this 
(Boardman & Palmer 2003).
Annual carbon emissions statements 
could be included as part of the bills.
There are many energy efficiency policies which can be re-oriented towards carbon saving as 
their primary goal. This can begin immediately, without the need for carbon rations to be 
introduced. However, as Chapter 2 made clear, current policy is not achieving energy savings, 
so simply re-orienting it towards carbon savings would not be sufficient. These policies would 
offer information, incentives and advice, but will help achieve real savings only within a carbon 
cap.
New businesses and public sector organisations would also be expected to emerge to meet 
people’s need to manage their carbon emissions, and existing organisations would take on new 
roles. One possible new organisation would be ‘CarbonWatchers’ - a community information 
and support scheme equivalent to diet schemes such as WeightWatchers (Hillman & Fawcett
2004). Based on the diet clubs template, it would provide its members with booklets / electronic 
information explaining the carbon impacts of different purchases and travel options, set 
reduction targets for individuals, hold regular audits (the equivalent of weigh-ins) and provide 
both professional and peer support for participants. Monitoring personal emissions would 
provide a practical means of appreciating the role of different energy-dependent activities in the 
total budget and of developing coping strategies to avoid excess consumption.
Energy companies could expand their existing role, by offering their customers carbon 
management services. They could develop ‘smart meters’ which informed people how much of 
their carbon ration for that year was left, which appliances were using most energy, how much 
carbon could be saved, for example, by reducing time spent in the shower, or by only heating 
bedrooms in the late evening. Alternatively, the companies could install sophisticated carbon 
management systems in houses which took these decisions automatically.
These are just some of the initiatives which would improve householders’ understanding of 
their carbon emissions. New businesses and organisations to help people to manage and reduce 
emissions would no doubt be set up. In fact there are already several such businesses, for
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example both Future Forests and Climate Care sell carbon offsets (although there is controversy 
around the efficacy of carbon offsets (Muir 2004)). Advice on energy saving and carbon 
emissions is already available from a range of organisations, e.g. Global Action Plan, Energy 
Saving Trust. With proper information and advice, people should find it possible to be able to 
use this new ‘currency’ quickly, particularly as it will become an increasingly important part of 
life.
5.7.4 Discussion
Having presented the idea of carbon rationing to several audiences, one of the most frequent 
questions is ‘how do we get from here to there?’ In other words, how can the perceived gulf 
between the present world and the radical changes that would be required under carbon 
rationing be bridged? Is it credible to claim that carbon rationing could be a ‘practical policy’? 
This section has indicated a timetable for the introduction of carbon rationing, the many 
supporting information and advice services which could be developed, and some suggestions 
about how existing policies could be transformed to support carbon rationing. These ideas are 
intended to show that rations could indeed be implemented in the real world, in a way which 
people would find acceptable. However, it would be unrealistic to suggest that introducing 
carbon rationing would be socially and politically easy. Although it can be considered as 
simply a method to achieve an already agreed target of 60% reductions, it would be a big 
change from current policy.
5.8 Wider implications of carbon rationing
In this section some of the wider implications of carbon rationing are considered briefly. This 
includes the extension of carbon rationing to the rest of the economy, followed by the sorts of 
social and lifestyle changes which might be introduced with carbon rationing. Finally there is 
speculation about the likely relationship between future energy prices and carbon rationing.
5.8.1 Carbon rationing for the rest of the economy
In order to make 60% savings throughout the economy it will be necessary to have a system in
place to manage downwards the emissions in the half of the economy that is not subject to
personal carbon allowances. As mentioned earlier, Anderson and Starkey are working on the
form this could take within their DTQ framework (Anderson & Starkey 2004). It can be argued,
that if the cap is set correctly, EU ETS provides a mechanism for most of the non-domestic
sector. For the non-domestic sector, the considerations of what constitutes equity are likely to be
rather different than for the domestic sector, and this may be crucial in designing a system.
When the equivalent of carbon rationing is introduced for these sectors it will result in a
reduction in the carbon intensity of goods and services, and it would be expected that higher
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carbon goods and services would become more expensive relative to the lower carbon 
alternatives. Householders’ indirect carbon emissions will fall.
5.8.2 Social and lifestyle changes
Carbon rationing will inevitably introduce changes in lifestyle — both welcome and 
unwelcome. Some indirect social benefits of carbon rationing were identified in Hillman & 
Fawcett (2004), including health benefits from more journeys being made on foot and by 
bicycle and a reduction in fuel poverty as the thermal condition of housing is improved to 
enable people to live within the ration. Although people will be able to choose how to live 
within their ration, and which aspects of their lives to change, given the lack of technological 
fixes for motorised transport, particularly air transport, travel options are likely to narrow. 
Presently, travel to distant locations is not only seen as a benefit in its own right, it is also 
symbolic of social and economic success. However, under carbon rationing, there will be much 
less scope for this, particularly flying to foreign countries or within the UK. There can be little 
doubt that many will view the prospects of this as a considerable limitation on their choice and a 
distinct reduction in their quality of life.
5.8.3 Supply side issues and prices
Economic and supply side issues are beyond the expertise of the author to address in any detail. 
It is clear that the introduction of carbon rationing in the UK, within a world-wide C&C 
framework, would have a profound effect on the fossil fuel business. What would happen to the 
price of fossil fuels in the UK (or worldwide) under conditions of carbon rationing but no 
shortage of supply? (As explained earlier, there is many times more carbon contained in oil, gas 
and coal stocks than can be safely released to the atmosphere.) This would depend partly on the 
behaviour of the energy extractive industry, but it seems reasonably likely that energy prices 
might go down as demand for fossil fuel energy fell. During the second world war, under food 
rationing, the government controlled the price of rationed foods as well as individual access to 
them. However, that was under conditions of restricted supply, which will not be the case for 
fossil fuels, so it not clear that the government would wish or need (or be able) to take any 
action on energy prices.
The relative price of different fuels could be expected to change. Lower carbon fuels, such as 
renewably generated electricity, would be in greater demand, so prices might rise. The higher 
carbon fuels, such as oil and coal, might fall in price to encourage use despite their carbon 
penalties.
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5.9 Summary and conclusions
The UK, in common with most other countries, needs new ways of making carbon savings. As 
explained in Chapter 2, although this country is likely to meet its Kyoto target it is extremely 
unlikely to meet its 20% carbon dioxide reduction target by 2010. This chapter proposes 
personal carbon rationing as the UK framework within the larger international solution of 
contraction and convergence. Calculations have been undertaken which demonstrate that a 
personal carbon rationing scheme would cover just over half of the UK’s carbon equivalent 
emissions (including those from international air travel).
A system of national personal carbon rationing, based on the same principles as the 
international solution of contraction and convergence, should be effective in limiting damage 
from climate change. The principle is the same as that used at an international level: reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions is a benefit needed by all the earth’s people and equal rights to emit 
carbon are as applicable at national as at international level. Following a description of the 
features of a UK personal carbon rationing scheme, there is a more detailed debate about 
different interpretations of equity, the virtues of a mandatory versus voluntary system and some 
calculations showing what the personal ration would be under different scenarios, and how this 
might affect individuals.
Administratively, putting carbon rationing in place should be much less challenging than the 
experience of introducing food rationing at the start of the second world war. It would require 
information on the carbon consequences of purchasing, usage and travel decisions to be readily 
available. Energy bills would become key providers of information, not only on costs but also 
on how much carbon allowance the householder had used up. There would be many new ways 
of informing people of their carbon emissions, and new business opportunities would arise to 
help people to reduce their emissions. Existing energy efficiency policies and information 
systems could be adjusted to meet the new carbon reduction goal. A key advantage of carbon 
rationing is that it provides an overall framework for carbon savings, within which a variety of 
individual responses can be adopted.
Past experience has shown both that UK-wide rationing systems can be implemented and be run 
successfully (food rationing in the second world war) and that international solutions to global 
environmental problems can be found (the hole in the ozone layer). Neither of these examples is 
a close analogy to the problems of carbon rationing and climate change, but both offer some 
practical lessons as well as providing good examples of regulated restrictions leading to positive 
outcomes.
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In Chapter 6, carbon rationing will be considered more critically, its effects on different groups 
and individuals will be discussed, and it will be compared with an alternative policy approach, 
carbon taxation.
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Chapter 6 - Analysis of personal carbon rations
6.1 Chapter overview
Chapter 5 presented a scheme for carbon rations in considerable detail. This chapter takes a 
more critical look at carbon rationing, the principles on which it is based and the practical 
outcomes of the scheme.
First of all the practical implications of carbon rationing are explored. How would equal rations 
impact on different individuals and groups in society? This question is first explored in general 
terms. Then, in order to understand in more detail the likely effects of carbon rationing on 
individuals, original case study data on carbon emissions have been collected and analysed. The 
data illustrate the wide range of personal carbon emissions in the UK at present: a variation of a 
factor of 12 for a sample of 32 individuals was found. The data also show how variable 
individuals’ carbon emissions patterns can be, with very different proportions of emissions 
coming from domestic energy, land transport and air transport.
Following this, detailed data analysis considers the current differences in carbon emissions 
between different income groups and people in different household sizes and properties of 
different ages. Overall, carbon rations would be progressive because people with lower incomes 
are responsible for lower emissions than those on higher incomes. Proxy data have to be used to 
carry out this analysis, and the complications and limitations this creates are discussed.
Potential problems with carbon rationing are identified and explored in some detail. The 
problems chiefly relate to operational difficulties and the consequences of rationing for 
particular groups, rather than challenging the principles of carbon rationing. Potential solutions 
and counter-arguments have been presented. Finally, carbon taxation is discussed and compared 
with carbon rationing as a method for making carbon savings. Despite having some advantages, 
the argument is made that carbon taxes do not offer the same advantages of equity and certainty 
of savings as would carbon rations.
6.2 Methodology
A lack of data on personal carbon emissions has been identified -  the only data that are 
available are based on average values for groups of individuals. In order to address this gap in 
knowledge, a data collection exercise was undertaken using questionnaires. Although the 
sample which resulted is small and not necessarily representative of the UK, it does allow
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discussion o f  the range of individual carbon emissions and of variation in patterns of personal 
energy use for the first time. The methodology is discussed and described in detail in section 
6.4.
This chapter also brings together existing secondary information in new combinations to derive 
insights into variations in carbon emissions. For example, to investigate how personal carbon 
emissions vary between income groups, existing data from the Family Expenditure Survey has 
been combined with fuel price and fuel intensity data, to give an estimate of carbon emissions 
per household income decile. The methodology used has been compared with those of other 
authors who have addressed similar questions. In addition, the model developed in Chapter 4 
has been used to look at carbon emissions by property age over time.
In order to look critically at carbon rationing, it is necessary to identify weaknesses and 
criticisms o f  the idea. However, there is a lack of academic or published critiques of carbon 
rationing. So, the limited literature has been supplemented by feedback received by the author at 
events when carbon rationing has been presented to various audiences. Literature review has 
also been used to investigate carbon taxation.
6.3 Would rationing be equitable in practice?
Equity is one of the key claimed benefits of carbon rations, along with certainty of savings. 
However, this does not mean rationing would have the same impact on everybody. The case for 
carbon rationing is that giving each person equal rights to emit carbon seems the most equitable 
possible scheme. The case against is stated clearly in a Ministry of Food second world war 
memorandum, quoted in Zweiniger-Bargielowska (2000):
"Rationing is essentially inequitable; it provides the same quantity o f an article for each person 
without any consideration o f  their needs or habits or o f their capacity to secure alternatives". 
Variation in needs, habits and capacity to secure alternatives are very evident in energy use, and 
these are discussed below.
6.3.1 ‘Needs and habits’
Neither equal carbon emissions nor equal energy consumption allowances equate to equal 
energy services. To take a specific example of this general statement, Figure 6.1 shows how an 
average carbon allowance for space heating would translate into different internal temperatures 
depending on the carbon intensity of the fuel used and the efficiency of the heating system. The 
figure of 400kgC for a household carbon allowance for space heating is based on the average 
carbon emissions generated per pre-96 household for that purpose in 1996 (from TF model).
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This equates to 18,000kWh of gas or 6,600kWh of electricity. The internal temperature this 
energy consumption would achieve in an average pre-1996 dwelling in 1996 is shown for 
different efficiencies of the gas heating system and for electric heating (which is 100% efficient 
by definition). The temperatures were calculated using the TF model described in Chapter 4. 
Electric heating would result in a temperature of 13.7°C, a 50% efficient gas system 15.6°C and 
a 90% efficient system would achieve 20.2°C. Thus an average carbon ration could lead to an 
internal temperature of anywhere between 13.7°C and 20.2°C in a pre-96 dwelling of average 
size, built form and building fabric.
Figure 6.1 does not show the full range of energy services that could be achieved from equal 
heating allowances. The true temperature range achievable from a 400kgC carbon ration would 
be far greater than six and a half degrees, given the wide variation that actually exists in 
dwelling size, built form, efficiency of building fabric, and the possibility of using renewable 
fuels. More efficient homes could achieve higher temperatures, and emit less carbon. For 
example, a semi-detached house of 80m2 built to the proposed 2005 building regulation 
standards, will only generate 163kgC emissions (40% of 400kgC) to achieve a temperature of 
21°C (ODPM 2004). In addition, depending on the occupation level of the property a higher or 
lower carbon ration would be available for heating -  400kgC is based on average household 
size. Finally, as explained in Chapter 4, internal temperature is not a complete measure of 
energy services, because it can represent different levels of thermal comfort depending on levels 
of clothing, activity and other environmental variables.
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Figure 6.1: Internal temperature achievable on an average carbon ration for gas and 
electricity use in the average pre-96 dwelling, 1996
For cars, which are used for most personal travel within the UK, only two key factors intervene 
between carbon emissions and energy services: the choice of fuel and the efficiency of the car. 
Carbon emissions from diesel cars are typically 20% lower per km than those from petrol cars 
(Vehicle Certification Agency 2004). At present, carbon emissions for new cars (excluding 2 
seaters) range from 104gC/km (Toyota Prius -  a hybrid electric car) up to 332gC/km for a 
diesel ‘sports utility vehicle’ or 570gC/km for a petrol sports car. However, for more 
conventional cars the upper limit is generally around 190gC/km (diesel) to 210gC/km (petrol) 
(Vehicle Certification Agency 2004). Thus possible vehicle emissions per km for the majority 
of new cars vary by a factor of two. The relationship between carbon emissions and energy 
services is much less complex and variable than for energy use in households.
In general, for household energy, efficient end-use equipment, well insulated homes, lower 
carbon energy sources and renewable energy all create a disconnection between carbon 
emissions and energy services (Figure 6.2). It is this disconnection that offers people positive 
opportunities to reduce their carbon emissions without sacrificing energy services which are 
important to them. In addition, the size of a person’s home will affect the energy services 
available to them, for example, a smaller home will allow warmer rooms than a larger one, 
given the same carbon allowance. Together these factors mean that equitably distributed carbon 
allowances could result in very inequitable levels of household energy services.
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Figure 6.2: An average carbon allowance can lead to very different levels of energy 
consumption and energy services
This raises the question of whether it would be possible or desirable to base an emissions 
scheme on giving people access to equal energy services, rather than equal carbon rations
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There is no simple index of energy services -  it consists of a wide range of services including 
clean clothes, warm rooms, mowed lawns, hours of TV watched and refrigerated food. People 
do not have equal wishes or needs for these services and the idea of ‘equality of energy 
services’ may not be a useful one.
Similarly, an allocation scheme based on what energy or energy services people ‘need’ (as 
opposed to want) would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to devise. Dobson (1995) 
reflects that building a theory of need is notoriously difficult. Owens & Cowell (2002) report 
that there is an immense literature on the subject of needs versus wants. They found that some 
authors retained an aversion to distinguishing between wants and needs, while others have 
perceived a morally significant difference between 'goods of the needs category' and 'goods of 
the wants category’. Wilhite and Lutzenhiser (1997) suggest that determining the minimum 
amount of resources needed for any consumption activity is fraught with both analytical and 
political pitfalls. They take refrigeration as an example and state that “no one really ‘needs ’ a 
refrigerator, but given the packaging and distribution o f foods, it is difficult to participate in 
normal food provisioning and eating without one ”. The authors then debate what size of 
refrigerator and freezer might currently be considered the minimum reasonable in terms of food 
storage, and note the many social reasons, including working and shopping patterns, 
householders’ wishes to be seen as good providers and the influence of kitchen designers which 
serve to increase the minimum size ‘needed’. They note that what is now taken to be 
conventional and basic social hardware was once regarded as unnecessary, luxurious or even 
frivolous. The authors conclude that there is constant renegotiation of what are regarded as basic 
needs, usually in the direction of increasing consumption of energy and other resources.
There is then no clear agreement that energy needs could be distinguished from energy wants. 
Even if needs could be agreed at a particular point in time, e.g. a requirement for everyone to 
have a ration sufficient to allow them to achieve an internal temperature of 18°C in their home, 
actually designing a system to deliver such differentiated allowances would be impossible, 
given the wide variety of personal circumstances, occupation levels and variation in the housing 
and energy-using equipment stock.
6.3.2 ‘Capacity to secure alternatives’
People will not have the same capability of achieving ‘off-ration’ or lower carbon energy 
supplies. For household energy, currently the main household level options for renewable 
energy are solar water heating (SWH) and photo-voltaics (PV). As noted in Chapter 4, only an 
estimated half of all properties are suitable for SWH, due primarily to their orientation, and this 
would also apply to PV. Of conventional fossil fuels, the lowest carbon option is natural gas
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which is available to around 80% of UK households leaving the remainder with higher carbon 
heating fuels to choose between.
A key constraint on the capacity of households and individuals to secure alternatives is money. 
Many lower carbon options, e.g. solar water heating, and carbon saving technologies, such as a 
new, efficient boiler, require capital investment. However, this is not universally true, generally 
more energy efficient cars are cheaper than less efficient ones, which tend to be larger and more 
upmarket. In addition, as Chapter 4 identified, changes in behaviour can offer significant energy 
savings without requiring financial investment. In the current government schemes there is 
additional help for lower income households in making their homes more energy efficient (see 
Chapter 2). Nevertheless, for technology solutions which do require additional investment, 
lower income householders will be at a disadvantage. Householders who are tenants rather than 
owner occupiers may also face additional difficulties if their landlords are unwilling to invest in 
improvements on their behalf.
6.3.3 Discussion
This discussion in principle has shown that equal carbon rations would lead to unequal access to 
energy services, particularly for household energy use, due to the current wide range of property 
and equipment efficiencies and variation in living arrangements and lifestyles. Similarly, the 
unequal capacity to adjust that people have, either in technical, financial or social terms, means 
that adapting to carbon rationing will fall more heavily on some people than on others. Whether 
this is of concern in public policy terms probably depends on the numbers of ‘winners’ and 
‘losers’, and particularly on whether it is disadvantaged groups who have less capacity to adjust, 
or are less able to buy additional rations, who suffer most. The following sections use a variety 
of empirical, modelling and secondary data to further consider how carbon rationing would 
affect different individuals and groups in society.
Unequal effects could be compensated to some extent by government policy. Those without 
sufficient income could be helped either to reduce their need for carbon (ideally) or given more 
rations from the pool of those sold back to the government. It would also be possible to build 
special allowances into a carbon rationing scheme (as discussed in Chapter 5). For the better off 
in society, since there is to be trading, people who don’t have sufficient carbon rations to meet 
their desired lifestyle can buy more. Although the unequal consequences of carbon rationing 
could be of political concern, unequal consequences do not prove that the ‘equal shares’ basis is 
flawed. There is little likelihood of being able to devise an alternative scheme based on 
individual ‘needs’ for energy service / carbon emissions. Even if such a scheme could be 
devised, it would effectively subsidise those with higher carbon lifestyles at the expense of the 
more carbon thrifty.
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6.4 Case studies of personal carbon emissions
6.4.1 Introduction
There is currently no published data on personal carbon emissions on an individual basis'. To 
rectify this gap, empirical data have been gathered from a number of individuals and their 
emissions for 2003 have been calculated. This case study data were collected in order to 
undertake analysis on the variation in personal carbon emissions, and to identify how different 
components of energy use contribute to this variation. The aim was not to try to explain the 
variation in terms of underlying factors, such as individual income, household size, access to 
different transport options etc. Instead, secondary data were subsequently used to look at some 
of these factors (section 6.6).
6.4.2 Questionnaire design
The questionnaire used to collect the case study data was a simplified carbon audit, based 
closely on that developed with Mayer Hillman (Hillman & Fawcett 2004). In order to make the 
carbon audit relatively easy to complete, the questions were kept to a minimum. A copy of the 
questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix 7. Respondents are asked to use energy bills to provide 
information on gas, electricity and other household fuel usage in 2003. For travel, respondents 
are asked to estimate the distance travelled by each motorised mode, or to give a description of 
the routes travelled. Socio-economic questions, other than about occupation, were not included, 
because the planned sample size would not be big enough to undertake analysis based on socio­
economic differences between respondents.
The questionnaire was piloted on a small number of individuals, who completed it without help 
from the author. Since none of the respondents reported difficulties and all completed the 
questionnaire satisfactorily, the initial questionnaire design was unchanged. In a small number 
of cases, the respondents were helped through the process and their energy bills were read, but 
the majority of respondents completed the form themselves.
6.4.3 Sampling strategy
From the start, the decision was made not to try and achieve a sample which would be large 
enough to be representative of the UK population, because this would be beyond the resources 
of the author. In the National Travel Survey, samples of 3,000+ individuals are aggregated over 
three years, to give a suitably large sample size of over 9,000 (DfT 2004a). The English House 
Condition Survey used a sample size of 24,700 for household interviews in 2001 (ODPM 2003).
1 Carbon emissions o f  a small number o f  households have been calculated by Marshall, who has 
developed his own methodology for calculation o f  carbon emissions (Marshall 2002). However, this work 
has not yet been published (Marshall 2004).
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The size of a representative sample for carbon audits would depend on the type of analysis to be 
carried out. The required sample size has not been calculated, but it would clearly exceed the 
tens of audits the author planned by at least one or two orders of magnitude.
Initially, it was planned to try to gain some responses through distributing questionnaires at a 
series of public talks the author was involved in during June and July 2004. At a talk given by 
the author and Mayer Hillman to present their book in Oxford during June 2004, about fifteen 
carbon audit questionnaires were handed out to people who requested them. Although all of the 
potential respondents had volunteered to complete carbon audit forms, none of these was 
returned. Similarly the author had a fairly poor response from fellow participants on an ‘Eco 
building and design course’ at the Centre for Alternative Technology. Only four out of sixteen 
responded with completed forms, despite all sixteen having volunteered and reminders being 
sent. There may be an element of people ‘not wanting to know’ what their impact is on the 
environment (a phenomenon also identified by Marshall and Lynas (2003) and discussed in 
Hillman and Fawcett (2004)). For many people, even those who aspire to ‘green’ lifestyles, the 
carbon audit would show that their impact on the global atmosphere is considerable, and 
possibly much greater than the UK average. However, without being able to question the non­
respondents (whose details were not generally recorded), it is not possible to determine why 
there was such a poor response rate.
Given these poor response rates, it was decided a different approach to persuading respondents 
to complete the audit was required. A strategy was adopted of approaching relatives, friends and 
colleagues of the author and, via them, their contacts. This could clearly lead to a less varied 
sample than other approaches but, given the limitations of time and the fact that the sample 
would in any case be unrepresentative, it was decided this method of recruiting respondents was 
acceptable. In order to encourage a response, the author offered to send respondents an analysis 
of their carbon emissions, a comparison with the UK average and some advice on how carbon 
emissions might be reduced. An example of this feedback is included in Appendix 8. In total a 
sample of 35 people was achieved, with 32 returning usable questionnaires. Potential 
respondents were approached from a variety of household sizes and with different heating fuels 
-  two factors which are known to influence household carbon emissions. The characteristics of 
the sample compared with the UK population are described in section 6.4.5.
6.4.4 Calculations
The carbon intensity factors listed in Table 2.2 were used to convert gas, electricity, oil and 
solid fuel energy consumption into carbon emissions. The factors in Table 6.1 were used to 
convert journey distances in km to carbon emissions in kgC. The factors for calculating carbon 
emissions from travel were devised by Mayer Hillman (Hillman & Fawcett 2004).
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Emissions for car travel are given for the driver only. However, the average car journey in 
Great Britain contained 1.59 people in 2002/03 (DfT 2004b). By allocating all vehicle emissions 
to the driver, those who travel greater distances as a driver than as a passenger will appear to 
have greater than their ‘true’ emissions, and those who travel by car predominantly or solely as 
a passenger will have artificially low emissions. Despite the inaccuracies of the method chosen, 
it was judged necessary because of the difficulties of asking drivers to estimate the average 
occupancy of their cars during 2003 and of asking passengers to estimate the distance travelled 
by car and how many other people were in the car.. A more detailed method of collecting travel 
data, such as travel diaries, would be required to get accurate enough information about travel 
patterns to warrant calculating car emissions per person, whether passenger or driver. Allocating 
all car emissions to drivers increases the apparent variation in personal travel emissions -  as 
those of non-drivers are lower than they should be, and those of drivers are generally higher.
Respondents were not asked to state what model of car they drive, and subsequent calculations 
are based on the carbon emissions per kilometre for an average petrol car or an average diesel 
car. There is not sufficient data to use actual emissions figures for individual cars: carbon 
emissions figures are only available for new car models, under test conditions (Vehicle 
Certification Agency 2004). For passenger travel by public transport, average figures are used, 
covering the relatively energy-inefficient times of the many off-peak hours when there are few 
passengers as well as the peak hours when travel by public transport is more heavily used.2
Table 6.1: Factors for translating travel distances into carbon emissions
Travel mode Carbon emissions in kgC per km / 
(kgCe/km for air travel)
Petrol car (as driver) 0.055
Diesel car (as driver) 0.038
Rail: intercity 0.030
Rail: other services 0.044
Rail: underground 0.019
Bus: London 0.025
Bus: outside London 0.046
Express coach 0.022
Air: within Europe 0.139
Air: outside Europe 0.087
Source: Hillman & Fawcett 2004
Travel by sea and by motorbike have not been included, because they are relatively minor travel 
modes. In addition, figures for travel by sea are not readily available.
2 The figures in Table 6.1 demonstrate that many forms o f  public transport differ little from travel by car 
in terms o f  emissions per person per kilometre.
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For long distance road or rail travel, and for travel by air, respondents did not generally estimate 
the distances travelled and instead gave details of their starting and destination points. To 
translate this information into distances, the following web sites were used:
• For road or rail journeys within Europe and air journeys within the UK: 
www.viamichelin.com
• For air journeys beyond the UK: www.indo.com/cgi-bin/dist, except for some 
European destinations which are not in the database, in which case 
www.viamichelin.com was used.
The www.indo.com website uses data from the US Census and a supplementary list of cities 
around the world to find the latitude and longitude of two places, and then calculates the 
distance between them (as the crow flies). This will not give an exact distance travelled by air, 
in part because planes normally travel along great circle routes, which are the shortest routes 
between two points on the surface of the earth and lie on a plane passing through the earth’s 
centre, although national airspace restrictions and jet streams may also influence the route 
(Choose Climate 2004).
For those people who had chosen renewable electricity tariffs (five out of 32), their emissions 
from electricity were set to zero. There is a complex debate about the value of signing up to a 
renewable energy tariff and the extent to which this results in ‘additional’ renewable energy 
(FOE 2004). However, well designed renewable energy tariffs should provide additional 
renewable energy beyond that which is already legally required, and on this basis it is assumed 
that renewable electricity customers have zero carbon emissions.
6.4.5 Results
Individual carbon emissions have been summarised into domestic energy use, land travel (travel 
by car, bus and train) and air travel, and are presented in Figure 6.3. The columns with stars 
above them are those where the individual has chosen a renewable electricity tariff. Full details 
of the original data and carbon emissions are presented in tables in Appendix 9.
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Figure 6.3: Individual annual carbon equivalent emissions by source, UK, 2003
The data show a huge range of personal carbon emissions with the highest emitter being 
responsible for twelve times the emissions of the lowest (Table 6.2). They also show the huge 
variation in the way an individual’s carbon emissions are made up. For Respondent 32, 92% of 
carbon emissions came from leisure air travel, by contrast Respondent 11 did not travel by air 
and 95% of their emissions were from household energy use. Of the sample of 32, eight did not 
travel by air in 2003, and their total emissions were on average just over half those of the group 
which did fly. The data demonstrate 23 respondents (72% of the total) were responsible for 
above average UK carbon emissions for 2003.
Table 6.2 demonstrates the ratios between the highest and lowest carbon emissions by type of 
energy use, with air travel varying the most between individuals -  by a factor of 46 between 
those who did travel by air. The lowest variation between individuals was for household energy 
use -  although a factor of nine still seems surprisingly high.
Table 6.2: Comparison of lowest and highest values from case study individuals
Ratios lowest: highest values
Total carbon equivalent emissions 1:12
Carbon emissions from household energy use 
per individual
1:9
Carbon emissions from household energy per 
household
1:8
Carbon emissions from land transport 1:19
Carbon equivalent emissions from air travel 
(for people who have undertaken air travel)
1:46
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Some of the characteristics of the case study sample are compared with UK averages in Table 
6.3. The UK average carbon emissions figures are based on values for 2001, which as 
mentioned earlier is the last year for which official figures which give carbon emissions 
separately for household and transport. (Note that total carbon emissions figures for 2001 were a 
little higher than those for 2002 -  as presented in Table 5.1).
Table 6.3: Comparison of sample characteristics with UK averages
UK average, 2001/02 Case studies sample
Total personal carbon equivalent 
emissions per person (kgCe)
1560 2270
(45% higher than UK av.)
Carbon emissions from household 
energy use (kgC)
700 780
(11% higher than UK av.)
Carbon emissions from land 
transport (kgC)
430 480
(12% higher than UK av.)
Carbon equivalent emissions from 
air travel (kgCe)
420 1010
(140% higher than UK av.)
Average household size * 2.3 2.1
One person households * 31% 31%
Households with children * 27% 16%
Households with one or two retired 
people (or over 60) *
30% 31%
Households using gas as main 
heating fuel
80%
(author estimate)
84%
Households with renewable 
electricity tariff
Estimated at 50,000 in 
2002, 0.2% of UK 
households
16% (5 individuals)
Sources: Household characteristics: Rickards et al. 2004, green electricity: FOE 2004
* Values for GB population
The comparisons show that carbon emissions from household and personal energy use for the 
case study samples were similar to the national average. However carbon equivalent emissions 
from international air travel were almost two and half times the national average. In total, 
average case study emissions are 45% higher than the UK average. Note that the UK average 
carbon equivalent emissions figure includes children (who must have lower than average adult 
carbon emissions as they cannot drive), whereas no children were included in the case studies.
In terms of household size, the case study sample average was lower than the GB average. This 
was largely due to the small number of households with children which were included in the 
survey. The author did try to get additional responses from households with children -  but with 
little success. The proportion of one-person households and retired households was similar to 
the national average, as was the proportion of households with gas as the main heating fuel. 
Households choosing a renewable electricity tariff were considerably over-represented 
compared with the UK population.
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Respondents were invited to contact the author with follow-up comments or questions after 
receiving their carbon audit. A number of comments were received, most of which either 
expressed surprise that their emissions were so high, or that the recipients had plans to reduce 
their emissions (usually by reducing flying / travel by car).
6.4.6 Reducing carbon emissions in the case study group
Of the case study sample, 23 out of 32 had higher than average carbon emissions. So what 
would the options be for these 23 individuals if they wanted to reduce their emissions to the 
national average? The highest priority is reducing air travel. Eighteen of the 23 had higher than 
average emissions from air travel, compared with 15 with higher than average land travel 
emissions, and 10 with greater than average domestic energy emissions. By reducing air travel 
alone, 14 out of 23 could reduce their emissions sufficiently to reach the national average. Many 
of these 14, while reducing their air travel from present levels, would still be able to travel 
considerable distances by air and stay below the average, e.g. case studies 12, 20, 25, 27 and 32. 
In addition, long distance rail or driving can be used as a lower carbon alternative for reaching 
European destinations. It is perhaps not surprising that reducing air travel is the most single 
important carbon reduction measure given that the case study sample as a whole has unusually 
high emissions from air travel.
Of the nine case study individuals who cannot reduce their emissions to the national average 
even if they cut out all air travel, all but one has higher than average emissions for both land 
travel and domestic energy use. On average their household energy emissions are 90% higher 
and their land travel emissions are 66% higher than the national average. This suggests they will 
have to address both patterns of household energy use and land travel. There are many options 
for doing both. Chapter 4 has already detailed the many technical and behavioural options that 
are available to reduce household energy use and carbon emissions. That chapter also showed 
that an approach which included both behavioural and technological changes could result in 
greater savings than either changes in behaviour or technology on their own. For transport, 
lower carbon options include reducing motorised distance travelled, switching from travelling 
by car to public transport, using a more efficient car and switching from petrol to diesel. Many 
different behavioural strategies are available for reducing distance travelled (Semiyen 2000), 
however, this does not necessarily mean it is easy to change existing travel patterns.
It would have been interesting to look in specific detail at how some of the case study 
individuals could reduce their emissions to the national average or below. However, to do this 
additional data would have had to be collected about the energy characteristics of their housing 
and detailed travel patterns.
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6.4.7 Discussion
Data collection, calculations and accuracy
Two problems were encountered with completion of the questionnaire:
1. difficulty with reporting the units for gas consumption;
2. lack of availability of a complete year of household bills.
Gas meters can measure consumption in kWh, cubic metres and hundreds of cubic feet. Gas bill 
layout varies by company, and it is not always clear what the units are on the bill. In two cases 
the respondents had to be contacted again in order to clarify their gas usage figures and the units 
in which it was measured. Three respondents were unable to supply figures for a whole year of 
household energy consumption, and so their replies could not be used in the analysis. No other 
problems were found with completion of the questionnaire.
The data presented by respondents is likely to have been of varying accuracy. Good quality 
information should be available for household fuel use assuming people are able to read their 
energy bills correctly. However, estimates for transport energy use are likely to be less accurate, 
because people do not have good records of travel which is not undertaken by car (for which 
mileometers and subsequent MOT certificates can be used). The National Travel Survey (DTLR 
2001a) bases its figures on seven day travel diaries kept by participants. For most people, it 
seems likely that travel by air is an unusual enough event to be recalled with accuracy. In 
addition to the problem of inaccurate reporting of travel, some emissions were not included in 
the totals: travel by motorbike -1 respondent; travel by sea - 3 respondents; solid fuel as a 
supplementary heating fuel (where estimates of weight used were not available) - 2 respondents. 
By allocating all car emissions to drivers, the true variation in carbon emissions between 
different people is likely to have been overestimated. By contrast, by using average figures for 
car emissions, rather than basing this on the particular model people drove, the true variation in 
carbon emissions is reduced.
Consequences for carbon rations
This preliminary information on the range of personal carbon emissions presents a challenge to 
the practical implementation of carbon rationing. It shows that variations between individuals 
(even based on a small sample) can be very considerable. This has a number of consequences:
• Under carbon rationing, trading of rations will be very important and most people will 
want to buy or sell spare rations.
• It indicates there are likely to be large numbers of people, particularly those who fly 
long distances and want to continue to do so, who will have difficulty in reducing 
emissions to the national average. The challenge of reducing emissions by 60% by 2050 
may be less onerous by comparison.
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• The responses to carbon rationing are likely to vary hugely depending on how personal 
emissions are made up. In the examples highlighted earlier, Respondent 32 would need 
to cut down air travel considerably, whereas all of Respondent 11 ’s actions should be 
directed towards improving the efficiency of their home, using lower carbon fuels and 
reducing domestic energy use via behavioural changes.
6.5 Other perspectives on individual carbon emissions
This section looks briefly at how carbon emissions can vary over time for the same individual, 
and how they might vary between individuals in the same household. The consequences of these 
types of variations are discussed.
Although carbon audit data above illustrate the current differences between individuals, they do 
not show how an individual’s emissions might vary from year to year as his / her circumstances 
change. Annual variations are particularly likely for those who fly abroad, where a return flight 
to New York could add 970 kgCe to emissions, a figure greater than average annual individual 
emissions from household energy use. However it can also apply to household energy use, and 
emissions of an individual can vary considerably as their accommodation choice and household 
arrangements change. The data below (Table 6.4) shows how the author’s household carbon 
emissions have varied over the past four years living in different properties.
Table 6.4: Author’s changing annual household carbon emissions between different 
properties
Location SAP
People
per
household
Gas
(kWh)
Electricity
(kWh)
Carbon 
emissions per 
household (kgC)
Carbon 
emissions per 
person (kgC)
Oxford 1 57 1 0 4,800 653 653
London 67 2 7,800 2,030 666 333
Oxford 2 72 2 14,400 1,700 951 476
Source: Author’s records and calculations, using 2003 va ues for electricity carbon intensity.
By moving between properties and households, the author’s carbon emissions from household 
energy have varied by almost a factor of two over a four year period. This variation was due 
largely to changes in the size of property occupied, the fuel used by the heating and hot water 
systems and whether or not the property was shared with another person - factors which cannot 
be easily altered once the decision to live in a particular place is taken. Although the efficiency 
of the properties was also relevant, in these cases it was not the crucial factor. A more general 
point illustrated by this data, is that change in household size with changing family stage or for 
other reasons can have a considerable influence on personal carbon emissions without a 
corresponding increase in energy services -  this is discussed further in section 6.6.4.
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By definition household energy use is shared equally by all the individuals in a household. 
However travel patterns are likely to differ between people in the same household. It is known 
that there are differences between the average travel patterns of people of different ages and 
genders. For example, men travel on average two fifths further on land than women in Great 
Britain. Length of travel also varies by age, with annual mileage increasing with age, reaching a 
maximum for both men and women between 40 and 49, declining thereafter (DTLR 2001a). 
Children’s mobility patterns also vary very considerably from those of adults.
These glimpses into the further complexity of variations in personal carbon rations over time 
and between household members show that the many adjustments required if carbon rationing 
were introduced would go beyond simply use of energy. Considerations such as household size, 
locations of home and work and the fuel used in a household would become key factors in 
decision making. There are likely to be negotiations around who uses carbon rations for what 
purpose between people within a household. People may also want to ‘save up’ rations for 
special events -  however, it would probably be necessary that rations had some sort of ‘expiry 
date’, because they would become more valuable over time as the individual ration reduced. 
Understanding variations in carbon emissions will be key to designing the details of a good 
carbon rationing scheme.
6.6 The effects of carbon rationing on different groups within 
society
6.6.1 Introduction
This section analyses the expected effects of carbon rationing on different groups in society. 
Ideally, carbon emissions data which included household energy and personal travel (including 
air travel) differentiated by social class, income, family stage and household size would be 
available. However, it is not and neither is there data on the combined amount of energy used by 
individuals or households for transport and household energy other than at a national level. 
Transport and household energy statistics are collected by different government departments, 
using separate questionnaires (this is discussed further in Chapter 7). To get an understanding of 
personal carbon emissions by different groups, proxy measures have to be used, and this 
inevitably introduces limitations into the analysis.
6.6.2 Recent research
Subsequent to the research for this thesis being completed, new analysis of greenhouse gas and 
carbon emissions have been published in October 2004 (Ekins & Dresner 2004, Francis 2004).
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Both studies overlap with some of the research in this thesis. The studies are briefly described 
below, and their results are included in the following sections where relevant.
The study by Ekins and Dresner (2004), together with the associated background documents 
Dresner & Ekins (2004a) and Dresner & Ekins (2004b), was primarily concerned with 
researching the effects on low-income households of different environmental taxes. As part of 
the research, the effect of carbon taxes on household energy use was considered in some detail, 
as were various transport taxes. The effects of introducing DTQs (a policy proposal very similar 
to carbon rations, as explained in Chapter 5) were also investigated. This involved analysis of 
energy use by income group similar to that carried out by the author.
The Office for National Statistics have published a report called “The impact of UK households 
on the environment through direct and indirect generation of greenhouse gases” (Francis 2004). 
The report looks at greenhouse gas emissions in 2001 for households broken down by region, 
household size and age of the head of household (under 30, 30 to 64 and 65 and over). Francis 
states that no attempt was made to identify emissions by the level of household income due to 
limitations in time and data availability.
There are a number of methodological differences between Francis’ research and that carried 
out in this thesis:
• Results are reported on a total greenhouse gas basis. It is not possible to separate out 
figures for carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel energy use (the subject of this 
thesis).
• The analysis is based on the National Accounts (NA) methodology of counting carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases. This differs from the IPCC methodology which is 
used in this research. The NA methodology includes emissions from international 
aviation and international shipping and from fuels purchased abroad by UK residents. It 
excludes emissions from fuels purchased in the UK by non-UK residents.
• The aircraft emissions are not adjusted to take account of their true global warming 
effect (as described in Chapter 2).
Nevertheless, the Francis analysis is very interesting and key results are highlighted below.
6.6.3 Carbon emissions by income
The best available proxy data on a combination of domestic energy and transport fuel use by 
income is expenditure information. TheFamily Expenditure and Food Survey (ONS 2004) gives 
expenditure data for both domestic energy and personal private transport fuels by income decile, 
where decile 1 is the 10% of households with the lowest income and decile 10 is the richest 
10%. Figure 6.4 shows how expenditure on domestic energy and motoring fuels vary per
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individual by household income decile. The data on which this figure is based are given in full 
in Appendix 10.
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Figure 6.4: Expenditure per person per week on domestic energy and personal private 
transport fuels by household income deciles, 2002/03, UK
Source: ONS 2004
The data demonstrate that expenditure per person on domestic energy plus personal private 
transport fuels rises considerably with household income. Rising expenditure with income 
decile is driven by spending on motor fuels where the richest individuals spend almost four 
times as much as the poorest. Importantly, the number of people per household increases in 
parallel to household income; the average number rising from 1.3 to 3.2 between decile 1 and 
decile 10. Thus, although domestic energy expenditure per household rises with income (see 
Appendix 10), when domestic energy expenditure is compared on a per person basis it is the 
poorest individuals who spend most. In addition, people in the lowest decile spent 5.6% of their 
income on household fuel in 2002/03, compared with 1.9% spent by those in decile 10.
Because of the variation in household sizes, a simple comparison of household incomes is not 
necessarily a true picture of how income varies between the deciles. Adjustments can be made 
to produce ‘equivalent’ income figures per decile for two-person households. Such analysis 
increases the equivalent income of households in lower deciles, and reduces that of those in the 
higher deciles (Dresner & Ekins 2004a). However, this adjustment does not change the order of 
the deciles, and so for the purposes of this research, where no analysis is being carried out using 
absolute values of income, it is an unnecessary refinement.
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Translating expenditure into carbon emissions
Expenditure on gas, electricity and motor fuels can be translated into carbon emissions by using 
information about the cost of each form of energy and the carbon emissions per kWh or litre of 
energy. Average prices for fuels, their carbon emissions per unit energy and consequently their 
emissions per pound spent (kgC/£) are shown in Table 6.5. The data show that each pound spent 
on motor fuels results in lower carbon emissions than a pound spent on household fuels. This 
largely result from the high levels of taxation on these fuels.
Table 6.5: Average price and carbon intensity of gas, electricity and motor fuels, UK, 2003
Energy source Price per unit 
energy (£/unit)
Carbon emissions 
per unit energy 
(kgC/unit)
Carbon emissions 
per £ (kgC/£)
Gas 0.016 per kWh 0.05 per kWh 3.09
Electricity 0.066 per kWh 0.136 per kWh 2.06
Petrol 0.75 per litre 0.63 per litre 0.84
Diesel 0.77 per litre 0.73 per litre 0.95
Sources: DTI 2004a, D EFRA 2001a, AA 2004- prices for June 2003
To undertake the next stage of the analysis these figures for kgC/£ are combined with 
expenditure per income group (Figure 6.5). These data show that carbon emissions from 
domestic energy are significantly greater than those from motor fuels for all income deciles 
(which contrasts with expenditure, where more is spent on motor fuels than on domestic energy 
for by people in higher deciles).
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Figure 6.5: UK average weekly carbon emissions per person from travel by car and 
domestic gas and electricity use, by household income decile, 2002/03
Sources: ONS 2004, DTI 2004a, DEFRA 2001a, AA 2004
179
The total emissions per person by household income decile show that, for the five lowest 
income deciles, emissions per person are about equal, and that they rise gradually after that. The 
conclusion is that if everyone had equal carbon allowances and wished to continue with their 
pre-existing consumption patterns, there would have to be transfer of allowances from those in 
poorer households to those in richer households and a transfer of payments from richer to poorer 
to buy their spare allowance. It also demonstrates that an individual allowance scheme based on 
household energy only would be regressive, it would impact the poor more heavily.
However, this analysis is incomplete because it does not include carbon emissions from ‘other’ 
household fuels, energy use via public transport or travel by air, (because this data cannot be 
derived from expenditure figures). There is little variation in expenditure on public transport 
(i.e. rail, tube, bus and coach fairs) in income deciles one to eight, with higher expenditure in 
deciles nine and ten. In addition, public transport is a much less significant source of energy use 
than travel by car. Similarly, the average expenditure on ‘other’ household energy varies little 
between the income decile groups, and at an average of 7% of expenditure on household fuels 
they represent a minor component of expenditure. Therefore exclusion of public transport 
energy use and of other household fuels does not significantly affect the pattern of carbon 
emissions by income decile.
Also, a number of assumptions have been made by simply combining average prices with 
expenditure per income decile:
• It is assumed that average household energy prices apply equally across all income 
deciles. However there is evidence that poorer people tend to pay more per unit of 
energy than the better off. For example, in 2001 pre-payment electricity users 
(predominantly low income households) paid 12% more on average for the same 
amount of electricity than somebody paying by direct debit (higher income households) 
(Boardman & Fawcett 2002). An assumption of equal emissions per pound spent will 
tend to overestimate the carbon emissions of lower income people.
• If off-peak electricity is used in unequal ratios between different income groups, then 
this will distort the analysis somewhat. This is because off-peak electricity costs only 
around a third of standard electricity, but has very similar carbon emissions to all 
electricity. At present around one third of electricity is used off-peak (DTI 2004a).
• In the Family Expenditure Survey, motor fuel expenditure is not distinguished between 
petrol and diesel. DTI (2004a) figures show that 2003 retail sales were in the ratio 68% 
petrol to 32% diesel (by weight), but it is likely many small businesses buy diesel from 
retail outlets -  so this ratio is unlikely to apply to household transport fuels. In the 
absence of good data, it is assumed all expenditure was on petrol.
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The important omission is air travel, which is responsible for 27% of the average individual’s 
personal carbon equivalent emissipns, and which varies considerably by income. Air travel is 
predominantly undertaken by the richer members of society, with, for example, three quarters of 
all low cost flights being taken by the top three social classes (Bishop & Grayling 2003). There 
is no good proxy data on cost of air travel which can be used to estimate distance travelled. 
Expenditure on foreign package holidays increases considerably by decile, such that decile ten 
individuals spend seven times more than those in decile one (ONS 2004). However, this cannot 
be related directly to the proportion of expenditure on air travel or distance travelled.
In Figure 6.6, in order to get some idea of how air travel could affect total individual carbon 
emissions it has been assumed that air travel carbon equivalent emissions vary in the same way 
across the deciles as those from motor fuels. This probably underestimates the true emissions of 
those in higher income groups. However, given this assumption, the average individual in decile 
ten was responsible for almost 60% more carbon equivalent emissions in 2002/03 than 
somebody from deciles one, two and three. The inclusion of air emissions increases the gap in 
carbon emissions between higher and lower income individuals.
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Figure 6.6: UK average weekly carbon emissions per person from private transport, gas 
and electricity use, and estimated air travel emissions by household income decile, 2002/03
Sources: ONS 2004, DTI 2004a, DEFRA 2001a, AA 2004
The simplifications in this analysis, which have been identified above, on balance probably 
mean that the emissions of higher income individuals have been underestimated. Nevertheless it 
is clear that, on average, individuals in lower income deciles have lower carbon emissions than 
those in higher deciles. Thus carbon rations would not unfairly disadvantage the poor.
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Dresner and Ekins (2004b) carried out analysis very similar to that described above, the most 
significant difference being the way they estimated aircraft emissions. They identified the same 
problems with estimating air travel by income decile as the author. However, they decided to 
use data on expenditure on package holidays as proxy for the number of flights taken per year, 
the total number of flights from the International Passenger Survey (ONS 2003) and assumed 
that all holidays were to the same destination. As they recognised, this is a considerable 
simplification, which does not recognise the role of scheduled flights, the many causes for 
variation in expenditure on package holidays, and the variation in destinations which may be 
chosen by different income deciles. They do not report the consequent carbon emissions per 
income deciles, so the results from this method of estimation cannot be compared with that used 
by the author.
6.6.4 Carbon emissions and household size
There is strong evidence that carbon emissions from household energy use are likely to vary 
considerably by household size. As Table 6.6 illustrates, somebody in a one-person household, 
regardless of income, uses around twice as much electricity and gas and therefore produces 
twice the carbon emissions as somebody in a three-person household.
Table 6.6: Scale effects of household size on the use of domestic energy (one-person 
household = 100), England, 1996
Household size Electricity per 
household
Gas per 
household
Electricity 
per person
Gas per 
person
1 100 100 100 100
2 137 129 69 65
3 165 142 55 47
4 180 156 45 39
5 192 175 38 35
Source: Based on Fawcett, Lane, & Boardman 2000
Francis (2004) shows that for all greenhouse gas emissions from domestic energy use, on a 
National Accounts basis, individual emissions for one, two and three plus person households are 
in the ratio 100:71:41. This is similar to the ratios in Table 6.6. Equivalent data for land travel 
show that individual emissions for one, two and three plus person households are in the ratio 
100:115:85. Unfortunately air travel data are not collected by household size. Putting the land 
travel and household energy use data together gives a combined individual emissions ratio for 
one, two and three plus person households of 100:81:52. Unless people living alone fly very 
much less than those in larger households, it is likely that average total personal greenhouse gas 
and carbon emissions reduce with increasing household size.
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There is little doubt that people living alone would face a greater challenge in adapting to 
carbon rations than those in larger households. In the UK, 29% of households contained just 
one person in 2003 (National Statistics 2004a). Single person households consist of a wide 
variety of people from a low-income widowed elderly person to an affluent young professional. 
The likelihood of living alone increases with age, with 48% of those over the age of 75 living 
alone, compared with 15% in the 45-64 year old age group in Great Britain in 2002 (Rickards et 
al. 2004). The environmental impacts of single person households are wider than just increased 
per capita carbon emissions, and affect the nation as well as the individual. People living alone 
are also likely to consume more land, goods and materials per person than those living in larger 
households (Williams 2003). Liu et al. (2004) state that rapid increase in household numbers 
and resultant higher per capita resource consumption in smaller households pose serious 
challenges to biodiversity conservation. This is not a problem just for the UK. Growth in 
household numbers globally, was more rapid than aggregate population growth between 1985 
and 2000 (Liu et al. 2004). However, household size is typically seen as outside the realm of 
government policy, and the government appears to be unaware of or unconcerned by the 
possible environmental implications of an increase in one-person households (Williams 2003). 
Whether the exclusion of household size from public policy can be maintained in the face of the 
importance of this issue for national carbon emissions, as well as the greater difficulties under 
carbon rationing for people living alone, is open to question.
6.6.5 Domestic energy use carbon emissions by age of property
Figure 6.7 shows the annual energy consumption of pre-1996 and post-1996 houses in 
Johnston’s BAU and Demand Side scenarios. The figures for pre-1996 represent the average 
house in the stock which was built before 1996, and post-1996 values represent the average 
house built from 1996 onwards. The two ages of housing use very different amounts of energy 
throughout the whole period, with post-1996 households in the BAU scenario generally needing 
only half the energy of the pre-1996 households (while achieving higher internal temperatures 
up to 2040). This difference means that, for example, in DJ-BAU post-96 houses make up 29% 
of the stock by 2050 but only use 16% of total household energy. There is a similar ratio of 
energy use of 2:1 between pre-96 and post-96 housing in the DJ-DS scenario, where huge 
strides are made in improving the energy efficiency of pre-96 housing.
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Figure 6.7: UK domestic sector annual energy consumption per pre-1996 and post-1996 
household, DJ-BAU and DJ-DS, 1996-2050
The data in Figure 6.7 are a simplification of the differences that would actually emerge 
between different types of houses. Using just two types of houses for modelling purposes hides 
the variation between the best and the worst in the stock, and those which are more or less 
capable of upgrading to the average standards suggested in DJ-DS. In addition, in Chapter 4, 
doubt was thrown on some of the technologies used particularly in retro-fitting improvements to 
existing homes in DJ-DS. However, this analysis shows that even under optimistic assumptions 
about retro-fitting technology options, it is clear that differences between efficient and 
inefficient properties will persist through time, making it easier for people in some properties to 
achieve lower carbon emissions than others.
6.6.6 Greenhouse gas emissions by UK region and age of head of 
household
Francis (2004) investigated the variation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by UK region and 
by age of the head of household. As explained earlier, both the methodology for counting 
emissions and the inclusion of greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide means this analysis 
is on a different basis from that in this thesis. Nevertheless, the results can act as a proxy for the 
carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel use. All Francis’ results have been adjusted so that air 
travel emissions reflect their true global warming impact -  i.e. air travel emissions have been 
multiplied by three.
184
Regional analysis showed that GHG emissions for household energy use plus land and air travel 
varied little per person between England, Scotland and Wales. English emissions were equal to 
the UK average, with Scottish emissions being 2% higher and Welsh emissions being 6% lower. 
The English regions showed greater variation, with emissions in the highest region, London, 
being 12% higher than the average, and the emissions in Yorkshire were the lowest regional 
value at 17% less than average. Emissions per individual from Northern Ireland were 25% 
higher than the UK average — a considerable difference. However, there is good reason to 
believe that this is an overestimate. In carrying out his analysis, Francis has assumed that all 
expenditure on fuels other than gas and electricity is on coal (in common with the analysis in 
this thesis and that by Ekins and Dresner, he makes extensive use of the Expenditure and Food 
Survey). In reality, the most important fuel other than gas or electricity is heating oil (DTI 
2004a), which has considerably lower carbon intensity than coal (Table 2.2). Thus GHG 
emissions from household energy use have been overestimated, and this is particularly the case 
for Northern Ireland, where natural gas has only recently been introduced and most people use 
‘other’ fuels as their main heating source (Boardman and Fawcett 2002).
Francis also carried out analysis of household GHG differentiated by the age of the head of the 
household. This has been combined with GB data on the size of households by age of the head 
of household from the Family Resources Survey (DWP 2002). This combination results in the 
figures in Table 6.7. The data show interesting differences in patterns of energy use, with older 
households travelling much less by land and by air than younger ones, but having higher 
domestic energy emissions. Consequently households with a head aged 65 or over have the 
same emissions per person as those headed by people 30-64. Younger households have higher 
emissions, and these are dominated by air travel. However, given the previously identified 
weaknesses of air travel data, it would be best to view these figures somewhat cautiously.
Table 6.7: Greenhouse gas emissions per person by age of head of household, UK, 2001
Household Domestic energy Land Air travel Total
Age size use (tCe) travel (tCe) (tCe) (tCe)
Under 30 2.2 0.5 0.4 1.0 1.9
30 to 64 2.8 0.6 0.4 0.4 1.4
65 and over 1.7 0.9 0.2 0.2 1.4
Based on: Francis 2004 with adjustments to air travel figures as explained, DWP 2002
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6.6.7 Summary and discussion
Table 6.8 presents a summary of the characteristics that will influence personal carbon 
emissions, based on the research presented in this chapter and Chapter 4.
Table 6.8: Characteristics which influence personal carbon emissions
Low
Personal carbon
emissions -----------------------------------► High
Main heating + hot 
water fuel
Wood, solar water 
heating or other 
renewables
Gas Oil Coal / solid fuel 
Electricity
Heat loss of building 
fabric
Low High
Size, age and form of 
property
Small, new, flat or 
terraced
Average, mid 20th century, 
semi-detached
Large, old, 
detached / 
bungalow
Use of household 
energy
Careful, modest 
temperatures + 
warm clothes
Profligate, many 
gadgets, high 
temperatures
Travel patterns Short distances, 
few or no flights
Long distances, 
by car, many 
flights
Income Low High
People per household Four + Three Two One
Age of head of 
household
Greater than 30 Less than 30
The differences identified here according to individual, household and housing characteristics 
are key to understanding the very different emissions between individuals found in the case 
study data.
The overlap between the author’s research and that subsequently published by Ekins & Dresner 
and Francis has been useful in a number of ways. First of all, in investigating the variation of 
energy use by income, Ekins & Dresner have used largely the same data sources and methods of 
analysis as the author. This confirms the validity of the methodology used in this thesis. 
Secondly, both Ekins & Dresner and Francis have identified the same problems of data 
availability, particularly with regard to air travel. This is confirmation that no key data sources 
have been overlooked in this chapter’s analysis.
The author has argued that, because the analysis shows individuals in lower income deciles have 
lower carbon emissions than those in higher deciles on average, carbon rations would not 
unfairly disadvantage the poor. However, in their detailed work on household energy use by
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income decile Dresner & Ekins (2004a) found that average expenditure figures across deciles 
hide a considerable variation in energy expenditure and energy use between individuals in the 
same decile. Those at the 80th percentile in the lowest decile consume nearly nine times as much 
energy as the 20th percentile of the decile. Using their more detailed data on energy expenditure 
by income, they look at the effect on the lowest income households of introducing DTQs 
covering household energy use, transport and carbon equivalent emissions from air travel (i.e. a 
scheme identical to personal carbon rations). Their research shows that if DTQs were 
introduced, around 25% of low-income households (defined as the two lowest income deciles) 
would be worse off. However, if only emissions from travel and aviation were included, then a 
smaller proportion of low-income households would lose out, no more than 10-15%. On this 
basis, they suggest that domestic energy use should be excluded from DTQs/carbon rations, and 
instead a comprehensive programme of energy efficiency measures and incentives should be put 
in place. Once all houses were brought up to an efficient standard, which they estimate could 
take 20 years, they imply then energy taxation could be introduced because fuel poverty would 
have disappeared.
The variation of expenditure between individuals in the same income decile undoubtedly 
undermines the author’s argument that a carbon ration will not adversely affect those on lower 
incomes. However, the alternative to rationing suggested by Dresner & Ekins (2004a) is simply 
a variation on a technological improvement scenario which has been thoroughly investigated in 
Chapters 3 and 4, and found to be at high risk of not achieving carbon savings. So although 
Dresner & Ekins’ evidence does suggest a need for more careful investigation into supporting 
programmes to those low income households likely to lose out under carbon rationing, the 
author would argue that it is still the fairest proposal which is likely to be effective in securing 
carbon savings. Section 6.8 will present a comparison with carbon taxation.
6.7 Objections to carbon rationing
Objections to carbon rationing, many of which have been raised at presentations and in 
discussions, are discussed here. In Appendix 11 there is a record of audience questions or 
comments made at a number of presentations about carbon rationing and contraction and 
convergence given the author, alone and with Mayer Hillman. One of the most common themes 
is the large gap between the world as it is now and the changes which would needed before 
carbon rationing would be adopted - this has already been discussed in Chapter 5. Other themes 
are discussed in turn below. These are: how will people cope?; the problems of cold winters; 
individual responsibility; and the role of goods and services within carbon rationing. The larger- 
scale strategic issues which have been raised at public meetings, such as the role of nuclear
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power, the nature of political and social change and the power of corporate interests, are not 
discussed here as they are beyond the scope of this thesis.
6.7.1 How will people cope?
One of the big concerns about carbon rationing is how people will cope with this new method of 
restricting their energy use. A key question is what would happen if people ran out of their 
ration before the end of the year - would this mean that they ended up being unable to heat their 
homes, and suffer ill-health or worse?
This question can be answered in a variety of ways. Firstly, because carbon rationing would 
become an important part of everyday life, it seems reasonable to suggest that people would 
swiftly learn to manage their ration. In order to be able to afford energy throughout the year, 
people already have to manage their money. Help and support is available for those who have 
difficulties with affording their energy bills (including measures such as debt counselling and 
pre-payment energy meters), and parallel services could be available to those who found 
managing their carbon ration problematic. There would have to be mechanisms in place to allow 
people access to vital energy services whilst at the same time recovering the carbon ‘debt’ over 
time. Energy companies might be required to offer carbon management services for vulnerable 
individuals who could not cope with the budgeting and trading of emissions required. 
Alternatively, Starkey & Anderson (2004) have suggested that individuals not wishing to 
participate in rationing and trading could immediately sell all their ration when it was allocated, 
keep the money to one side, and simply use it to buy rations on the market when they bought 
energy.
Another answer to this concern is that because carbon rations are tradable, there is no absolute 
limit on an individual’s consumption and, if people could afford it, they could simply buy more 
carbon rations to meet their needs. They could also invest in efficiency measures etc. to reduce 
their carbon emissions.
Finally, it is important to remember that a lot of carbon emissions come from activities which 
are not nearly so vital (or as emotive) as using energy to stay warm in winter. For example, over 
one fifth of land-based travel in the UK (by distance) is for the purpose of seeing friends and 
another fifth is used for shopping, sport and entertainment (DfT 2003c). While no doubt 
important socially, reducing travel for these purposes would not be a matter of life and death.
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6.7.2 Changes in heating energy requirements with weather
How will carbon rationing allow for the variation of heating energy requirement with different 
external temperatures? Data presented in earlier chapters on energy consumption in the 
domestic sector since 1970 (e.g Figure 3.3) clearly show that energy use can vary quite 
considerably from year to year. In the 1990s the coldest year was 1996, with an average 
temperature over the six coldest months (January to April, November and December) of 5.1°C, 
compared with average for the decade of 6.4°C (DTI 2004a). Domestic sector energy 
consumption in 1996 was 10% higher than the average of the two years either side. Carbon 
emissions from the household sector account for around half of personal carbon emissions, so 
an increase in household emission of ten percent would equate to a five percent increase in total 
personal emissions. According to research into climate futures (Hulme, Turnpenny, & Jenkins 
2002), there are likely to be fewer cold winters in future years, as well as generally increasing 
temperatures. Nevertheless, there is no guarantee that there will not be any years which are cold 
enough to lead to a ten percent rise in energy use in future.
A carbon rationing scheme could be adapted to allow either universal or targeted additional 
emissions in cold years. This would necessarily result in reduced allowances for warmer years 
so that the overall carbon reduction target could be met. The government used to operate a cold 
weather payment system, giving extra money to vulnerable groups to meet increased energy 
costs, which was triggered by cold weather periods. In recent years this has been changed to an 
annual winter fuel allowance for all vulnerable groups, whatever the weather (DWP 2004). 
Experience shows that it has been possible to create administrative systems that respond to the 
weather and, if this was thought necessary, a carbon rationing system could make allowance for 
cold winters.
6.7.3 Putting all the responsibility on the individual
It can be argued that carbon rationing puts all the responsibility for carbon emissions from 
personal energy use onto the shoulders of individuals. However, manufacturers, energy 
companies, retailers, house builders, plumbers and many other professions and industries have 
an influence on a householder’s or traveller’s carbon emissions. For example, the carbon 
intensity of electricity is very largely controlled by government and the energy industries, yet it 
would be the householder who faces the consequences. In addition, as many authors argue, 
consumption is a social rather than an individual process (Shove 2003). Would the many other 
actors in the process which translates an individual’s desire for energy or travel services into 
carbon emissions avoid their share of responsibility under personal carbon rationing?
The concern about individuals being expected to take responsibility where they have only 
limited autonomy is clearly legitimate. However, at the same time individual choices are very
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important in determining and potentially reducing carbon emissions, and giving the individual 
no responsibility would not be a viable option. While technology choices can be mandated by 
government, individuals and households make key choices about the ownership and use of 
technologies. For example, the government can make efficient boilers compulsory, but it cannot 
regulate thermostats in people’s homes or determine their heating patterns. Under carbon 
rationing, manufacturers and retailers should compete to sell low carbon emissions products and 
all of society and its economic processes should be re-oriented towards low carbon solutions. 
The government will wish to support people in their choice of lower carbon options. Thus, 
although the individual has to manage his or her own carbon ration, it will be in the other actors’ 
best interests to enable people to make low carbon choices, and the government would be 
expected to support the vulnerable. So, the view that carbon rationing places all the 
responsibility on the individual is incomplete. Carbon rationing is one part of a wider 
realignment towards a low carbon society, in which all actors will be involved.
6.7.4 Problems with not including goods and services
One of the concerns about not including goods and services is that people will not be directed 
towards making lower carbon goods choices, such as preferring vegetables grown in the UK to 
those air freighted from abroad. However, at present there are nowhere near sufficient data to be 
able to identity embodied energy or emissions in particular consumer goods. There are no 
comprehensive UK data on the indirect energy content / carbon emissions of goods and 
services. Francis (2004) does include some data on GHG emissions for broad ranges of goods, 
e.g. ‘clothing and footwear’ and ‘food, drink and tobacco’. Somewhat more detailed data are 
available from the Netherlands (Wilting & Biesiot 1998). Gathering the necessary data would 
be far from easy, and Appendix 6 includes a discussion of the difficulties involved in compiling 
embodied energy data.
For the reasons elaborated in Chapter 5, it is proposed that personal carbon rations should not 
apply to the embodied energy in goods and services. When the equivalent of carbon rationing is 
introduced for the non-domestic sectors it will result in a reduction in the carbon intensity of 
goods and services, and householders’ indirect carbon emissions will fall. Higher carbon goods 
and services will become more expensive relative to the lower carbon alternatives. The 
consequence will be that individuals will have access to a carbon emission allowance for energy 
on an egalitarian basis, but their access to the goods and services attached to embodied carbon 
emissions will depend on price and income.
6.7.5 A single nation solution?
The question of whether it would make sense for the UK to introduce carbon rationing 
unilaterally has been raised. As Chapter 5 stressed, ultimately UK carbon emission reductions
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only make sense within a global agreement to reduce carbon emissions. The UK already has 
adopted a unilateral target of 60% emissions reductions and, following this lead, introducing 
carbon rationing in the UK alone would not be a departure from current policy. However, it 
should also be a government priority to seek an effective post-Kyoto framework for global 
emissions reduction.
In this thesis, carbon rationing is proposed for the UK alone and there is no detailed discussion 
about its applicability to other countries. It could be equally appropriate in other developed 
countries, but no work has been done to explore this assumption.
6.7.6 Conclusion
While these objections or perceived weaknesses of carbon rationing (and others mentioned in 
Appendix 11 but not addressed here) do require a response, none of them challenges the 
fundamental basis of rationing. The following section looks at a completely different policy 
approach: carbon taxation.
6.8 Carbon taxation
6.8.1 Introduction
There are two key alternatives to a policy of carbon rations: a package of policy measures 
primarily focussed on energy efficiency, or carbon taxation. Chapters 3 and 4 have already 
argued that the first approach would be very unlikely to make the required carbon savings. 
Despite significant improvements in the energy efficiency of the UK housing stock, energy 
savings have not been achieved. The other alternative is carbon taxation, which is considered in 
some detail in this section. First of all the advantages of carbon taxation are explained. Then 
existing UK carbon and energy taxes are described. The potential levels of taxation which 
would be required are discussed. Finally carbon taxation is compared with carbon rations and 
conclusions are drawn.
6.8.2 The case for carbon taxation
Carbon taxation represents an alternative method of reducing carbon emissions from personal 
energy use. It would operate by increasing the price of energy such that consumption would 
reduce to the extent required. Like carbon rationing, it is a policy tool which provides a 
framework which should encourage lower carbons solutions, such as energy efficiency and 
renewable energy, and discourage profligate use of energy.
191
RCEP (2000) suggested that taxation should be part of the package of measures used to reduce 
the UK’s carbon emissions. Their key arguments in favour of taxation were:
• it would encourage a shift to low-carbon and non-carbon energy sources;
• it would increase the average cost of energy, which would lead to reduced energy use as 
the attractiveness of energy saving measures and equipment increased.
They recognised this could cause problems for those in fuel poverty, but stated this should not
prevent the introduction of carbon taxation, rather that comprehensive and effective 
compensatory mechanisms for the fuel poor should be put in place.
There are a number of other arguments in favour of carbon taxation. Firstly, it would fit well 
with existing administrative systems, under which energy taxation is long-established. This 
contrasts with carbon rationing, which would require a whole new administration and regulatory 
system. Carbon taxation is a policy instrument for which there is already experience: six 
European countries have already introduced carbon taxes (The Royal Society 2002). In addition, 
taxation is also considered to be an economically efficient way of making carbon savings (The 
Royal Society 2002).
6.8.3 Existing energy and carbon taxation
Energy taxation has long been part of UK taxation strategy. Additional energy taxation was 
introduced in 2001 for electricity, gas and other fuels for the non-domestic sectors of the 
economy via the Climate Change Levy (Chapter 2). However, levels of taxation have proved 
particularly controversial for both household energy and transport fuels.
In 1994, the UK government added VAT to household fuels at the rate of 8%. This was an 
extremely controversial move, due partly to public concern about the impact on poorer members 
of society. When the Labour government was elected in 1997, they reduced VAT on domestic 
fuels to 5%. Because of a desire not to exacerbate fuel poverty the present UK government has 
made a repeated commitment not to further tax the household use of energy (HM Treasury 
2002).
Transport taxes, both on fuels and vehicles, are used extensively by UK governments. In 
September 2004, 73% of the price of petrol was taken as tax (AA 2004). The most celebrated 
transport tax in the UK was the ‘fuel duty escalator’ or fuel tax, which was introduced in 1993 
to rise annually at above the rate of inflation. It was removed from government policy in 1999, 
and the following year much of the country was brought to a halt for several day due to ‘fuel tax 
protests’ which were inspired by claims that UK fuel taxes were higher than those in other EU 
countries. In the aftermath of the protests, the Chancellor pledged in his following budget to cut 
fuel duty by four pence per litre. However, during autumn 2003 the government once again
192
raised tax on fuel, to little apparent public alarm. Given the seemingly inconsistent response of 
public opinion to fuel taxation levels, it is difficult to draw a clear lesson on the acceptability of 
fuel taxation.
There have been several attempts to introduce a carbon / energy tax at an EU level (Haigh 
1996). This has been opposed, due to worries about the regressive nature of the tax and its 
potentially damaging effect on international competitiveness. In addition, many member states 
believed they should be free to control their own tax levels. It currently seems unlikely that 
there will be a co-ordinated EU-wide tax which affects domestic and transport energy use
There is no significant taxation of aircraft fuels anywhere in the world (SDC 2004a). This is 
something which many believe should be remedied as a matter of urgency (e.g. SDC 2004a, 
Bishop & Grayling 2003). As RCEP state: “It is not acceptable that the aviation industry 
should continue to receive what is in effect a large subsidy at the expense o f other modes o f  
transport or sectors and the environment. ” (2002: 32)
6.8.4 What level would taxes be set at?
There does not appear to be a study on carbon taxation which looks at what level of taxation 
would be required to reduce carbon emissions by 60% by 2050. This is not perhaps surprising 
as the methodology usually used for calculating the effects of future taxes, using elasticities of 
demand, is not designed for taxes which would be much greater than those in previous 
experiences and which will be employed for decades into the future.
Price elasticity of demand describes how demand for energy changes with price. If an 8% 
increase in price reduced demand by 2%, the resultant elasticity would be -0.25. In addition to 
this there is income elasticity of demand, a measure of how demand for energy changes as 
income changes. Finally, another important factor is how demand for different fuels will vary 
with their relative prices (known as cross-elasticity). So a forecast of energy demand in the year 
2020 must take into account all of these factors:
“it will need a price-elasticity-of-demand-in-2020-assuming-that-all-other-energy-prices-are- 
unchanged, and so on. ” (Ramage 1997: 339)
Barker, Ekins, & Johnstone (1995) concluded that measurements of price elasticity are beset 
with theoretical problems and that different measurement techniques result in different numbers. 
Also, the future under climate change will be so different from the past that even if current 
measurements of elasticity were meaningful and reliable (which they may not be) then they may 
offer no guide to a future where many things may be very different. If the authors are correct,
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then it is simply not possible to state (now) what taxation levels will need to be in order to 
reduce emissions sufficiently.
However, others take a different view. RCEP (2000) report work undertaken for the DTI’s 
Energy Advisory Panel, which estimated that the carbon tax required to bring about a 20% 
reduction in emissions by 2010 would cause a 72% increase in domestic gas prices and a 23% 
increase in domestic electricity prices (compared to a 1990 base year). RCEP suggest this level 
of price rise would be unacceptable and stress that carbon taxation should only be introduced as 
part of a wider package of measures.
6.8.5 Comparison of carbon taxation with carbon rations
Table 6.9 summarises comparative characteristics of carbon taxation and carbon rations. The 
statements in this table are elaborated below.
Table 6.9: Summary of comparison between carbon rations and carbon taxation
Characteristics Carbon rations Carbon taxation
Basis for introduction Equal rations for all. Emissions determined by ability 
to afford energy cost + tax.
Distributive effects (i.e. 
effects on different income 
groups)
Progressive Progressive for road and air 
transport. Regressive for 
household energy.
Administrative system New system would have to be 
introduced.
Already in place.
Effectiveness Guaranteed to deliver 
savings.
Savings will depend on the 
economy, taxation rates will 
have to continually adjusted to 
deliver savings.
Economic efficiency Both policies are economically efficient.
Political acceptability Both face severe challenges to acceptance. Carbon rationing may 
be more acceptable as a long term solution.
Carbon taxation operates on a different basis from carbon rationing. It allows those with higher 
incomes to pollute more as of right, rather than sharing a scarce resource equally. However, it 
could be designed to penalise high consumption levels. Nevertheless, because of the nature of 
taxation, it is unlikely to engender the same ‘all in it together’ social cohesion towards the goal 
of lower carbon emissions as could rationing based on equal carbon shares.
The poor spend a higher proportion of their income on household energy than the rich (see data 
in Appendix 10). Thus, carbon taxation is regressive, i.e. those on a lower income would be left 
proportionally worse off by its introduction than those on higher incomes. Supporters of carbon 
taxation in the domestic sector argue that the poor can be compensated for its effects, either 
through the benefits and taxation system or by introducing progressive tariffs such that basic 
energy needs can be afforded by everyone, with luxury levels of consumption being more
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expensive (SDC 2004b). However, as argued earlier, it may be very difficult if not impossible to 
make an acceptable distinction between ‘needs’ and ‘luxury’. In addition, Ekins & Dresner 
(2004) concluded that it is not possible to adequately compensate the fuel poor for the effects of 
domestic energy carbon taxation. The question of whether lower income groups really could be 
compensated for the effects of carbon taxation is far from settled.
The effectiveness of carbon taxation varies according to the trade cycle — a tax rate that 
achieves its objective in a period of strong economic growth will be much too harsh when that 
same economy is in recession (Meyer 2000). This means there would need to be continual 
amendments to carbon taxation to ensure the necessary carbon savings were achieved. By 
contrast, rationing has the advantage of certainty of result: it is clear exactly what carbon 
savings will be made.
One of the benefits of increased carbon taxation is that the administrative system needed to 
ensure this occurs is already in place, whereas a new system would be needed to introduced 
carbon rations (as discussed in Chapter 5).
Carbon taxation is considered to be an economically efficient way of making carbon savings. A 
recent report suggests this may also be the case for carbon rationing: “In principle, tradable 
permits achieve the same result as environmental taxes....In practice, there are several 
considerations that may favour one option over the other. ’’(The Royal Society 2002:11) The 
report focuses on firms rather than individual householders and the effect o f introducing 
tradable permits (like rations or DTQs) for householders, rather than carbon taxes, is not 
discussed. However, the conclusion is that in theory there are no economic grounds for 
favouring taxes compared with rations.
There are good reasons to believe that the massive carbon taxation necessary to reduce 
emissions by 60% or more would be less politically or socially acceptable than the incremental 
introduction of a system of personal carbon rationing. Chapter 5 presented arguments 
suggesting that without equal rights to carbon emissions, there is little prospect of a global 
agreement on emissions reduction. These arguments can be equally made on a national level, 
where the prospects of introducing a carbon reduction scheme on other than an equitable basis 
may be equally poor. In addition, recent history suggests that it is likely there would be great 
resistance to any form of taxation on household energy use or on petrol and diesel
In conclusion, although carbon taxation may have some short-term benefits, such as policy 
familiarity and ease of administrative introduction, carbon rationing is more likely to introduce
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a carbon cap that has clarity, certainty of result, equity for individuals and likelihood of 
implementation.
6.9 Summary and conclusions
This chapter began with a discussion in principle of whether giving people equal carbon 
emissions could really be described as equitable. This is because equity is one of the key 
claimed benefits of carbon rations, along with certainty of savings. The conclusion is that while 
it will not be perfectly fair, it is the fairest possible system. Attempts to design an alternative 
allocation system based on differentiating ‘needs’ and ‘wants’ would end in failure.
Original case study data on personal carbon emissions have been presented. Very powerful 
insights have emerged from this sample of thirty two people. The most striking finding is the 
range of carbon emissions encountered, with the highest carbon emissions being twelve times 
the lowest. Compared with the average UK carbon emissions for personal travel and household 
energy use, the lowest emissions in the survey were 37% of the average, with the highest being 
4.6 times the average. Highly unequal individual contributions to climate change are being 
made at present in terms of direct energy use. Another surprising insight is the extent to which 
patterns of carbon emissions differ, with the ratios of household: land travel: air travel emissions 
varying widely.
This variation shows that the trading aspect of carbon rations will be very important to many 
people, who may not want to change their lifestyles drastically, and who need to buy spare 
rations. The problem of trading and vast differences between individual requirements did not 
arise under food rationing (Chapter 5). In addition, many different adaptation strategies will be 
necessary depending on individual circumstances. One size will not fit all.
As well as differences between individuals, the systematic differences between various groups 
have been explored. Expenditure data has been used to show that individual carbon emissions 
for household energy use and personal private transport increase with income decile. Analysis 
has shown that people in one-person household use considerably more household energy per 
person than those in multi-person households. Others likely to have higher than average 
emissions are: households headed by an under-30 year old; users of solid fuel and oil heating; 
those living in large, detached or inefficient houses; frequent flyers and high mileage car users; 
and those who prefer very warm rooms to warm clothing. Use of the model developed in 
Chapter 4 shows that the energy consumption differences between old and new homes is likely 
to persist through time, even if considerable technical improvements are made to existing old 
houses.
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A number of problems with carbon rationing, some of which were identified at public meetings, 
have been discussed. Each of these objections to rations is discussed in turn. Although each 
highlights potential practical or theoretical objections to introducing carbon rations, in the 
author’s view none is powerful enough to merit fundamentally re-considering the proposition 
that carbon rationing would be a good policy solution to delivering 60% or greater carbon 
savings by 2050.
Finally, carbon rationing is compared with one of the major alternatives -  carbon taxation. 
Research does not indicate how high carbon taxation would have to be to achieve 60% savings 
by 2050, indeed it may be impossible to do so given the methodology available. Carbon taxation 
is a much more familiar policy than carbon rations and would have some administrative 
advantages. However, this chapter has argued that carbon taxation would provide neither the 
same advantage of certainty of result nor the same moral justification as a system of carbon 
rationing. Introducing carbon rations is unlikely to be easy, universally popular or without 
problems. However, this applies equally to the alternative of carbon taxation on the scale likely 
to be required to make significant savings. It is hard to imagine carbon rations being introduced 
given today’s political and social priorities. However significant carbon savings are not going to 
be made if the world continues in a ‘business as usual’ mode. If we are serious about preventing 
serious climate change, there is no choice but to challenge the status quo in a fundamental way.
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Chapter 7 -  Discussion and conclusions
7.1 Chapter overview
The central aim of this thesis has been to identify a plausible route to achieving 60% carbon 
savings in the UK domestic sector by 2050, and in particular to investigate whether strategies 
relying on either energy efficiency or personal carbon rations are likely to be successful. In 
undertaking the research, many different types of evidence and analysis have been employed, 
from detailed investigation of energy savings from solar water heaters, to a critique of 
government energy policy.
This chapter pulls together the key evidence from each of the preceding chapters which supports 
the conclusions reached. Linkages between different parts of the research and findings from 
different chapters are emphasised. Chapter 1 provided background information, demonstrating 
why the thesis question is important. Chapter 2 presented information and analysis regarding 
energy consumption and carbon emissions in the UK, particularly in the domestic sector. 
Chapter 3 and 4 were primarily concerned with answering the question of whether energy 
efficiency had in the past, or was likely in the future, to deliver significant energy savings. The 
answer was that it was not. Following this, Chapter 5 focussed on making the case for carbon 
rationing as an effective policy mechanism for making 60% savings. Chapter 6 investigated its 
weaknesses as well as strengths. Overall, this analysis leads to the conclusion that personal 
carbon rations offer a more convincing route to sufficient carbon savings than reliance primarily 
on energy efficiency improvements.
Following the summary of research findings, there is reflection on the methodologies used to 
undertake the research. Areas for further research and unanswered questions are identified, and 
suggestions for changes to government data gathering and policies are made. Finally, the 
original contribution to knowledge made by this thesis is clearly outlined.
7.2 Key research findings
Figure 7.1 is a reminder of the three key themes of the thesis: understanding the true challenge 
of 60% savings; investigating whether a strategy of largely relying on energy efficiency is likely 
to be effective; and developing and critically evaluating the idea of personal carbon rations. Key 
research findings are here presented under these three headings.
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Figure 7.1: Overview of thesis structure
Context:
Identifying the true challenge of 
achieving 60% savings.
Chapter 1: Climate change and the global context 
Chapter 2: The UK’s contribution to climate 
change and the role of the domestic sector. 
Identifying emissions not currently counted.
Question I:
Is a strategy of relying largely on 
improvements in energy 
efficiency likely to achieve the 
required savings?
Chapter 2: The effects of efficiency policy on 
energy consumption since 1970.
Chapter 3: Modelling savings from efficiency: past
experience, current practice and pitfalls
Chapter 4: Identifying the potential of social change
to outstrip technological means to deliver efficiency
savings.
s / >
Question 2:
Could personal carbon rations 
offer an alternative route to 
savings?
Chapter 5: Introducing carbon rations, explaining 
the principles and practical details.
Chapter 6: Critically evaluating carbon rations, 
investigating their effects on individuals and 
different social groups, comparing with taxation.
Chapter 7: Discussion and conclusions
7.2.1 The true challenge of achieving 60% savings by 2050
Chapter 1 concluded that despite a global response to climate change, in the UNFCC and Kyoto 
treaty, there have been few actions by any governments which truly recognise the scale of action 
required to prevent “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”.
Chapter 2 focussed on the UK’s record on carbon dioxide emission reductions. This has been 
challenged, and found to be less good than it at first appears. In spite of rising energy demand, 
emissions have fallen considerably since 1970 and the UK is likely to be one of the very few 
nations to meet its Kyoto reduction targets. However, firstly, most of the carbon savings are a 
result of changes towards lower carbon fuels, which cannot be repeated in future. Hence the UK 
is not as firmly on the path towards a low carbon economy as this statistic suggests. Secondly, 
when the carbon equivalent effect of international airline emissions are taken into account, UK 
emissions have not fallen since 1990. Including international air travel adds 19% to UK carbon 
emissions for 2002. Thirdly, preliminary evidence suggests that the UK has exported (net)
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energy-intensive activities to other countries, meaning that the indirect energy use of imports 
exceeds that of exports. Together these factors indicate that the UK will have to work harder to 
achieve future emissions because fortuitous reductions will not happen on the same scale again. 
It also shows that achieving a 60% reduction on the UK’s ‘real’ carbon emissions (i.e. including 
the carbon equivalent emissions of all air travel) will be more challenging than the current 
understanding which excludes the fastest growing source of emissions.
In conclusion, the challenge in reducing the UK’s carbon dioxide emissions is much greater 
than generally thought.
7.2.2 Can energy efficiency deliver 60% savings?
The government’s current strategy for making carbon savings in the domestic sector up to 2020 
relies primarily on energy efficiency, with a minor contribution from renewable energy and 
CHP (DTI 2003b). In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, evidence for the effectiveness of energy efficiency in 
delivering energy savings in the domestic sector has been reviewed. The arguments in favour of 
relying primarily on energy efficiency together with the counter-arguments presented in this 
thesis are summarised in Table 7.1.
Table 7.1: Arguments for and against the proposition that 60% carbon savings can be
achieved by 2050 largely through improvements in energy efficiency
Arguments for believing that energy 
efficiency can achieve 60% savings by 
2050
Counter-arguments and evidence presented in 
this thesis
Past policies have achieved energy 
savings, compared with what would 
have happened in the absence of 
efficiency measures.
Considerable improvements in energy efficiency in 
the domestic sector over the past thirty years have 
not led to actual energy savings. Despite a 30% 
decrease in heat losses from buildings, and a 43% 
improvement in space heating efficiency, average 
energy use per household has not decreased over the 
past thirty years, due to a contemporaneous increase 
in demand for energy services. Because of 
increasing household numbers, total energy use in 
the domestic sector rose by 32% between 1970 and 
2001. (Chapter 2)
Considerable savings from efficiency 
are still available. UK modelling studies 
summarised in Chapter 3 show a range 
of potential energy savings from the 
domestic sector between 1995/2000 and 
2020 of between 13% and 25%. Two 
studies (Johnston 2003a, ICCEPT 2002) 
show 60% carbon savings being 
achievable by 2050.
Studies like this have also been produced in earlier 
decades, but the savings have not materialised. These 
studies assumed widespread adoption of existing 
energy efficient technologies, the development of 
new technologies, and limited growth in demand for 
energy services. These expectations have not been 
met -  and current modelling and scenario exercises 
are likely to be just as vulnerable to these type of 
assumptions not being met in reality as those in the 
past. (Chapter 3)
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Monitoring evidence shows real life savings from 
specific policies and measures are often lower than 
those projected by models. (Chapter 3)
Johnston’s Business As Usual (DJ-BAU) projection 
underestimates future energy demand, and thus 
overestimates the ease of using technical 
improvements to achieve a 60% reduction in carbon 
emissions. While Johnston’s projection for energy 
use 1997-2003 was constant, in actual fact energy 
use has risen. (Chapter 4)
Modelling of potential energy savings has several 
weaknesses which leads to an over-estimation of 
potential savings. (Chapters 3 + 4 )
Even with very vigorous technological 
improvements, plausible increases in energy use due 
to increasing demand could far outweigh reductions 
due to efficiency. The High Energy scenario (TF- 
HighE) shows 58% greater energy use in 2050 than 
in DJ-BAU. If this is combined with the 
technological savings in DJ-DS, a maximum of 17% 
energy savings would be achievable by 2050. 
(Chapter 4)
New technologies offer new savings 
opportunities, e.g. micro-CHP.
The key energy saving technologies have not 
changed in thirty years. (Chapter 3)
New technologies, e.g. mains pressure hot water, 
digital entertainment equipment, which could 
facilitate increases in energy usage have however 
grown and are identified. (Chapter 4)
Non-technical issues could prevent energy saving 
technologies being adopted, for example the 
problems of creating a market and aesthetic concerns 
could prevent widespread uptake of solid wall 
insulation. (Chapter 4)
With very robust policy and actions, 
past experience can be transcended and 
efficiency can lead to savings.
Scenario analysis argues that only with a society- 
wide change towards sustainability will major carbon 
and energy savings be achieved. (Chapter 3)
The new government policies planned to make 
savings to 2010 (DEFRA 2004b) offer little different 
from previous policies which have improved 
efficiency, but not saved energy. Current energy 
policy in the domestic sector barely engages with 
questions of consumption, despite the fact that 
increased demand for energy services has been a key 
force in moving energy consumption upwards. 
(Chapters 2 + 4)
The conclusion is that, while efficiency can deliver savings in theory, these are only likely to be 
realised if there is a cap on increasing energy demand. Without this, this thesis has argued that
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improvements in energy efficiency are very unlikely to result in significant energy savings. 
Therefore, relying on energy efficiency to deliver unprecedented sector-wide savings in energy 
is too risky given the serious nature of climate change, and an alternative strategy is required.
7.2.3 Investigation and critical analysis of personal carbon rations
Chapter 5 introduced the idea of carbon rationing as a mechanism to achieve a cap on carbon 
emissions, and situated it within the existing literature. Calculations have shown that personal 
carbon equivalent emissions, from household energy use and all forms of transport (including 
by air), account for 51% of UK national emissions.
The key advantages of carbon rationing are:
• It offers an overall framework for carbon savings, which can incorporate and encourage 
savings from energy efficiency, renewable energy, social change and lifestyle 
alterations.
• It would be equitable, based on egalitarian interpretation of equity, giving individual 
carbon allowances.
• It fits with the international scheme, contraction and convergence.
The practicalities of introducing carbon rationing have also been discussed in some detail:
• The experience of food rationing during the second world war shows it is possible to 
introduce a successful UK-wide rationing system.
• The global agreement to protect the ozone layer, offers a positive example of a global 
environmental treaty which has some of the features a future climate agreement will 
need.
• Introduction of carbon rations would need to be supported by considerable government 
information and education campaigns. Many methods of providing information about 
personal carbon rations have been identified, these include carbon labels for appliances, 
carbon receipts for petrol, intelligent energy meters.
• There would also be many opportunities for businesses and other organisations to help 
consumers live within their ration, including ideas such as ‘CarbonWatchers’.
• Administratively, carbon rationing should pose no great problems, as electronic 
transactions are standard for most people, and the number of businesses selling fossil 
fuel energy sources direct to the public is relatively low. However, that is not to say 
there are no challenges, for example, several million people currently do not have bank 
accounts and may be unfamiliar with electronic transactions.
A strong case has been made for carbon rationing as a practical policy, and the beginnings of 
support for and research into carbon rationing and similar schemes has been reported.
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Chapter 6 took a more critical look at carbon rationing as an idea, and presented original 
analysis and data to illuminate further what the introduction of carbon rationing might mean in 
practice. Key findings from the original and secondary data were:
• Equal carbon rations would not lead to equal energy consumption or equal energy
services for individuals because of differences in energy types, efficiency of use and 
lifestyle choices. For example, equal carbon allowances for heating could result in a 
difference of six and half degrees in the internal temperature achieved in the same
house, depending on fuel used and efficiency of the heating system.
• Case study data has shown that currently there is a highly unequal distribution of 
personal carbon emissions between people in the UK, with a factor of twelve difference 
between the thirty-two people in the sample.
• The case studies also demonstrate the varying composition of carbon emissions -  with 
very different balances between household energy fuels, personal transport and 
international air travel. This will make adaptation to carbon rationing very different 
between individuals.
• Analysis of individual carbon emissions by household income decile has shown that 
personal carbon emissions rise with income, when land travel, air travel and household 
energy use emissions are all included.
A number of problems with carbon rationing were identified, but none was persuasive enough 
to merit rejecting carbon rationing as a solution. Finally, carbon taxation was considered as an 
alternative to carbon rationing. Carbon taxation would have the advantage of familiarity and 
ease of implementation. However, the disadvantages include the fact that carbon taxation would 
be regressive (would affect those on lower incomes more than those on higher incomes), would 
have to be constantly adjusted to achieve the necessary carbon savings and would not have the 
same moral basis as carbon rationing.
In conclusion, a case has been made for personal carbon rations as a means of achieving 60% 
savings by 2050, which warrants more detailed investigation (as suggested in Section 7.5).
7.3 Reflection on methodology
A variety of methods have been used to address the research questions in this thesis. The 
success, limitations and contributions of different methodologies are addressed below.
Original analysis of secondary data was a key part of the research in this thesis. Existing 
national data was required to get new insights into energy use and carbon emissions. Results 
included identifying the contribution of international air travel to the UK’s carbon and carbon
203
equivalent emissions, calculating the percentage of UK carbon equivalent emissions that are 
generated from personal energy use and travel and estimating the carbon emissions from 
different income deciles of the population. Making use of existing national statistics has also led 
to suggestions for additional data which should be collected or compiled by the government 
(Section 7.5).
Past projections of the future have been compared with what has actually happened for both 
bottom-up and top-down modelling. The useful insights from this analysis make the case for 
more historical awareness and reflection on past experience in energy research, as a means of 
enriching understanding.
In Chapter 3, the inherent problems of using a model to look forward almost fifty years were 
identified. Nevertheless, an existing bottom-up model was replicated in Chapter 4, in order to 
highlight how vulnerable even well-researched technological improvement scenarios could be to 
plausible increases in demand for energy services. It also helped identify what savings could be 
achieved by reducing demand for energy services or society-wide changes such as increasing 
the rate of demolition. Modelling was useful in order to challenge projections for energy savings 
through efficiency on their own terms.
There is a lack of interaction between different types of futures modelling. As Chapter 3 
demonstrated, scenario exercises suggest that decreased emissions will only happen in futures 
which give increased priority to sustainability. However this result is ignored by bottom-up 
modelling which assumes technology change can be implemented and make emissions savings 
whatever the societal and economic environment. Having made this criticism, the modelling in 
this thesis has only addressed it to a limited extent. This is because the model was primarily 
used to show grounds for disputing the results of bottom-up modelling on its own terms, rather 
than trying to create a better type of modelling.
Original empirical data have also been used in this thesis, and they have proved to be valuable, 
despite its limited scope. The collection of a small number of carbon audits, although just a pilot 
study, proved to be very illuminating. In retrospect, more effort might have been spent on this 
aspect of the work, by trying to collect data over time, or focusing on particular groups. In 
addition, the feedback received from public presentation of carbon rationing was helpful in 
identifying concerns about carbon rationing. This was particularly the case in the virtual absence 
of a literature on carbon rationing and related ideas. Although this feedback was not as 
systematic as an academic review of carbon rationing might be, it brought to light a very wide 
range of comments and concerns.
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equivalent emissions, calculating the percentage of UK carbon equivalent emissions that are 
generated from personal energy use and travel and estimating the carbon emissions from 
different income deciles of the population. Making use of existing national statistics has also led 
to suggestions for additional data which should be collected or compiled by the government 
(Section 7.5).
Past projections of the future have been compared with what has actually happened for both 
bottom-up and top-down modelling. The useful insights from this analysis make the case for 
more historical awareness and reflection on past experience in energy research, as a means of 
enriching understanding.
In Chapter 3, the inherent problems of using a model to look forward almost fifty years were 
identified. Nevertheless, an existing bottom-up model was replicated in Chapter 4, in order to 
highlight how vulnerable even well-researched technological improvement scenarios could be to 
plausible increases in demand for energy services. It also helped identify what savings could be 
achieved by reducing demand for energy services or society-wide changes such as increasing 
the rate of demolition. Modelling was useful in order to challenge projections for energy savings 
through efficiency on their own terms.
There is a lack of interaction between different types of futures modelling. As Chapter 3 
demonstrated, scenario exercises suggest that decreased emissions will only happen in futures 
which give increased priority to sustainability. However this result is ignored by bottom-up 
modelling which assumes technology change can be implemented and make emissions savings 
whatever the societal and economic environment. Having made this criticism, the modelling in 
this thesis has only addressed it to a limited extent. This is because the model was primarily 
used to show grounds for disputing the results of bottom-up modelling on its own terms, rather 
than trying to create a better type of modelling.
Original empirical data have also been used in this thesis, and they have proved to be valuable, 
despite its limited scope. The collection of a small number of carbon audits, although just a pilot 
study, proved to be very illuminating. In retrospect, more effort might have been spent on this 
aspect of the work, by trying to collect data over time, or focusing on particular groups. In 
addition, the feedback received from public presentation of carbon rationing was helpful in 
identifying concerns about carbon rationing. This was particularly the case in the virtual absence 
of a literature on carbon rationing and related ideas. Although this feedback was not as 
systematic as an academic review of carbon rationing might be, it brought to light a very wide 
range of comments and concerns.
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7.4 Limitations of this research
One of the key limitations of this research is that the thesis subject is multi-disciplinary, but 
most of the author’s analysis has been technical and policy-oriented. This thesis contains little 
qualitative data or social science-based analysis, or economic analysis which would have added 
to the arguments around carbon rationing, and especially the comparison with carbon taxation. 
Energy policy is by its nature a multi-disciplinary area of enquiry and ideally such problems are 
best tackled by multidisciplinary teams, which is not possible within a PhD where individual 
research is required.
Although the thesis question concerns only energy use in the household sector, the research has 
exceeded these boundaries. Firstly, to understand the full picture of carbon emissions in the UK, 
international air emissions had to be investigated and incorporated into the total. Secondly, to 
research carbon rations it was necessary also to include personal transport emissions. The 
disadvantage of widening boundaries is the risk that the research goes beyond the author’s area 
of expertise. Every effort has been made to undertake high quality research in these areas, and 
the author benefited from working with a transport expert, Mayer Hillman on parallel research, 
as explained in Chapter 1. Nevertheless, widening boundaries poses risks as well as offering 
benefits.
Other specific limitations are:
• The Tina Fawcett (TF) model used in Chapter 4 suffers from several limitations, which 
include modelling just two standard house types, an inability to include new uses of 
energy, and incomplete understanding of the linkage between efficiency and behaviour.
• Carbon emissions data gathered from the thirty-two individuals did not include the 
actual emissions from their car travel (national averages were used) so underestimated 
the true extent of variation between individuals.
• Most of the analysis of carbon emissions by different groups relied on proxy data.
• Analysis of the effects of carbon rations on individuals by income decile did not 
acknowledge the wide variations in energy use between individuals in the same decile.
7.5 Recommendations for further research
The recommendations for further research are outlined under several separate headings below.
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7.5.1 Technical and modelling research
In Chapter 4 a number o f questions were identified as being difficult to answer due to a lack of 
technical data. The following technical and modelling issues would benefit from further 
research:
• Monitoring energy savings from solar water heating in ‘real life’ situations and 
agreement on the format for reporting savings from such systems
• Better monitored data on hot water usage and investigation of the possible effects of the 
new combi and mains pressure hot water systems on patterns of demand
• More monitoring of internal temperatures in housing
• Research on the potential for and problems with solid wall insulation -  including non­
technical concerns around markets and aesthetics
• Adjusting UK degree day data to take account of climate change
• Creation of population density-weighted heating season figures for expected 
temperature changes under UK future climate scenarios.
7.5.2 Gathering further data on individual carbon emissions
Chapter 6 presented pilot data on individual carbon emissions. However, a much better 
understanding of the variations in carbon emissions between individuals and households would 
be essential before carbon rationing could be introduced.
Collection of additional data would need to be done in two stages:
1. Developing the methodology for determining carbon rations
This thesis used a deliberately simplified methodology with which to estimate individual carbon 
emissions. However, to get more precise information on individual carbon emissions it would 
be necessary to develop the methodology further.
2. Large-scale survey of current individual carbon emissions
The data from a nationally-representative survey would be used to advance the understanding of 
carbon emissions from different groups within society. This could be based on one of the 
existing household energy or travel surveys.
Some of the topics which could be investigated with such data include: identifying groups who 
would be disadvantaged under carbon rationing, e.g. one-person households; discovering 
whether people’s emissions can be fitted into a number of characteristic patterns, for which 
different advice on carbon reduction possibilities would be required; understanding children’s 
carbon emissions patterns. Appendix 12 discusses a future research agenda for carbon rationing 
in further detail.
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7.5.3 Social science research
Social science-based analysis would be very important in investigating the potential role of 
carbon rations. Two examples of research which could be undertaken are given below:
• Experience during this research has been that many people, even those who would 
claim to be environmentally concerned, seem reluctant to calculate their own carbon 
emissions (Chapter 6). Face-to-face interview and focus groups could be used to try and 
characterise further and gain insight into the roots of this reluctance.
• To try to understand how people might adapt to carbon rationing, they could be 
introduced to the idea and asked to imagine how they would respond to future rations. 
This might reveal which aspects of people’s energy use are least negotiable, and what
actions they would take first in order to reduce their carbon emissions -  and how these
decisions would vary between individuals. The outcomes would be limited by people’s 
ability to predict their own behaviour in the unfamiliar scenario of energy rationing. 
However the results would provide an insight into the social challenges associated with 
carbon rationing.
7.5.4 Economic questions
Economic questions which require further investigation include:
• What would happen to the price of fuel under conditions of carbon rationing but no
shortage of supply?
• Is it possible to create an estimate of how much carbon taxation would have to rise to 
achieve 60% reductions in emissions by 2050?
• How should the trading aspect of carbon rations be introduced, and what would be the 
fairest and most effective way of running the trading element of the scheme?
• Identifying the sort of businesses and activities that would thrive under a low carbon 
regime.
7.6 Recommendations for policy makers
Recommendations are made for changes to national policy, international policy and the 
availability and presentation of government data.
7.6.1 National policy
The key policy recommendation from this research is that the UK government should seriously 
explore carbon rationing for personal energy use. Initially, more research on carbon rationing is 
required to understand in more detail how the policy could work and how it would affect 
people.
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In order to prepare for a lower carbon future, the government should introduce education and 
information measures to help the public understand the carbon consequences of their choices. 
Chapter 5 identified many possible measures, including altering the information which appears 
on energy labels on lights and appliances at the point of sale, including carbon information on 
energy bills, and public education campaigns. Whether or not the government eventually 
introduces carbon rations, these education and information measures will be an essential part of 
achieving 60% savings by 2050.
Possible tensions and contradictions in the goals of the government’s energy policy have been 
identified (Chapter 2). The key question is whether economic growth is consistent with reducing 
carbon emissions. There needs to be a policy review to identify the many conflicts between 
different parts of the government’s policy, building on the work the Sustainable Development 
Commission (SDC 2003) has already undertaken on sustainable economic growth and 
alternative measurements of well-being.
7.6.2 International policy
The UK needs a negotiating strategy for achieving a global carbon reduction framework beyond 
Kyoto. Without this its 60% target for 2050 will lose its meaning as a contribution to preventing 
maximum atmospheric concentrations of CO2 exceeding 550ppm. This thesis suggests that 
contraction and convergence is the only framework which is likely to be successful and that the 
UK government should adopt it unilaterally.
Given the recent reports that IPCC may have underestimated the climate changing effects of 
concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere (Chapter 1), the Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution should re-consider whether 550ppm is a sufficiently risk-averse upper 
limit on atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide. This would lead also to consideration of 
whether a 60% reduction by 2050 would be sufficient to avoid ‘dangerous climate change’ (the 
stated aim of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (United Nations 1992)).
Finally, the government should try to advance international agreement on the apportioning of 
carbon and carbon equivalent emissions from international air transport, so that this can be 
included in the successor to the Kyoto agreement.
7.6.3 Improvements to government data
Analysis in this thesis has relied heavily on government data. In the course of this research, gaps 
in data provision and potentially confusing data have been identified, and this section makes 
recommendations for improving the provision of government data.
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The following data were either missing or difficult to extract from existing publications:
• Carbon dioxide emissions by sector (up to date) — the most recent data are for 2001
• Carbon dioxide intensity of electricity (up to date) -  the most recent data are for 1999. The 
carbon intensity of electricity is not published with the main energy statistical series, the 
Digest of UK Energy Statistics, but instead can be found for 1990-1999 in a one-off 
document (DEFRA 2001a).
• Aircraft emissions — both national and international have been difficult to find.
• UK total carbon dioxide emissions including international air transport, both as carbon and 
carbon equivalent emissions.
Recommendations
• All the data identified above should be included clearly in annual government publications.
• As the fastest growing source o f carbon dioxide, international air travel emissions should be 
included in UK environmental indicators as a matter of urgency, without waiting for an 
international agreement on accounting for international air movements.
• Publishing airline emissions without acknowledging the greater degree of radiative forcing 
due to aircraft emissions verges on the misleading. Data should be published both in terms 
of tC and tCe (based on the best current scientific understanding of the radiative forcing 
effect of emissions in the upper atmosphere).
Finally, carbon dioxide data for the UK are available based on three different methodologies -  
IPCC, UNECE and that used for the National and Environmental Accounts. A degree of 
complexity is no doubt inevitable given different international reporting requirements. However 
given the importance of carbon dioxide and greenhouse gas emissions, the government has a 
duty to make the figures as transparent and accessible as possible. More could be done to 
compare and contrast the results from the different methodologies and to make clear which data 
set should be used for different purposes. If IPCC is the ‘main’ methodology, government 
studies which report based on other bases (e.g. Francis, 2004) should explain how their results 
would differ if IPCC methodology had been used.
7.7 Original contribution to knowledge
This thesis has made a number of original contributions to knowledge:
• UK carbon equivalent emissions have been calculated when international aircraft
energy use is included. This gives a new insight into the reality of UK carbon emissions 
and highlights the importance of international air travel.
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• The proportion of carbon and carbon equivalent emissions for which individuals are 
directly responsible has been identified.
• A bottom-up energy use model, developed by Johnston, has been replicated and minor 
flaws have been corrected. The model has been used to investigate the vulnerability of 
savings from technological improvements to plausible increases in demand for energy 
services.
• A wide variety of data has been used to demonstrate that it is very unlikely that a 
strategy based primarily on energy efficiency will result in significant savings from the 
domestic sector.
• The idea of carbon rationing has been developed in considerable detail. Practical 
aspects of the policy have been discussed, as have possible routes to easing the 
introduction of carbon rationing.
• Objections to carbon rationing have been collated and addressed.
• Original case study data on the personal carbon emissions of individuals have been 
presented. The data demonstrate the wide range of individual carbon emissions, even 
within the small pilot study group, and the striking degree to which the activities which 
lead to emissions can vary between people.
• There has been an initial analysis of the effect of carbon rationing on different groups 
within society, particularly different income groups.
• Recommendations have been made for further research and changes to the way 
government data on carbon and carbon equivalent emissions are presented.
The results of the research have been disseminated via conference and journal papers (Fawcett 
2002, Fawcett 2003, Fawcett 2004) and in the book co-authored with Hillman (Hillman & 
Fawcett 2004). In addition, parts of the work have been presented at public meetings (as listed 
in Appendix 11) and at various university seminars and teaching sessions. Evidence based on 
this research and the work with Hillman has also been submitted to two UK and one EU enquiry 
into related topics (e.g. Fawcett & Hillman 2004).
7.8 Were the objectives of my thesis achieved?
This thesis aimed to identify a means for achieving 60% savings in the domestic sector by 2050. 
Initially, the generally accepted solution of energy efficiency was investigated and was found to 
be at high risk of not delivering savings. Thus carbon rationing has been proposed as an 
alternative strategy. This could in principle achieve 60% savings (or any other level that the 
ration was set to achieve). To build the case for carbon rationing, it has been important to go 
beyond setting out principles and to show how it might work in practice. Suggestions have been
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made about how present policy could be transformed to work under carbon rationing. In 
summary the true challenge of meeting a 60% target has been identified, the conventional 
solution of energy efficiency has been disputed, and a good initial case has been made for 
carbon rationing and its likely effectiveness. Therefore the objective of the thesis has been 
achieved.
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Appendix 1: Comparisons of future-oriented house 
designs
This appendix compares two ‘self-sufficient’ houses — designed and built about 20 years apart. 
The reason for the comparison is to see how architects and designers with approximately the 
same objectives resolved the problem of making a house largely self-sufficient, or autonomous. 
The self-sufficiency was primarily focussed on energy, although both houses also addressed 
other resource issues. Both projects aimed to demonstrate methods of more sustainable future 
construction. This is explicitly acknowledged in the name of the first: ‘a house for the future’. 
The book documenting the second house, ‘the new autonomous house’, states: “Robert and 
Brenda Vale provide a thought-provoking, practical solution to the environmental problems 
caused by the houses in which we live, a blueprint of green architecture for future generations”.
‘A house for the future’ was adapted from an existing building in Macclesfield and occupied in 
1976. It was the focus for a television series (McLaughlin 1977). ‘The new autonomous house’ 
was newly built on a site in a small town, Southwell, Nottinghamshire and occupied in 1994 
(Vale & Vale 2000). Both houses were detached family homes with gardens. The key 
technologies and approaches used in each house are summarised below (Table A 1.1). There are 
both similarities and differences between the houses. The documentation for the 1970s house is 
not as comprehensive as that for the later house, so detailed comparisons are not always 
possible.
Table A l.l:  Comparison of two future-oriented houses built twenty years apart
Technologies and 
approaches used
A house for the future, 1976 The new autonomous house, 
1994
Solar water heating Yes- ‘open’ low-efficiency system, 
where water does not run in pipes 
installed over whole of south-facing 
roof (45m2).
No -  electricity used instead as 
SWH thought ‘too expensive’. 
Hot water demand was reduced 
considerably from UK norm.
Solar PV No -  ‘too expensive’ Yes -  provided 1600 kWh in 
first year, 52% of household 
requirements.
Wind turbine Installed but problematic -  still not 
working well after one year
No
Active solar space 
heating
Using excess hot water from roof 
plus storage -judged not to have 
been very successful
No
Passive solar design Large windows facing south, small 
facing north. Also greenhouse with 
heat store on south side of building.
Adopted only to a limited extent 
due to site constraints. 
Conservatory attached to south­
west wall.
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Back-up heating 
system
Solid fuel boiler Wood burning stove.
Ventilation and heat 
exchange system
Yes -  successful Yes -  operated only when 
required. Mostly operates by 
natural air leakage.
Insulation Yes -  judged the most critical part 
o f improvements.
Yes
Efficient lights and 
appliances
No — but did have a large pantry for 
food storage -  not clear whether 
this replaced some refrigeration.
Efficient lighting, but most 
appliances were already owned 
-  possibly inefficient. Appliance 
ownership restricted.
Embodied energy Not mentioned (would be less of an 
issue as house not built from new.)
Key consideration -  heavy 
materials sourced locally.
Sewerage Not stated. Composting toilet -  which has 
had only minor problems. Other 
‘greywater’ discharged to 
soakaway -  which has been 
more problematic.
Water supply Not stated Rainwater collected from the 
roof, stored and treated for use. 
No other water supply
Vegetable and fruit 
plot
Yes Yes
It is also possible to make some comparisons of the U values (a measure of insulating 
performance, where lower number indicate greater resistance to heat transfer, i.e. better 
insulation) for elements in the two houses (Table A1.2). For comparison, standards in the 
Building Regulations 2002 (elemental method) and possible future standards in 2005 are 
presented.
Table A1.2 House element U values (W/m2K)
Building
element
U value (W/m2K)
A house for the 
future, 1976
New autonomous 
house, 1994
Building
regulations,
2002
Possible
standards,
20051
External wall 0.3 0.14 0.35 0.27
Roof <0.3 0.07 0.16-0.25 0.13
Glazing
(average)
Not stated -  double 
glazing
0.85 Triple 
glazing -  low E
2.0-2.2 1.8
Floor 0.36 Not insulated as
basement
underneath
0.25 0.22
Sources: ODPM 2001, ODPM 2004
1 The 2005 Part L building regulations w ill require achievement o f a target carbon emissions rate per
square metre (TCER). Standards are no longer specified in terms o f  U-values. However i f  these values are 
achieved, the building should meet the TCER.
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The most interesting similarities between the houses are:
• The key role of insulation
• Use of mechanical ventilation and heat recovery systems
• The 1994 new autonomous house did not incorporate any technologies which were not
available in some form in 1976.
The most interesting differences are:
• The different view taken of solar PV and solar water heating. PV has become 
considerably cheaper since the 1970s, although it is still expensive, at around £10,000 
for a system capable of generating 1,500 kWh/ year. Solar water heating is generally 
thought to be the better value option, but by reducing hot water demand the Vales 
judged the economics were not in its favour.
• The improvement in technologies is noticeable -  particularly insulation values 
achievable in walls, windows and doors (Table A1.2).
• Due to climate change concerns, coal would not now be used in a back-up heating 
system for a low energy home.
• The 1994 house employed fewer renewable energy technologies now than were used in 
the 1976 house. Active solar heating and wind turbines are not generally considered 
viable now.
• Due to energy labelling, people can now make choices about the efficiency of their 
appliances and boilers, which was not possible until the 1990s.
The comparison does show that insulation and some renewable energy technologies have 
improved since the 1970s. However, it also clearly illustrates that there have been no new 
‘wonder’ technologies. Indeed, time has proved that some technologies being tried in the 1970s, 
such as active solar heating, are not viable despite the hopes at the time. Perhaps the most 
sobering reflection is the slow progress in bringing the ideas tried out in the 1970s house into 
the mainstream, so that in the 1990s it was still necessary to be building demonstration homes 
with advanced insulation and other long-established energy saving technology.
The comparison of the advanced homes’ U-values with those mandated in 2002 and expected to 
be introduced in 2005, shows that 2002 standards for new houses were similar to those achieved 
in 1976 for a retro-fit project. The standards achieved in the new autonomous house are higher 
by a considerable margin than those in the 2002 regulations and 2005 proposals, showing there 
is room for future improvement of building standards.
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Appendix 2 -  BREDEM based model
These calculations, based on BREDEM and SAP, are used within TF model to calculate energy 
consumption of the housing stock, for each type of housing for each year 1996-2050.
1. Weighted average overall building dimensions
Total floor areas, m2 
Dwelling volume, m3
2. Weighted average ventilation rate
(5)
(6)
Infiltration due to chimneys, fans and flues
Measured L50 + 2 0  + infiltration due to chimneys, fans and flues
Shelter factor
(Assum es that 2 sides of the ‘notional’ dwellings are sheltered)
IF dwelling has mechanical ventilation with heat recovery
Effective air change rate = shelter factor x [(L50+ 20) + infiltration due to chimneys,
fans and flues] + [(1-tvt)x 0.5]
0.85
(10)
(19)
(2 1 )
(22)
Where r|T is the efficiency of heat recovery, taken as 66% throughout and 0.5 is the design air supply
rate. Where heat recovery is absent, r|r is zero and the equation becom es...
effective air change rate = shelter x [(L50+ 20) + infiltration due to chimneys, fans and flues] + 0.5
If dwelling is naturally ventilated
Background ventilation rate = shelter factor x [(L50 + 20) +infiltration due to chimneys, 
fans and flues]
If background ventilation rate >=1, effective ventilation rate = background ventilation rate 
Otherwise ventilation rate = (1+background ventilation rate2) + 2 
Weighted effective air change rate
(23)
(24)
(25)
3. Weighted average heat losses and heat 
loss parameter
ELEMENT Area U-value
(W/m2K)
Doors x
Windows 0.9x x
Ground floor x
Walls x
Roof x
Fabric heat loss Ct = (26) + (27) + (30) + (31) + (33)
* the factor 0.9 takes into account the normal use of curtains
Ventilation heat loss, Cv = weighted average effective air change rate x 0.33 x
dwelling volume
Total heat loss Q t  = Ct +CV
Heat Loss Parameter, HLP (W/m2K) = Qt + total floor area
A x U
(W/K)
(26)
(27)
(30)
(31) 
(33) 
(33a)
(36)
(37)
(38)
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4. Weighted average water-heating energy 
requirement
Hot water energy requirement, HWER = mean household size x annual hot water 
demand x 45*
* assum es that cold water enters at 10C and is supplied to the hot water tap at 55C 
Distribution loss DL
Energy lost from hot water storage tank, HWSTL
Weighted solar input = solar fraction x proportion of dwellings with solar
Primary circuit loss, PCL
Output from water heater = HWER + DL +HWSTL + PCL- solar input 
Efficiency of water heater (%)
Energy required for water heating = [output from water heater x 100] + efficiency 
of water heater
Heat gains from water heating, W = {(0.25 x HWER) + [0.8 x (DL + HWSTL + PCL)]} 
x 31.71
(39)
(40) 
(43)
(47)
(48)
(49)
(50)
(51)
(52)
5. Weighted average internal gains
Lights, appliances, cooking and metabolic 
Heat gains from water heating
Total internal gains = Lights, appliances, cooking & metabolic gains + heat gains 
from water heating
Watts
(53)
(52)
(55)
6. Weighted average solar gains
For the solar gains calculations it is assum ed that all of the glazing on the ‘notional’ dwellings is 
orientated on the north and south face. The ratio of south to north glazing is defined as the ‘asymmetry’ 
Windows (m2)
Asymmetry 1.00
(56a)
(56b)
Orientation
North facing solar gains = area of glazing x 0.5 = 
South facing solar gains = area of glazing x 0.5 =
Area
(m 2)
Flux
(Table
A2.1)
Gains
(W)
Total gains from glazing = North facing gains + south facing gains 
Solar access factor (assum ed to be 1 for notional dwellings)
Solar gains = total gains from glazing x solar access factor 
Total gains, W = total internal gains + solar gains 
Gains/ loss ratio, GLR = total gains Qt 
Utilisation factor = 1-exp[-18 -5- GLR]
Useful gains = total gains x utilisation factor
1.00
(56c)
(60)
(64a)
(65)
(66)
(67)
(68)
(69)
(70)
7. Weighted average mean internal temperature
Mean internal temperature, Tjn (77)
8. Degree days
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Temperature rise from gains, A T free = Useful gains QT 
Temperature rise due to global warming, A Tgi0bai warming
B a s e  t e m p e r a t u r e  =  T ln -  A T free - A T gl0bal warming
Degree days DD (use box (79) and Table A2.2)
9. W eighted average sp ace-h ea tin g  en ergy  requirem ent
Energy requirement (useful) = 0.0000864 x DD x Qt 
Conventional heating s y s te m s  
Fraction of heat from secondary system  
Efficiency of main heating system , %
Efficiency of secondary heating system , %
Weighted average sp ace heating fuel, main = [1.0 -  (82)] x (81) x 100 ^ (83) 
Weighted average sp ace heating fuel, secondary = (82) x (81) x 100 + (84) 
Comm unity heating  
Overall system  efficiency 
Distribution loss factor (Table A2.3)
Space heating from district heating = [((81) x 100) ((82*) x (85*))] x proportion of
dwellings with community heating
GJ/year
100
(78a)
(78b)
(79)
(80)
(8 1 )
(82)
(83)
(84)
(85)
(86)
(82*)
(85*)
(87*)
10. W eighted average cook in g  en ergy requirem ent
Electric cooking 
Gas cooking
GJ/year
(88)
(89)
11. W eighted average lighting energy requirem ent
Lighting requirement
GJ/year
(90)
12. W eighted average appliance energy requirem ent
Consumer electronics 
Wet goods 
Cold goods 
Miscellaneous goods 
Electricity for MHVR
GJ/year
(91)
(92)
(93)
(94)
(95)
13. Total w eighted  average energy requirem ent per ‘notional’ dwelling
Space heating = (85) + (86) + (87*)
Water heating = (51)
Lights = (90)
Appliances = (91) + (92) + (93) + (94)
MVHR system  = (95)
GJ/year
(96)
(97)
(98)
(99)
(100)
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Cooking = (88) +(89)
Total = (96) + (97) + ...(101)
(101)
(102)
Table A 2 .1: Solar flux through glazing
Flux (W/m2)
North South
Single glazed 13 32
Double glazed (air or argon filled) 11 28
Triple glazed (air or argon filled) 10 25
Source: adapted from BRE 2001
Table A2.2: Degree days as a function of base temperature
Base temperature Degree days Base temperature Degree days
1.0 0 11.0 1140
1.5 30 11.5 1240
2.0 60 12.0 1345
2.5 95 12.5 4150
3.0 125 13.0 1560
3.5 150 13.5 1670
4.0 185 14.0 1780
4.5 220 14.5 1900
5.0 265 15.0 2015
5.5 310 15.5 2130
6.0 360 16.0 2250
6.5 420 16.5 2370
7.0 480 17.0 2490
7.5 550 17.5 2610
8.0 620 18.0 2730
8.5 695 18.5 2850
9.0 775 19.0 2970
9.5 860 19.5 3090
10.0 950 20.0 3210
10.5 1045 20.5 3330
Source: BRE & DETR 1998
Table A2.3: Distribution loss factor for group and community schemes
Heat distribution system Factor
Mains piping system installed in 1990 or earlier, not pre-insulated, medium or 
high temperature distribution (120 -  140°C), full flow system
1.20
Pre-insulated mains piping system installed in 1990 or earlier, low temperature 
distribution (100°C or below), full flow system
1.10
Modem high temperature system (up to 120°C), using pre-insulated mains 
installed in 1991 or later, variable flow system
1.10
Modern pre-insulated piping system operating at 100°C or below, full control 
system installed in 1991 or later, variable flow system
1.05
Source: BRE 2001
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Appendix 3: Summary of TF scenarios
These tables summarise input and output values from three scenarios: TF-BAU, TF- 
LowE and TF-HighE.
Table A3.1: Summary of TF-BAU scenario inputs
Pre-1996
1996
Pre-1996
2050
Post-1996
1997
Post-1996
2050
H ouseholds:
Total number of UK households (million) 24.010 22.260 0.243 9.184
Mean household size 2.4 2.0 2.4 2.0
Dwelling size: 
Floor area (m2) 
Volume (m )
85 83 76 83
212.5 207.5 174.8 190.9
Building fabric:
Wall U-value (W/m2K) 1.40 0.96 0.45 0.24
Ground floor U-value (W/m2K) 0.67 0.62 0.45 0.20
Roof U-value (W/m2K) 0.50 0.43 0.25 0.14
Glazing U-value (W/m2K) 4.04 1.62 3.30 1.61
Door U-value (W/m2K) 3.70 1.51 3.30 1.61
Air leakage rate (ac/h @ 50Pa) 13.1 12.4 11.7 5.4
Total dwelling heat loss (W/K) 287.7 194.0 144.9 80.7
Mean internal tem perature:
24 hour mean internal temperature 16.0 21.0 18.0 21.0
S p ace and water heating sy s te m s
Efficiency of primary space heating system  (%) 66.6 85.9 78.6 87.9
Efficiency of secondary space heating system  (%) 60.0 77.5 68.2 81.1
Efficiency of water heating system  (%) 71.7 87.2 79.9 87.2
Hot water usage per person (litres/day) 42.9 40.0 42.9 40.0
Lights, ap pliances and cook in g  (per dwelling):
Lighting consumption (kWh/year) 704 841 709 841
Cold appliance consumption (kWh/year) 728 301 725 301
Wet appliance consumption (kWh/year) 473 262 471 262
Consumer electronics consumption (kWh/year) 437 719 431 719
Miscellaneous appliances consumption (kWh/yr) 232 209 232 209
Gas cooking consumption (kWh/year) 347 277 343 277
Electric cooking consumption (kWh/year) 530 481 528 481
Table A3.2: Summary of TF-BAU outputs
UK dom estic sector, annual final energy (TWh)
Space
heating
Water
heating
Lights & 
appliances
Cooking Total
1996 354 125 62 21 561
2000 361 123 63 21 569
2010 449 117 70 21 657
2020 446 110 76 22 654
2030 375 102 79 23 579
2040 326 97 80 25 527
2050 267 89 77 25 459
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Table A3.3: Summary of TF-LowE scenario inputs
Pre-1996 Pre-1996 Post-1996 Post-1996
1996 2050 1997 2050
H ou seholds:
Total number of UK households (million) 24.010 19.700 0.243 1.985
Mean household size 2.4 2.9 2.4 2.9
Demolition rate (thousands / yr) 16.6 162 16.6 162
Dwelling size:
Floor area (m2) 85 80 76 76
Volume ( n r r ) 212.5 200 174.8 174.8
Building fabric:
All values as per TF-BAU
Mean internal tem perature:
24 hour mean internal temperature 16.0 16.0 18.0 16.0
S p a ce  and w ater heating sy stem s:
All values as per TF-BAU, except...
Hot water usage per person (litres/day) 42.9 20.0 42.9 20.0
Lights, ap p lian ces and cook in g  (per dwelling):
Lighting consumption (kWh/year) 704 421 709 421
Cold appliance consumption (kWh/year) 728 360 725 360
Wet appliance consumption (kWh/year) 473 131 471 131
Consumer electronics consumption (kWh/year) 437 151 431 151
Miscellaneous appliances consumption (kWh/yr) 232 104 232 104
G as cooking consumption (kWh/year) 347 139 343 139
Electric cooking consumption (kWh/year) 530 241 528 241
Table A3.4: Summary of TF-LowE outputs
UK dom estic sector, annual final energy (TWh)
Space
heating
Water
heating
Lights & 
appliances
Cooking Total
1996 354 125 62 21 561
2000 351 129 63 21 565
2010 271 109 61 20 460
2020 210 87 1 52 17 366
2030 166 66 43 J 14 289
2040 133 52 34 11 230
2050 102 40 25 8 175
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Table A3.5: Summary of TF-HighE scenario inputs
Pre-1996 Pre-1996 Post-1996 Post-1996
1996 2050 1997 2050
H ouseholds:
Total number of UK households (million) 24.010 23.121 0.243 11.800
Mean household size 2.4 1.8 2.4 1.8
Demolition rate (thousands / yr) 16.6 16.2 16.6 16.2
Dwelling size:
Floor area (m2) 85 80 76 76
Volume (m ) 212.5 200 174.8 174.8
Building fabric:
All values a s per TF-BAU
Mean internal tem perature:
24 hour mean internal temperature 16.0 23.0 18.0 23.0
S p ace  and w ater heating sy ste m s:
All values as per TF-BAU, except..
Hot water u sage per person (litres/day) 42.9 80.0 42.9 80.0
Lights, ap p lian ces and cook in g  (per dwelling):
Lighting consumption (kWh/year) 704 1682 709 1682
Cold appliance consumption (kWh/year) 728 1438 725 1438
Wet appliance consumption (kWh/year) 473 524 471 524
Consumer electronics consumption (kWh/year) 437 602 431 602
Miscellaneous appliances consumption (kWh/yr) 232 418 232 418
Gas cooking consumption (kWh/year) 347 554 343 554
Electric cooking consumption (kWh/year) 530 962 528 962
Table A3.6: Summary of TF-HighE outputs
UK dom estic sector, annual final energy (TWh)
Space
heating
Water
heating
Lights & 
appliances
Cooking Total
1996 354 125 62 21 561
2000 348 136 63 21 569
2010 1 347 139 77 25 587
2020 1 351 141 97 31 620
2030 352 141 118 38 649
2040 362 143 140 45 690
2050 338 144 163 53 699
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Appendix 4: Modelling solar water heating
Introduction
Johnston includes solar water heating (SWH) in the Demand Side scenario (DJ-DS)
• pre-1996 housing - by 2050 10% of dwellings have solar water heating
• post-1996 housing - from 2010 all dwellings to have solar water heating.
So, solar water heating is an important technology for reducing the use of fossil fuels. However, 
the way it is currently modelled could be improved, as described below.
Energy supplied per system
Johnston’s modelling of SWH is based on the concept of ‘solar fraction’ which can be 
confusing; it is usually used to indicate the percentage of hot water demand supplied by solar 
water heating. However, ‘hot water demand’ does not include the losses involved in heating hot 
water. A SWH providing a 70% solar fraction will not replace 70% of the energy used to 
produce hot water unless the non-solar hot water system is 100% efficient. Solar fraction is a 
concept used widely within the SWH industry -  possibly because of the ambiguity of the 
phrase.
Because of the way hot water demand is modelled by Johnston, a constant solar fraction results 
in the same SWH system delivering different amounts of energy over time. Hot water energy 
demand changes over time in the same way in all scenarios. It is based on a slowly reducing 
water demand per person, from 43 litres of hot water per day in 1996 to 40 litres per day by 
2050, multiplied by the number of people per household, which also decreases over time. In 
total, household hot water energy requirement reduces from 1961 kWh in 1996 to 1416 kWh in 
2050. Johnston assumed that a solar fraction of 70% would be achievable. This is not 
impossible, but the more generally quoted figure is that a SWH system can provide up to 50% 
of annual hot water needs (EST 2003). A SWH supplying a 70% solar fraction would deliver 
1370kWh in 1996 and 990k Wh in 2050. Because of this inconsistency, it seems preferable to 
model the contribution of SWH systems as a constant amount of energy, rather than as a 
fraction of hot water energy demand.
In order to determine how much energy an average SWH system can deliver, data on monitored 
systems and other expert opinion is described and analysed below. There do not appear to be 
any large-scale monitoring studies of solar hot water heating in the UK. The largest study 
identified monitored eight different solar water heaters under test conditions. The other two 
studies monitored three and seven homes with SWH installed (Table A4.1).
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Table A4.1. Summary of UK studies monitoring the performance of solar water heating
Study No. of
systems
monitored
Annual energy 
delivered (kWh)
Solar
fraction
Notes
ECD, Reading 
(Stewart 2000)
3 3 8 0 -5 8 0 57% * * Solar fraction defined 
as % total energy used 
to provide hot water 
(inc. losses).
IT Power, South 
Wales
(IT Power 2002)
7 not stated 60%
Martin & Watson 
Side-by-side testing 
(Martin & Watson 
2001)
8 9 6 0 -  1350 Systems monitored 
under test conditions
Of these studies, the most useful was the Martin and Watson (2001) study, both because the 
monitoring was very thorough and the results were reported in full detail. Eight different SWHs 
were set up at a test site, both flat plate and evacuated tube systems (the two major SWH 
technologies). The monitoring data, collected over six months, were extrapolated to give a total 
annual figure for energy delivered by each SWH, based on solar irradiation at Kew facing S at 
an elevation of 30 degrees and varying water input temperature throughout the year. In order to 
measure energy delivered, 150 litres of water was drawn off daily at 55°C. This was thought to 
represent the energy demand of a four person household. The draw-off pattern was varied 
between being all taken at once and taken throughout the day, to see what difference this might 
make.
The range of energy delivered annually from the systems was 960 to 1340 kWh for single run­
off and 1010 to 1350 kWh for a multiple run-off pattern. The energy delivered was relatively 
insensitive to the run-off pattern. The study also recorded the amount of electricity used by each 
system. Electricity consumption per system varied between 4 4 -1 0 9  kWh/yr. The values in this 
study were for systems which were facing south, thus producing the maximum amount of 
energy possible.
The Reading SWH systems delivered far less energy than those in the side-by-side trial. There 
were a number of odd things about the monitoring data:
• Although the houses had identical SWH systems, one supplied a third less energy than the 
other two.
• The energy supplied by the SWH systems was only half of that predicted (the prediction 
was for 1,100 kWh/year).
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• The houses have very low total water heating energy use -  meaning that despite modest 
energy output from the SWH systems, it was possible to report an energy contribution of 
greater than 50%.
It might be that the systems for monitoring hot water use, and partitioning energy use between 
space heating and water were not very accurate, and the data are incorrect. However, if the data 
are correct, then the results raise serious questions about the credibility of the savings the 
equipment suppliers predicted. The author had some correspondence with the people who had 
commissioned the research on the three Reading systems, but unfortunately, it proved not to be 
possible to resolve this issue.
It was not possible to get more detailed information on the monitoring carried out by IT Power, 
so it is not clear what their 60% solar fraction means in terms of kWh/year.
In addition to monitored data, there are a number of estimates of the amount of energy a SWH 
system will typically deliver:
• the Solar Trade Association (Solar Trade Association 2003) estimates that a solar water 
heating system in a typical household provides energy in the form of heated water of 
approximately l,000kW hto 1,500kWh per annum.
• ETSU (ETSU 1999) also estimated that for an average SWH system with a 3-4 m2 
collector, between 1000 and 1500kWh of energy will be produced per year.
Given experimental data and other research, it seems that a figure of 1,200 kWh/year energy 
delivered is not unrealistic for a SWH located on a south facing roof. However, not all SWH can 
be installed on south facing roofs which are not over-shaded, and so the expected contribution 
of solar water heating needs to be reduced to account for this. SWHs placed on east or west 
facing roofs are estimated to produce 15% less energy than those on south facing roofs (ESD 
2003), which would give a figure of 1020 kWh. The average figure used in the model (for the 
TF-BAU and TF-LowE scenarios) will be 1,100 kWh/year, which is realistic assuming that the 
systems installed will meet current best practice standards. In addition, based on the Martin and 
Watson study, it is also assumed that electricity consumption (to run the pumps etc.) will be at 
the low end of the current range at 50kWh/year.
Conclusions
The way that solar water heating energy is included in the model has been changed, from a solar 
fraction approach to a fixed contribution of 1,100kWh per SWH system. This does not greatly 
change the value which emerged from the 70% solar fraction used by Johnston (which varied
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from 1370kWh in 1996 to 990kWh). However, it does put the modelling on a more consistent 
basis.
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Appendix 5: Demolition rates, past and present
Introduction
This appendix estimates current demolition rates in England. It also looks at the history of 
demolition from the 1950s onwards — as well as giving good background understanding to the 
current situation. Looking to the past gives indicators of the boundaries of possibility for future 
demolition rates.
Demolition of housing can be divided into three categories:
• Publicly-funded demolition of private housing under slum clearance procedures;
• Privately-funded demolition of (largely) private housing;
• Demolition of local authority / social housing.
By far the most significant mechanism for demolition historically has been slum clearance, but 
now this has been overtaken by demolition of local authority housing.
Slum clearance demolition
Slum clearance demolition, which is funded by the government and administered by local 
authorities, deals with ‘unfit’ private housing ( ‘unfitness’ is legally defined). Although local 
authorities have had powers to clear slum housing since the late nineteenth century these were 
not used on a significant scale until the clearance drive of the nineteen thirties. In 1939 houses 
were being demolished at the rate of about 90,000 per year (English, Madigan, & Norman 
1976). After a fifteen year interruption caused by the Second World War the second clearance 
campaign reached its peak around 1970 at over 70,000 properties per annum (Figure A5.1). The 
demolition rate has declined dramatically from that time.
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Figure A5.1: Slum clearance: dwellings demolished or closed, England and Wales, 1955- 
2000
Sources: 1955-1975: English, Madigan, & Norman 1976 
1976-80: DoE, Scottish Developm ent Department, & Welsh Office 1981 
1981-90: DoE, Scottish Developm ent Department, & Welsh Office 1991 
1991-1997: DoE, Scottish Development Department, & Welsh Office 2000 
1998-2000: DTLR 2001b - England only
Commentators suggest that the shift away from large-scale demolition was not primarily related 
to the improved quality of the remaining housing stock. For example, Balchin and Rhoden 
(1998:221) state that the decline in slum clearance demolition evolved “largely as a 
consequence of the difficulties posed by large-scale clearance in terms of both political and 
financial implications.” English et al (1976:44) suggested the following factors: the 
unacceptable social consequences of clearance were stressed by politicians, reflecting the 
findings of much academic work; development of community opposition to many individual 
local schemes made the procedure less attractive to local officials; the then Conservative 
government policy encouraged alternatives to growing municipalisation of the housing stock.
Many things have changed in Britain since the last big slum clearance campaign in the 1970s. 
Currently 69% of the stock is owner occupied compared with 50% in 1971 (DTLR 2001b). 
National house condition surveys in 1967 and 1971 (quoted in English et al 1976:155) showed
2000
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that 73 /o of properties in potential slum clearance areas were owned by private landlords with 
the remainder being owner occupied. Thus, demolition was mainly of privately-rented, working 
class housing. Most people from slum clearance areas moved into council housing.
Privately-funded demolition
Demolition and rebuilding of housing (outside of the local authority stock) occurs on a minor 
scale without the need for government funding. Government research shows that this activity is 
concentrated in areas where there is a combination of houses in large plots and strong demand 
for flats (DETR 2000b). DETR estimate from the data available that redevelopment of private 
sector and housing association stock delivers a net gain of between 5,000 and 12,000 units per 
year and suggest it is likely that the actual rate is at the lower end of this scale. A reasonable 
estimate figure for the number of properties demolished might be quarter the number of new 
properties created, approximately 1,000 -  3,000.
Demolition of local authority stock
The number of English local authority dwellings demolished per year has increased through the 
1990s from 4,300 dwellings in 1991/92 to 16,200 in 2000/01 (DTLR 2001b). These official 
figures are an underestimate of actual numbers demolished, according to further government 
research (DETR 2000c). A postal survey collected information on properties which had been 
sold to the private sector prior to their demolition -  these demolitions are not included in the 
official figures. On this basis the estimate of local authority dwellings demolished in the six 
year period April 1991 to March 1997 was increased from the total (31,100) to around 40,000 
dwellings -  that is around 25% higher than previously thought.
Estimate of total curren t demolitions
Using government figures, including an estimate of privately-funded demolitions and increasing 
local authority demolitions as explained above, results in an estimate of 24,400 dwellings 
demolished in England in 2000/01 (Table A5.1).
Table A5.1: Estimated housing demolitions, England, 2000/01
Type of demolition Dwellings demolished Percentage
Slum clearance 1,700 7
Local authority 20,000 82
Privately funded 2,000 8
Change of use 500 2
Non-permanent dwelling loss 200 1
TOTAL 24,400 100
Source: DTLR 2002 with amendments as per text
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This is equivalent to demolishing around 0.1% of the English housing stock per annum, i.e. 
houses having to last 1000 years before replacement. At this rate of demolition, 94% of houses 
built by 2000 will still be standing in 2050. Rates of private housing demolition are much lower 
at 0.02%, implying these houses will have to last for 5000 years.
Future demolition rates
The life span of buildings is not simply, or even primarily, a technical issue; political, economic 
and social considerations are also important. In the case of housing, the rate of demolition has 
been largely determined by central and local government policy and has been funded by 
government. But, with a largely privately-owned housing stock, who takes responsibility for 
ensuring the appropriate level of demolition? Past and current evidence suggests the market will 
not encourage owners to undertake sufficient demolition to ensure that the stock is of a socially 
and environmentally desirable quality. If the rate of demolition is to increase it will either 
require a government funded programme, or a change to the housing market rules such that 
houses which are of very poor environmental quality, which cannot be sufficiently upgraded, 
are no longer saleable. Neither of these options seems at all likely at present. Presently, it seems 
the UK is likely to experience very low rates of demolition, particularly in the private sector, 
and an ageing housing stock, for many years to come.
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Appendix 6: Embodied energy in UK housing
This appendix explains the concept of embodied energy, presents data on the embodied energy 
in a typical UK house and discusses the reliability of the available data. The aim is to get an idea 
of the scale of embodied energy in a house compared with the running energy used over the life 
time of the house.
Embodied energy comprises all of the energy required to mine raw materials, to manufacture 
them into construction materials or components and to deliver and construct them on site. It is 
the energy which has ‘gone in with the bricks’ and cannot be recovered in the lifetime of the 
building (Sustainable Homes 1999). Energy used in house construction and demolition is often 
excluded from embodied energy figures, it is generally considered to be small. For example, 
Adalberth (1999) states that energy used in erection and demolition is around 1% of the total life 
cycle energy use of a house.
There are two basic approaches to embodied energy estimates for houses: bottom-up and top- 
down. The top-down method uses energy consumption figures in the construction industry (and 
its precursors) to estimate the amount of energy that is embodied in houses. The bottom-up 
method uses estimates of the amounts of materials used to make up a house and their typical 
embodied energy to come up with a total for the whole house. The bottom-up method is more 
detailed and is the one which is typically used. There are various methods to derive embodied 
energy coefficients of materials and these include process analysis, input-output analysis, 
statistical analysis and hybrid analysis. Process and input-output analysis have provided much 
of the available embodied energy data (Pullen 1996).
However, there are serious problems with embodied energy data, which can be inaccurate with 
wide variations in the data available for what is supposedly the same material. There are a 
number of factors that lead to variations in the data:
• data can be given in either primary or delivered energy, usually not stated which;
• different primary to delivered energy conversion ratios are used;
• energy for transport may or may not be included for the import of raw materials or delivery 
of final products;
• different product specifications are used;
• recycled materials can be accounted for differently, plus some allowance may be made for 
the future recyclability of the material;
• the same materials are made using different sources of fuel and different manufacturing 
processes;
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• older estimates tend to be higher as manufacturing processes become progressively more 
energy-efficient (Based on: Yohanis & Norton 2002).
There is little published information on the embodied energy of a typical UK house. The table 
below brings together various studies on the embodied energy of UK houses. These figures are 
for the houses themselves, not the possessions they contain. The embodied energy is compared 
per square metre where possible. Unfortunately embodied energy studies differ widely in the 
methodology adopted, which energy components are included and whether results are presented 
as primary or delivered energy, and the methodology is often not given in detail in the original 
source.
Table A6.1: UK figures for embodied energy in houses
House description Date Embodied 
energy 
(1000 kWh)
Embodied 
energy / m2 
(kWh/m2)
Reference
80m2 brick 1976 2 7 .8 -5 0 350 - 630 Gartner & Smith (1976)
Roaf energy 
efficient house
1996 2,580 Viljoen & Thompson 
(1996)
Five different 
types of housing 
including timber + 
brick, 90m2, 
detached
Late
1990s
190-340 2,110-4,250 Estimated from data in 
Smithdale & Thompson 
(1998)
100 m2 masonry 2000? 115 1,150 Strathclyde University 
(2002)
Current UK 
housing stock 
average
2000 180 1,800 Estimated from Rao et al. 
(2000) and Anderson & 
Howard (2000) -  for 
details see below
detached 3 
bedroom house
1998 138 Anderson, MSc Thesis 
unpublished, University of 
East London (pers comm.)
New house, 
detached, 160m2
2002 90 563 Brinkley (2002) His 
sources of information are 
not stated.
The figures per square metre vary by a factor of more than ten between the different studies. By 
far the most detailed work on the embodied energy of a house was published in 1976 by Gartner 
and Smith. However, their figures seem considerably lower than those of most other authors. 
Some of the more recent estimates are tending to higher totals, but this is not universally true, 
with Brinkley (2002) giving a low estimate of embodied energy per square metre. This variation 
makes it difficult to come to a consensus view of what the embodied energy in a UK house is, or 
how it might compare with the average annual energy use of a home.
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Rao et al (2000) and Anderson & Howard (2000) use a top down method to estimate the 
embodied energy in a new home. They suggest that between 1 and 3% of UK total energy is 
consumed in the products used to construct new houses. If, say, 2% of UK energy is used to 
build 180,000 homes, then the embodied in the typical new UK home would be around 220,000 
kWh (using DTI 2004a). This is equivalent to about ten years of energy in use for an average 
home (Shorrock and Utley 2003).
However, the conclusion from this brief review is that before a good estimate can be made of 
the importance of embodied energy in the lifetime energy costs of a house, more research is 
needed to untangle the many issues surrounding the understanding and use of embodied energy 
data.
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Appendix 7: Carbon audit form
When the carbon audit form below was distributed it was printed on two sides of paper.
Climate change and you
This questionnaire is designed to find out how carbon dioxide emissions vary between 
individuals. Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel energy use are the major cause of 
climate change and global warming. In the UK, half of all carbon dioxide comes from energy 
use in houses and from personal transport by air, train, car and bus.
For 2003, please try to estimate your personal energy use, using what information you have 
available. It is not important to be really accurate, just do the best you can and make estimates 
where necessary. Information from your questionnaire will be used anonymously and for 
research purposes only.
Please send completed form to: Tina Fawcett, 29 Stapleton Road, Headington, Oxford 0X3 
7LX, or email it to: t.fawcett@ucl.ac.uk. Any questions, please email me or phone 01865 
761697.
About you
Please state your occupation:
Would you like feedback on your responses? YES / NO 
If YES, your contact details (email / name + address):
Feedback will include an assessment of your carbon emissions, tips for reducing them and a 
comparison with the UK average. I will aim to supply this within four weeks.
Domestic energy use, 2003
You should be able to get energy use information from your household’s energy bills. If this 
isn’t possible, please estimate how much was spent on domestic energy in 2003. The important 
thing is you give an annual figure, not that it relates exactly to 1 Jan - 31 Dec 2003.
Gas users: gas usage is measured in different ways depending on your meter and company. The 
main options are kWh, cubic metres, 100s of cubic feet. If possible please report usage in kWh, 
or state which measurement unit you’re using - if this is difficult, please include the cost of your 
gas usage.
Energy use 2003 Units Energy cost 2003 
(optional)
Gas
Electricity kWh
Heating oil Litres / gallons
If you use any other fuels, e.g. solid fuel / paraffin and can estimate in terms of cost or weight / 
volume how much you use per year, please give that information here.
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How many people live in your household? Adults Children
(1 want to know this so I can calculate your personal share of the household’s domestic energy use)
Do you use off-peak electricity (Economy 7 / White Meter etc.) for heating or hot water? YES/ 
NO
Have you chosen a renewable electricity tariff? YES / NO
Personal transport energy use, 2003
C ar travel - you only need to fill this in if you are a driver. Distance travelled as a passenger is 
not counted in this survey. For cars over three years old, you can use consecutive MOT 
certificates to find out your annual mileage. For newer cars, you can use the mileometer.
Rail / bus / air - there is table below with distances of journeys within and outside the UK. If 
you don’t know how far you have travelled, particularly for long distance or air journeys, you 
can instead write down the routes you travelled last year and I’ll work it out.
Include travel to and from work/ college, but not travel that you undertake as part of your job. 
Please state whether you are giving distances in miles or kilometres!
Transport method Distance 
travelled 2003
Miles / 
km?
Route(s)
Car Petrol car (as driver) Miles/km
Diesel car (as driver) Miles/km
Rail Intercity Miles/km
Other services Miles/km
Underground Miles/km
Bus/coach London bus Miles/km
Other bus Miles/km
Inter-city coaches Miles/km
Air Within Europe Miles/km
Beyond Europe Miles/km
Is there anything else you want to tell me about your household energy use or travel?
Distances for journeys inside and outside UK - All distances are return from London
UK long distance km
London underground
km
Birmingham 386 Ealing Broadway/Victoria 16
Brighton 190 Edgware / Green Park 12
Cardiff 498 Mile End / Holborn 11
Edinburgh 1,334 Stratford / Marble Arch 6
Exeter 664
Manchester 656 A ir travel km
Newcastle 920 Athens 4,770
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York 682 Cape Town 19,100
Hong Kong 18,980
Com m uter journeys km Los Angeles 17,410
Chelmsford 100 Madrid 2,520
Guildford 90 Melbourne 34,020
Oxford 170 N ew  York 11,070
Tonbridge 90 Paris 690
Rome 3,140
Tokyo 19,300
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Appendix 8: An example of carbon audit feedback
When the carbon audit feedback below was distributed it was printed on two sides of paper.
Your Carbon Audit Feedback -  M r X
Tina Fawcett, University College London.
Email: t.fawcett@ucl.ac.uk. Phone: 01865 761697
Thank you!
Thank you very much for sending me the information for calculating your carbon dioxide 
emissions (‘carbon emissions’ for short). This brief document tells you what your personal 
emissions were in 2003, and shows you how this compares with the UK average. If after reading 
this you have any comments or follow-up questions, please feel free to get in touch and I’ll do 
my best to help.
Your emissions and national averages
I have used the energy information you sent me to calculate your personal carbon emissions in 
kilograms of carbon dioxide, kgC02. If you live with other people I have allocated you a share 
o f household carbon emissions (half if you are one of two people etc.). This figure is compared 
with UK average individual values calculated on the same basis.
Y our energy use and emissions, 2003
UK average
Category of energy 
use
Energy used / distance 
traveled
Your personal carbon 
emissions (kgC02)
Personal carbon 
emissions ( kgCO2)
Household gas 38,306 kWh 3,639 1,480
Household electricity 2,007 kWh 478 870
Car 15,373 k m /9,608 miles 3,075 1,060
Rail 442 km / 276 miles 48 100
Bus/coach 240 km /150 miles 41 90
Air 3,400 km / 2,100 miles 1,757 1,800
TOTAL 9,038 5,420
Comments on your carbon emissions
• Overall your emissions are 67% higher 
than the average person in the UK.
• Your household gas usage is about two 
and a half times the average, but 
electricity use is less than average. Your 
overall personal household emissions are 
75% higher than average.
• Your land transport was about two and a 
half times the average.
• Your air transport emissions were very 
similar to the national average.
W here do your em iss io n s  co m e from ?
Bus/coach
0%
Electricity
5%
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The estimate of your carbon emissions is not entirely accurate because:
• An average value of carbon emissions per mile/km for cars has been used and your car may 
be considerably more or less fuel efficient than average
Nevertheless it is a good guide to where your carbon emissions come from and how you 
compare with the UK average.
General pointers for living a low carbon life
Household energy use
There are many ways of saving household energy, some of which are free and other which 
require investment. Simple measures include turning down the central heating thermostat by one 
degree, which can save around 10% of your heating energy. Energy saving light bulbs only use 
one quarter as much energy as normal bulbs and last ten times as long. Often energy companies 
and shops have special offers making the energy saving bulbs very cheap.
Unfortunately, I can’t give you detailed advice on how to reduce your household carbon 
emissions, because I don’t have details about your lifestyle or the efficiency of your house and 
your heating systems. To get further advice on household energy you can contact your local 
Energy Advice Centre -  freephone number 0800 512 012. The advice centre can help you to 
complete a free ‘home energy check’ and then they will evaluate the efficiency of your home 
and guide you on making savings. They will also be able to advise you if there are any grants or 
discounts available in your area. Other good sources of advice will be your local city / district 
council and your energy company.
Travel on land
To reduce carbon emissions from travel on land the key advice is to make greater use of the zero 
emissions methods of travel -  walking and cycling. This will also be good for your health. 
Public transport is generally somewhat better than travelling by car. Emissions per person from 
intercity trains and long distance coaches are about half those of an average car, but, perhaps 
surprisingly, city buses outside London have similar emissions to cars. London buses have 
somewhat lower emissions because they have higher passenger numbers per bus. Obviously 
there can be big differences between the fuel efficiency of different cars -  and using a more 
efficient car will be cheaper as well more environmentally friendly.
Both using a lower energy method of travelling and trying to reduce the distance you travel are 
important for reducing carbon emissions. To alter your transport patterns you may first need to 
keep a travel diary and find out how and why you travel and where the opportunities are for 
change.
Travel by air
Air travel has particularly high associated carbon emissions, both because it is used to move 
long distances, and because emissions from aircraft in the higher atmosphere are three times 
more damaging than those emitted at ground level by other transport methods. For trips within 
the UK and to Europe there is the rail or coach alternative, which produce approximately one 
fifth of the emissions of a plane travelling the same distance. There is generally no alternative to 
air for long haul travel. If you are concerned about your carbon emissions and want to lower 
them, limiting your air travel should be a priority.
Why does reducing energy use and carbon emissions matter?
Carbon dioxide emissions from personal energy use (household energy and personal transport) 
make up one half of the UK’s energy-related contribution to climate change. According to the 
government’s chief scientist: “climate change is the most severe problem that we are facing 
today - more serious even than the threat o f terrorism”. Scientists agree that we are already 
seeing the effects of climate change in rising global temperatures, changing rainfall patterns, sea 
level rise and increased storminess. If we do not take action now to reduce our emissions, the
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consequences for ourselves and future generations will be serious at best and catastrophic at 
worst.
Sources for further information
www.est.co.uk / www.saveenergy.co.uk - government-backed web sites with lots of energy 
advice
www.guardian.co.uk/climatechange and www.newscientist.com/hottopics/climate -  both good 
sites for general information and news stories about climate change
“How we can save the planet” by Mayer Hillman (with Tina Fawcett), Penguin Books, 2004 
Finally, thank you again for your help with my research
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Appendix 9: Full details of carbon audits
Two tables of data are presented. The first (Table A9.1) presents the original data collected on 
energy use and transport patterns from the case study individuals. The second table (Table 
A9.2) gives calculated values of carbon emissions per individual by fuel / transport mode.
Table A9.1: Data on energy use and transport patterns
Code
P eop le
/hh
H ousehold  energy u se  
(kWh)
Transport (km)
Car
Rail Bus / coach Air
Gas
E lec­
tricity
Other
fuels Intercity Other
Under­
ground
London
bus
Other
bus
Inter­
city
coach
Within
Europe
Beyond
Europe
1 2 1,615 4,288 128 5,440
2 6 32,063 4,474 2,406 160 1,280 2,00C)
3 2 14,441 1,709 5,972 450 270 7,650
4 2 14,441 1,709 4,685 3,502 300 850
5 1 0 4,800 3,000 500 1,000 1,200
6 2 33,557 3,370 R 1,600 400 100 1,200 100 10
T 2 20,733 1,779 R 3,456 320 912 4,160
8 2 24,233 5,348 1,472 80 19 6 2,200
9 1 9,801 1,464
10 kg 
Coal 14,400
10 2 13,656 8,612
16,000
D 128 1,658
11 2 26,434 1,760 288
12 3 16,000 1,200 R 2,000 500 200 5,100 10,000
13 1 9,882 1,662 9,600 1,920 16 4,186
14 1 5,987 1,261 8,000 544 3,840 5,200
15 2 24,233 5,348 11,658 80 19 6 2,200
16 1 211 7,660 16,694 240 1,034
17 2 7,733 2,230 13,894 320 480 160 7,290
18 1 7,040 1,747 14,400 80 1,300 7,469
1^ 1 20,958 3,000 R 3,200 200 50 6,900
20 2 14,813 1,895 1,800 75 65 400 19,300
21 2 38,306 2,007 15,373 432 10 240 3,446
22 3 31,346 7,486 1,600 26,400 6,504
23 2 8,208
2581 litr 
es oil, 
200kg 
coal 19,573
24 4 15,629 6,125 18,400 800 80 9,000
25 1 3,278 656 1,500 50 1,800 5,500 15,944
26 5 21,466 5,121 9,600 2,176 256 5,760 11,600
27 2 10,660 5,324 1,632 25 1,440 15,360
28 1 21,524 1,580 7,200 912 416 1,632 3,000 12,100
29 3 42,315
13,000
R 14,400 800 160 3,000 19,100
30 2 10,834 3,279 12,800 112 16 112 19,200 !
31 1 36,256 4,377 14,400 1,360 61 20 3 19 4,000 12,608
32 2 14,668 1,441 144 5,706 11,328 56,902
R = renewable electricity tariff, D = diesel car (otherwise petrol)
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Table A9.2: Individual carbon emissions by household energy fuel and transport mode, kgC
Code
Individ ual carbon em issions (kaC)
Household energy use Trans port mode
TOTALGas Electricity Other Car Rail Bus/Coach Air
1 42 279 4 252 577
2 277 97 75 59 278 787
3 374 111 179 190 855
4 374 111 256 105 32 878
5 624 90 45 167 926
6 869 0 (R) 87 39 3 999
7 537 0 (R) 118 42 579 1,276
8 628 348 80 4 306 1,366
9 508 190 2 785 1,485
10 354 560 611 6 36 1,566
11 1,718 88 1,806
12 276 0 (R) 70 116 1,391 1,853
13 512 216 524 58 1 582 1,892
14 310 164 436 12 988 1,910
15 628 348 636 4 306 1,921
16 11 996 911 5 144 2,066
17 200 145 758 10 26 1,014 2,152
18 365 227 785 2 833 2,212
19 1,086 0 (R) 175 4 1 960 2,225
20 384 123 55 2 1,740 2,304
21 992 130 839 13 11 479 2,465
22 541 324 87 792 905 2,650
23 534 1065 1,068 2,666
24 202 199 1,004 26 1,252 2,683
25 426 86 44 2,156 2,713
26 222 133 524 65 12 1,814 2,770
27 276 346 49 6? 2,136 2,875
28 1,115 205 393 27 55 1,473 3,269
29 731 0 (R) 785 27 2,084 3,628
30 281 213 698 5 5 2,671 3,873
31 1,879 569 785 44 1 1,657 4,935
32 380 94 4 124 6,542 7,144
R = renewable electricity tariff
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Appendix 10 -  Household expenditure on energy
All the data in these tables come from the Expenditure and Food Survey 2002/03 (ONS 2003a).
Table A 10.1 demonstrates that household expenditure on both motor fuels and domestic fuels 
increases with household income decile.
A 10.1: Weekly expenditure on motor fuels and domestic energy, by income decile, 
2002/03
Houshold
income
decile
Expenditure per week per lousehold (£)
Person/hh
Motor
fuels Electricity Gas
Other
domestic
fuels
All
domestic
fuels
1 3.00 4.20 3.10 0.40 7.70 1.3
2 4.30 4.70 3.90 0.80 9.40 1.7
3 6.50 5.10 4.20 0.60 9.90 1.9
4 10.70 5.40 4.70 0.70 10.80 2.2
5 12.30 5.70 4.70 0.60 11.00 2.4
6 15.60 5.90 5.50 0.60 12.00 2.5
7 18.20 6.10 5.40 0.90 12.40 2.8
8 22.30 6.30 5.90 1.10 13.30 2.8
9 26.60 6.80 6.30 0.80 13.90 3.0
10 28.80 7.70 7.60 1.30 16.60 3.2
Table A 10.2 demonstrates that individual expenditure on domestic energy is higher for those in 
lower income deciles than it is for those with higher incomes. It also shows that the percentage 
of income spent on domestic energy is highest for low income households -  almost three times 
the percentage spent by decile 10 households. Conversely expenditure on motor fuels as of a 
percentage of the total rises with income decile.
A10. 2: Individual expenditure on motor fuels and domestic energy by income decile, 
2002/03
Household
incom e
decile
Individual w eekly expenditure 2002/03 (£) M otor fuel 
as % of  
total
Dom estic  
energy as 
% o f  totalM otor fuels
D om estic
energy All expenditure
1 2.31 5.92 106.00 2.2 5.6
2 2.53 5.53 98.40 2.6 5.6
3 3.42 5.21 114.40 3.0 4.6
4 4.86 4.91 134.80 3.6 3.6
5 5.13 4.58 140.80 3.6 3.3
6 6.24 4.80 157.40 4.0 3.0
7 6.50 4.43 161.60 4.0 2.7
8 7.96 4.75 192.20 4.1 2.5
9 8.87 4.63 213.60 4.2 2.2
10 9.00 5.19 274.40 3.3 1.9
261
Appendix 11: Lists of questions and comments raised 
at different meetings
All presentations except the first were carried out in conjunction with Dr Mayer Hillman. The 
names of questioners are noted where possible.
European Council for an Energy Efficient Economy, Summer Study 2003, 6 July 2003
Questions after presentation
Lloyd Harrison -  what about the rest of the energy, how will that be controlled? Also, 
possibilities for cheating with, for example, business cars being used for personal travel.
Maarten Wolsink -  difficulty of equity between countries. Can C&C ever really work given the 
huge drop in consumption people in the US would have to achieve? Different levels of 
reduction would be seen as unfair.
Woman from WWF -  C&C is not the most promising basis for future negotiations. It is not 
being used in the current attempts to get the USA and Australia back on board with Kyoto. Even 
the NGOs have not agreed between themselves that C&C is the right position.
Paolo Bertoldi (European Commission) -  this focus on carbon would not deal with the problem 
of nuclear energy. Under such a scheme nuclear would be favoured. It also ignores other aspects 
of sustainability and thus is too narrow in focus.
Francois Moisan (ADEME) -  there is more than one definition of equity, giving equal carbon 
emissions quotas to everyone is not the only option. Economists have looked at other concepts 
of equity.
Jorgen Norgard -  social equity could also be achieved by imposing high carbon taxes with 
rebates for the poor. This would be a much simpler scheme than introducing carbon rationing.
Steve Nadel (ACEEE)- what sort of exceptions to the rule of equal rations for all?
Neil ? (EST) -  if this is going to be introduced, it would be a good idea to set the ration at a high 
level initially to make it acceptable to people.
Questions suggested bv Heather Lovell (University of Cambridge PhD student)
• How would enforcement work?
• How would the system be administered?
• Who would be the people getting additional carbon rations, and why?
• Political will -  is this feasible?
• Growth in population -  how will this be handled under the rationing scheme?
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• The balance between individual and institutional responsibility -  this scheme gives all the
responsibility to individuals, is that fair and can it be effective?
Comments made in seminar session about carbon rationing
• The individual responsibility entailed under this scheme fits with general changes in 
society towards individualisation of consumption.
• Rationing is a problematic name.
• Two questions can be separated: 1 - how could we get carbon rationing introduced?, 2 - 
would it work once implemented? Unless the answer to the second question is yes, there 
is little point in thinking about the first, so we need to answer the second question 
initially.
• The first step is for people to understand their own carbon footprint.
• Carbon is already going to be included on electricity bills under the new EU directive -  
this is a good start.
• Would the scheme have to be on a national or international scale? Which? Would it 
make any sense at a regional scale?
• The main objection seemed to be in terms of possible drop in GDP (or real economic 
progress indicator of choice). Thus to promote the idea it would be important to show 
that GDP would not necessarily be threatened.
• Developing countries do not necessarily consider themselves to be more vulnerable to 
climate change. The Indian argument is that climate change will be easier to cope with 
in their country where people are used to suffering, than it will be in the developed 
world.
• An alternative to carbon rationing (or massive carbon taxation) would be coping with 
climate change. In the short term this might be a more popular option.
• What would it take to get to the point where we make a decision between carbon 
rationing and carbon taxation?
• What will happen to the price of energy under this scheme -  and does it matter?
• There should be more development of ESCOs under rationing -  a good benefit.
Seminar attendees’ advice on what research to do next:
• Show that rationing won’t change GDP too much (qualitative arguments initially, then
find a friendly economist to do the quantitative work)
• Look at areas of the economy that would benefit, e.g. for the UK, domestic tourism
• Must mention business and the economy when making the argument, even if you don’t 
know what exactly you’re proposing for them it is important to say something. Work 
out what this something is.
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• Indicate what the world might look like under rationing -  what would a family have to 
do to live within their ration, 5, 10, 20 years down the line?
• Identify other benefits of rationing, e.g. more ESCOs, less fuel poverty, etc.
• Look harder at EHCS energy and income data. Peter lies thought BRE would be able to 
help with more data on this if necessary.
The Vaults, Oxford, 3 June 2004
• What is the future role of nuclear power?
• We already give power over to non-democratic decision-making bodies (e.g. EU has 
power over fisheries policy), so having a non-democratic institution bringing in carbon 
rationing could be possible.
• How will you persuade the government that they should take the actions you suggest?
• Carbon rationing doesn’t fit with current political culture. It may well not be possible to 
get political consensus on this, because carbon rationing affects distribution of 
economic resources, which is at the heart of political difference.
• We can have a high standard of living without fossil fuel consumption. What we need is 
smaller-scale lifestyles in harmony with the earth.
• How can the threat of climate change be communicated to people without simply 
making them fearful?
• The government has strong links with the oil companies. How can individuals do 
anything given the power of corporate interests which are operating in the opposite 
direction?
• People are currently in denial about the importance of climate change, and persuading 
them otherwise will have to be a gradual process.
• How about banding electricity prices to penalise higher usage?
• Are there any other good examples of planned social change on this scale?
• What we need is a route map, telling us how we’re going to get from where we are now 
to carbon rationing. Is more personal responsibility the first stage? What about the role 
of advertising and education?
Royal Institution, London, 14 June 2004
• What kind of society would it be if we have climate change and carbon rationing? What 
would our jobs be, how would we travel, what would our homes look like?
• Are you anti-development? Everyone should have opportunities to travel and develop 
their economies as we do in the west.
• It’s not the planet that needs saving, it’s our species’ survival on the planet that is in 
question.
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• The politics of carbon rationing seems very difficult. It’s not possible to tell people 
there will be less jam tomorrow, you need instead to persuade them that it will be 
different jam. It is necessary to be descriptive of a better future.
• 1 don’t believe in climate change, all the changes we have seen are natural.
• What political system could introduce carbon rationing? Can democracy survive?
• It will be very difficult to persuade the electorate to push for carbon rationing. Instead 
one should concentrate on educating the children, who will be the main sufferers, and 
get them to push for change.
• By the time we’re really suffering from climate change, it’ll be too late to do anything 
about it.
• Supermarket lorries are responsible for 40% of freight traffic- perhaps what we need are 
fewer choices of butter and fewer lorries.
• What we need is a single issue political party to push this issue forward.
• The role of big business is very important. They are increasingly dictating the agenda of 
government especially in the USA.
• If people are sceptical about the evidence on climate change (as one audience member 
was) they have to be very certain of their case, if they’re wrong and persuade people 
they’re right they will have blood on their hands.
• We need to be more imaginative about the political process - people need to move away 
from the consumer mindset.
• The redistributive aspect of carbon rationing will give poorer people more money and 
encourage the local economy to flourish.
• If carbon rations become a valuable commodity, what is there to prevent carbon wars 
breaking out in future?
• It is wrong to dismiss the possibilities of technology. The effort needed to implement a 
technology fix would be far less than altering the whole social and economic structure 
as called for by carbon rationing.
• Sometimes it seems that we’d do anything, even die, for our children and grandchildren, 
except turn the thermostat down.
• C&C and carbon rationing is not about redistribution, it’s pre-distribution of what we 
need to do to save our children (Aubrey Meyer).
House of Commons, 15 June 2004
• There is no constitutional system available for implementing C&C - no institutions. 
(Richard Lamming)
• We need to start planning now for the next 30 years - is this happening anywhere? 
(Ross King, Brunei / Middlesex Uni)
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• What we need to realise is that the eco-efficiency of quality of life is much more 
important and powerful than eco-efficiency alone. (Roger Levett)
• Need to bring concerns about climate change together with the understanding of what is 
currently happening to energy supplies. (David Fleming)
• We need also to consider the climate change aspects of material use (as well as energy 
use).
• What is the future role for nuclear energy?
• What would be the scale of resource transfer from North to South under C&C?
Meeting hosted by IPPR, 8 July 2004
• C&C is an attractive idea -  but governments can’t be forced to accept it.
• Some studies have show it should be possible to achieve radical cuts in C02 emissions with 
barely a dent in GDP. Would this be either good or possible?
• Would developing countries accept a cap on their emissions or aspirations?
• Why weren’t markets mentioned in the talk -  the solution to climate change will have to be 
market-led.
• Climate change could be seen as an opportunity. It gives the chance to replace the current 
energy infrastructure and energy systems. Climate change offers a chance to make things 
better.
• Need to tackle the short term issues in policy as well as the long term issues such as climate 
change.
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Appendix 12: A strategy for further investigation of 
carbon rations
This appendix sets out, in more detail than Chapter 7, how further investigations of individual 
carbon emissions and the effects of rationing could proceed.
Developing the methodology for calculating individual carbon emissions
This thesis used a deliberately simplified methodology with which to estimate individual carbon 
emissions. However, to get more precise information on individual carbon emissions it would 
be necessary to develop the methodology further. A number of questions would have to be 
decided:
• Whether respondents need to keep travel diaries, and if so for how long
• How to accurately capture data on annual air travel
• How to include people who move house during the previous year, or who don’t have a 
record of annual energy bills
• How to involve children
• What to do about using actual carbon emissions figures for cars, where available, and 
what figures to use when they are not available
• Whether to try to include carbon emissions for car passengers as well as car drivers
• Including travel via taxis, motorcycles and mopeds
• Generating very clear guidelines about the difference between personal and business 
travel
• Creating guidelines from how to determine household energy use where people work 
from home
• Do further research on Hillman’s initial figures for the carbon emissions from travel by 
sea
• How and whether travel in foreign countries, e.g. by train, car or bus, is to be included.
How some of these issues are addressed will also depends on the mechanism for collecting the 
data and how accurate the results need to be.
Large-scale survey of current individual carbon emissions
Chapter 6 presented pilot data on individual carbon emissions. However, a much better 
understanding of the variations in carbon emissions between individuals and households would 
be essential before carbon rationing could be introduced. There are existing government surveys 
which cover some of the activities which lead to personal carbon emissions. Presently, data on
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household and personal transport energy use is collected by different government departments — 
with ODPM (the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister) taking responsibility for housing surveys 
and Department for Transport commissioning national travel surveys. Domestic energy use is 
recorded for the whole household, because energy use is shared across all members of the 
household and an allocation to the different individuals in the household would make little sense 
for most purposes. The key household energy studies have been the English House Condition 
Energy Surveys (e.g. (DETR 2000). Travel data is recorded via the National Travel Survey, 
which provides information on personal travel and changes in travel patterns over time in Great 
Britain (DfT 2004). This does not include international travel. Travel abroad is monitored by the 
International Passenger Survey, a survey of a random sample of passengers entering and leaving 
the UK by air, sea or the Channel Tunnel, which is run by the Office for National Statistics 
(ONS 2003).
The carbon emissions survey would need to cover the whole of the UK, not just England or 
Great Britain, as is the case with existing energy surveys. The National Travel Survey as the 
basis for a carbon emissions survey has some advantages because it already asks for travel 
diaries and includes children in its sample. However, adding questions about international travel 
in the previous year, and including household energy use questions would add to the complexity 
of the survey. Whether it would be better to have a completely new survey, or to adapt one of 
the existing ones is a practical and administrative question which those managing the current 
surveys are best placed to answer.
It would also be worthwhile beginning a longitudinal sample, showing how the same people’s 
emissions change over time. In addition, it might be possible to do a retrospective longitudinal 
study for a few years into the past with people who have kept energy bills and MOT certificates 
for cars. This is unlikely to be as accurate as a contemporaneous study, but it could give useful 
early insights into the variability of personal carbon emissions over time.
The data from a nationally-representative survey would be used to advance the understanding of 
carbon emissions from different groups within society. Some of the topics which could be 
investigated with such data are:
• Determine the position of potentially disadvantaged groups under carbon rationing, e.g. 
one-person households, people living in rural areas
• Discover whether people’s emissions can be fitted into characteristic patterns, for which 
different advice on carbon reduction possibilities would be required.
• One of the key questions is what ration children would be given. The data from the 
national questionnaire should help elucidate this For example, it might be that 
graduated rations at different ages, say for 0-5, 6-10, and 11-15 and then children of 16+
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receiving an adult ration — but this would depend on what difference children make to 
household energy and travel patterns.
Current work on carbon audits
The author is aware of two possible projects which are aiming to use carbon audits as a starting 
point for working with householders to reduce their carbon emissions and other environmental 
impacts (NEF 2004, Marshall 2004). In addition, Anderson and Starkey are planning to carry 
out some similar work with individuals using DTQs as a basis (2004). This is clearly 
worthwhile research, although, attempting to reduce one’s personal carbon emissions in today’s 
world will be a very different experience than attempting the same in a world where carbon 
rations were mandatory and social and economic infrastructures were oriented towards carbon 
saving.
Household energy use by single householders
Independently of further research on carbon emissions, research should be carried out to 
understand in more detail the domestic energy consumption of one-person households. Is this 
chiefly a function of the house size, i.e. are their houses about the same size as those of multi­
person households, or is it because of their energy ‘fixed costs’ cannot be shared across several 
people? In addition, how much variation does the national average figure hide? It might be 
possible to do some of this research using the full database from the most recent EHCS Energy 
Survey (DETR 2000).
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